132 N.W. 645 | N.D. | 1911
Lead Opinion
This is an application to this court coming after appeal from the district court of Nelson comity that a supersedeas bond staying execution, issued under § 7212, Code of 1905, bo vacated, and that in lieu thereof a supersedeas bond be required under § 7209. In the district court plaintiff recovered a judgment for $4,197 and interest as a balance due plaintiff from defendant for certain lands sold by him to defendant. The action ivas brought to obtain said judgment, have it bé 'declared a vendor’s lien upon the land so sold, and that such lien be foreclosed. Following the relief sought in equity, the following judgment.was entered: “It is now' in conformity with the proceedings had in said action and on motion therein, ordered, adjudged, determined, and decreed, as follows: (1) That the said plaintiff do have and recover of and from the- said defendant, Pontus Olson, the stun of $4,197.20, being the principal amount sued for herein, and the additional sum of $330.52, interest thereon, and the further sum of $34.20, costs and disbursements of said action as taxed by the clerk, making a total judgment, in favor of said plaintiff and against the said defendant of $4,561.92. (2) That the plaintiff has a lien as vendor herein upon and against the lands described in the complaint in this action, for the security and satisfaction of the particular indebtedness existing between said plaintiff and the said defendant, Pontus Olson, and as hereinbe
Thereafter the district judge, who ordered the entry of the judgment, approved a surety bond containing one provision for costs on appeal in the amount of $250 and a provision thereof under §§ 7212 and 7215, lievised Codes 11)05, providing that that portion of said undertaking in the sum of $1,000 against the commission of waste on said premises and for the use; and occupancy of the property covered by tbo lien pending- appeal should stay tbo execution of the judgment and decree as a supersedeas bond on appeal from said judgment to this court. To the approval of this bond had upon notice, plaintiff and respondent, Schafer, duly excepted, demanding that before the execution he stayed defendant furnish a suitable bond under § 7209, Code of 1905, to at least the amount, of the judgment appealed from, conditioned that said judgment or such portion thereof as ivas affirmed on appeal would be paid. The respondent’s request was denied, and tbe bend for wash and for use and occupancy of the premises held suffi
Involved in the solution of the question presented are the following provisions of the Code of 1905, contained in §§ 7209, 7212, 7213, and 7215.
Section 7209 provides: “If the appeal is from a judgment directing the payment of money it shall not stay the execution of a judgment unless an undertaking is executed on the part of the appellant by at least two sureties to the effect that if the judgment appealed from or any part thereof is affirmed, the appellant will pay the amount directed to be paid by the judgment or the part of such amount as to which the judgment shall be affirmed, if it is affirmed only in part, and all damages which shall be awarded against the appellant on appeal.” Respondent urges that this judgment is one directing the payment of money and not to be stayed except the provisions of the above section be complied with.
Section 7212 is as follows: “If the judgment appealed from directs the sale or delivery of real property, except in actions for foreclosure of mortgages, the execution of the same shall not be stayed unless an undertaking is executed on the part of the appellant by at least two sureties in such sum as the court or presiding judge thereof shall direct, to the effect that during the possession of such property by the appellant he will not commit nor suffer to be committed any waste thereon, and that if the judgment is affirmed he will pay the value of the use and occupancy of the property from the time of the appeal until the delivery of possession thereof pursuant to the judgment.”
Section 7213: “To Stay Mortgage Sale. If the judgment appealed from directs the sale of mortgaged premises the execution thereof shall not bo stayed by the appeal unless an undertaking is executed on the part of appellant by at least two sureties conditioned for the payment of any deficiency as shall arise on said sale, not exceeding such sum as shall be fixed by the court or presiding judge thereof to be specified in the undertaking, and all costs and damages which may be awarded to the respondent on such appeal.”
Section 7215: “Other Judgments. If the judgment appealed from directs the doing of any particular act or thing and no express provision is mude by the statute in regard to the undertaking to be given on
The action is brought in equity to foreclose a lien existing by statute, which statute (§ 6281) is but declaratory of the vendor’s lien created by civil law and later adopted as an equitable principle and now enforced as a purely equitable action. While the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity have been abolished by statute (Code, § 6767), yet the two distinct systems remain, and the lien existing in equity and as declared by statute remains with the remedy administered under equitable jurisdiction. 2 Warvelle, Vendors, 2d ed. chap. 27; Sykes v. First Nat. Bank, 2 S. D. 242, 49 N. W. 1058. And the judgment rendered, folloAving the nature of the action, is one in equity for foreclosure of the vendor’s lien, even though in the rendition of the judgment the form of its rendition may embody a personal judgment for the amount of the recovery, coupled with the usual foreclosure decree directing the sale of the premises. AATiile not passed upon in this state, there is no doubt as to the authority of the court to enter this twofold judgment, in effect a personal judgment and a decree in equity combined, yet its rendition in such form cannot change the nature of the action of which it is but the conclusion. Rollins v. Forbes, 10 Cal. 299; Rowland v. Leiby, 14 Cal. 156; Chapin v. Broder, 16 Cal. 422; Englund v. Lewis, 25 Cal. 337. Plaintiff sought relief in equity and obtained a decree in equity. The court having equitable jurisdiction thereby cast upon it was clothed with a right to render such judgment as was necessary to completely adjudicate all matters involved in the cause of action litigated. It saw fit to enter a judgment personal in form as it would do in a law action as a part of the relief adjudged and in aid of its main decree in equity. But the judgment remains primarily one of lien foreclosure directed against specific real property; in effect by force of law governing foreclosures, a judgment to sell and deliver such property, the subject-matter of the action.
