264 Conn. 829 | Conn. | 2003
Opinion
In these two consolidated appeals, the plaintiff, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, appeals from the trial court’s decision granting the motion of the defendant, Ronald Harrison, to dismiss the plaintiffs trespass action, and the defendant cross appeals and the proposed intervenor, the Schaghticoke Indian Tribe, appeals, both from the trial court’s decision denying the proposed intervenor’s motion to intervene. We reverse both the trial court’s granting of the motion to dismiss and its denial of the motion to intervene.
The Schaghticoke are a state-recognized tribe of Indians who possess a state-recognized reservation in Kent.
I
We first consider the plaintiffs appeal challenging the trial court’s granting of the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff maintains that the facts alleged in its complaint were sufficient to demonstrate standing and that those facts should have been construed most favorably to the plaintiff. In the alternative, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motion to dismiss. We agree with the plaintiffs alternative argument.
“ ‘If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.’ ” Ramos v. Vernon, 254 Conn. 799, 808, 761 A.2d 705 (2000). “[T]he standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to demonstrate two facts. First, the complaining party must be a proper party to request adjudication of the issues. . . . Second, the person or persons who prosecute the claim on behalf of the complaining party must have authority to represent the party.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, 231 Conn. 563, 571, 651 A.2d 1246 (1995). “To demonstrate authority to sue ... it is not enough for a party merely to show a ‘colorable claim’ to such authority. Rather, the
In the present case, the defendant challenged the plaintiffs authority to bring an action on behalf of the Schaghticoke tribe,
The defendant asserts several alternate grounds for affirmance of the court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs action. The defendant maintains that, in the present case, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hold such an evidentiary hearing or to determine whether the plaintiff is in fact the Schaghticoke tribe
The defendant claims that “[a] determination of the tribal status of [the plaintiff] and [the proposed intervenor] is required prior to proceeding” in the present case. Noting the plaintiffs petition for federal recognition pending with the bureau, the defendant claims that “the determination of tribal status is a prerequisite to determining the merits of the plaintiffs complaint, and tribal status is also at the heart of the federal proceedings. The plaintiffs claims are contingent upon the resolution of that very issue, and are not ripe.” The defendant makes no other assertion regarding the status of the plaintiffs petition for federal recognition and, therefore, takes the position that the mere fact that such a petition is pending, standing alone, deprives the trial court of jurisdiction.
The defendant cites only one case in support of his claim that the present case is not ripe. Golden Hill
The plaintiff in the present case has not brought suit under any law requiring that it be a federally recognized tribe, however, but instead has brought a state common-law trespass action to protect the interests of the Schaghticoke tribe in the reservation assigned to it under § 47-63. Therefore, if the plaintiff can establish that it is authorized to bring this action on behalf of the Schaghticoke tribe, the plaintiff has standing whether its petition for federal recognition is granted,
The defendant further asserts that “[t]he question of ripeness in the present case also involves an understanding of the interrelated doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction as well as concerns over federal preemption.” Those doctrines, however, did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hold an evidentiary hearing in the present case to determine if this action has been properly authorized by the Schaghticoke tribe. The plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendant from removing trees from, or making other alterations to, land on the reservation. The granting by the bureau of the plaintiffs petition for federal recognition would not provide the remedy sought by the plaintiff in this action, and, as previously explained, federal recognition is not a prerequisite for the granting of that remedy. Consequently, the alleged failure by the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before the bureau did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Similarly, while the bureau has the authority to determine which, if any, Schaghticoke group will be granted federal recognition, it does not have primary jurisdiction over the issue of whether the plaintiff is in fact the tribe already recognized by the state.
We next consider the defendant’s claim that “[arguably, the federal government has preempted the field of determination of tribal status of Native American groups” because “[p]ursuant to [Congressional] authorization, in 1978 the [bureau] promulgated procedures for American Indian tribes to be federally recognized.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the defendant asserts that federal recognition of some tribes precludes state recognition of additional tribes not recognized by the federal
We conclude that the fact that the plaintiff has petitioned the bureau for federal recognition does not, by itself,
Finally, the defendant maintains that the trial court’s dismissal of the action should be affirmed because the plaintiff has failed to allege facts that constitute ele
II
We next consider the claim of the proposed intervenor that the trial court improperly denied its motion to intervene.
“The decision whether to grant a motion for the addition of a party to pending legal proceedings rests generally in the sound discretion of the trial court. ... It must be kept in mind, however, that the rules of inter
In its memorandum in support of its motion to intervene, the proposed intervenor alleged that it, not the plaintiff, is the Schaghticoke tribe referred to in § 47-63, that it therefore had the authority under that statute to control the reservation, and that all reservation residents were members of the proposed intervenor. These claims, if true, establish that the proposed intervenor has a direct and immediate interest that would be impaired by a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, because a judgment in favor of the plaintiff necessarily would require a finding that the plaintiff has property rights in the reservation that the proposed intervenor claims the right to control. Therefore, the trial court improperly denied the proposed intervenor’s motion to intervene.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes § 47-63 provides in relevant part: “The following terms as used in this chapter, shall have the following meanings: ‘Indian’ means a person who is a member of any of the following tribes [including] . . . Schaghticoke . . . ‘reservation’ means [inter alia] . . . the Schaghticoke reservation in the town of Kent, assigned to the Schaghticoke tribe . . .
As previously noted, the proposed intervenor also tiled a motion challenging the plaintiffs authority to bring an action on behalf of the tribe, but the trial court did not rule on that motion to dismiss.
The defendant asserts in his brief that “[a] determination of the tribal status of [the plaintiff] and [the proposed intervenor] is required prior to proceeding with any lawsuit involving [the plaintiffs] claims to any authority over [the] reservation. The federal proceedings currently [underway], involving both the Federal District Court for the District of Connecticut, and the [bureau], Branch of Acknowledgement and Research are addressing these very issues.” (Emphasis added.) The defendant does not explain why any ongoing federal court action might deprive the trial court of the authority to determine whether the plaintiff is the “Schaghticoke” tribe under § 47-63. Indeed, the only authority cited by the defendant in support for his claim that any pending federal action might prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court is a case that held that the District Court for the District of Connecticut should defer any determination of whether a plaintiff was a “tribe” under federal law while that issue was under consideration by the bureau. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1994). We conclude that the defendant has failed to provide any basis for the conclusion that any pending federal court case prevents the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.
As the defendant has noted, if, on remand, the trial court determines that either the plaintiff or the proposed inteivenor is the “Schaghticoke” tribe referred to in § 47-63, the bureau may nonetheless decide that the other faction, and only the other faction, shall be granted federal recognition as a tribe. It is also possible, however, that the bureau will grant federal recognition to the group found by the trial court to be the state-recognized tribe, that it will recognize both groups as a single tribe of uncertain leadership, that it will recognize the groups as two distinct, though historically related, tribes, or that it will recognize neither group as a tribe. Moreover, the defendant has provided no authority for the proposition that the granting of federal recognition to a group of Schaghticoke Indians not previously recognized as a tribe by the state would be in conflict with the continued recognition by the state of a different and additional group of Schaghticoke Indians under § 47-63. We conclude that, in light of the present state of the record in this case, any difficulties that might result from the possible future recognition by the state and federal governments of different Schaghticoke groups are too speculative to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine standing in the present case.
The proposed intervenor moved to intervene as of right, but requested permissive intervention in the alternative. “Connecticut procedure has not always clearly defined the distinction between permissive intervention and intervention as of right . . . .” (Citation omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 60 Conn. App. 134, 138, 758 A.2d 916 (2000). We find it unnecessary to draw such a distinction in the present case.
We also note that the trial court should not have ruled on the motion to intervene at all. The motion to intervene and the motion to dismiss were filed on the same day. Once the question of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, “cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). Thus, if the court ruled on the motion to intervene before the motion to dismiss, it violated the “jurisdiction first” rule; if the court ruled on the motion to dismiss first, determining that it lacked jurisdiction over the case, then it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion to intervene. Nonetheless, we address the question, in the interest of judicial economy, because it will necessarily arise on remand.