Respondent cites National Bank v. Hanberg, reported in 10 N. D. 383, 87 N. W. 1006, a holding on a bond given under § 5610, Revised Codes of 1899, being § 7209, in an action in equity to foreclose a chattel mortgage, as authority that this is a money judgment to be superseded only by a bond under § 7209. Tlie point raised was not there passed upon; the court holding a bond sufficient as a stay bond given under present- § 7209 to supersede the foreclosure judgment on appeal. The reasons given therefor were that, as the bond given was greater than the one that would have been required under respondent’s theory, it was sufficient in that “anv order lawfully made could not have required a greater or more onerous undertaking than that voluntarily filed by the appellants. It is therefore our opinion that the undertaking filed on the appeal from tlio judgment is sufficient.” The court there expressly avoided passing upon the necessity of giving the bond
Respondent has cited, in support of a bond for the amount of the judgment appealed from, the Iowa case of Flynn v. Des Moines & St. L. R. Co. 62 Iowa, 521, 17 N. W. 769, where in a mechanic’s lien foreclosure a judgment similar to the one in the instant case, declaring' judgment for a certain amount and adjudging it a lien upon certain personal property, was held to be a judgment or order for the payment of money, and a bond for twice the amount of the judgment and costs was accordingly held necessary to- stay execution. The statute of Iowa governing supersedeas bonds on appeal is contained in Code of Iowa, § 4134-, reading: “If the judgment or order is for the payment of money the penalty shall be at least twice the amount of the judgment and.costs. If not for the payment of money the condition shall be to save the appellee harmless from the consequences of taking the appeal, but in no case shall the penalty be less than one hundred dollars.” This and a provision contained in § 4128, that he “will satisfy and perform the judgment or order appealed from in case it shall be affirmed, and any judgment or order which the supreme court may render or order to be rendered by the inferior court, not exceeding in amount or value the original judgment or order, and all rents of or damages to property during the pendency of the appeal, out of the possession of which the appellee is kept by reason of tbe appeal,” constitutes the Iowa statutory provisions in this matter. Under these provisions the clerk fixes the amount of bond. It is noticeable that the statute referred to makes but the general classification as of judgments for the payment of money and judgments not for the payment- of money, instead of attempting, as does our statute, in its nine different sections applying to supersedeas bonds, to classify generally the conditions under which they may be required and prescribe tbe conditions of the bond so to be given to stay execution in each instance. It is also apparent from the case cited (Flynn v. Des Moines & St. L. R. Co.), from the opinion, that the fact that the bond is approved by the clerk, evidently as a ministerial as distinguished from a judicial act, had considerable weight in the court arriving at the conclusion reached. We quote the following from the opinion: “Taking this record as a guide to the clerk in fixing the amount of the bond, he finds a judgment- for money in proper form.”
For the same reasons that the Iowa cases cited under the statutes of that state as that court’s interpretation of the bond to be given to supersede judgments for the recovery of money do not apply under our statute, we find other authorities apparently in point until the statutes are consulted under which such holdings are made. We refer to Washington eases. State ex rel. Washington Bridge Co. v. Superior Ct. 11 Wash. 366, 39 Pac. 644, and State ex rel. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Superior Ct. 14 Wash. 365, 44 Pac. 859. These are foreclosure cases in which the form of the judgment rendered was similar to this case on trial, and the holdings are that such a judgment is “a judgment for, the recovery of money” within the moaning of the statutes of that state governing supersedeas bonds on appeal, being § 1408 of the Washington Codes (2 Hill’s Anno. Stat. & Codes), as amended by § 7 of the Session Laws of 1893, chap. 61. But an examination of the Washington statutes discloses that but one general classification exists on a basis of whether money relief is obtained or not, and not, as under our statutes, various classifications according to the nattire of the action as well as the judgment rendered. For the same reason the Pennsylvania case of Koecker v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & S. D. Co. 103 Pa. 331, decided under early statutes and rules of court procedure of that state, does not apply.
California eases are cited by counsel on both sides of this controversy, but all the California cases are in line with our holding herein. The principal case relied upon by respondent is that of Englund v.
It will be observed the case turns upon the question of when the lien took effect upon the property subsequently acquired by the judgment debtor and sold to Englund; and also whether said lien remained subject to being enforced by execution, or whether execution was suspended by the supersedeas bond on appeal in the Covillaud Case covering waste, use, and occupation of different premises entirely. The case them would be analogous to the one before us were plaintiff, Schafer, seeking to enforce the personal part of this judgment against some grantee of appellant, Olson, of other real estate than that involved in and subject-matter of this vendor’s lien action, and provided further our statutes declared any personal lien by judgment should expire at the expiration of two years from date of entry of judgment if the lien is not exercised within that period. Section 352 of the practice act under which the supersedeas on appeal in Englund v. Lewis was given, that later became without amendment § 945 of tlio Code of Civil Procedure of California, is nearly identical with § 7212 and § 7213 of our Code of 1905, taken together. And the provisions of the practice act are very similar, as are the California Code provisions 942 to 945, inclusive to all those of our own Code, §§ 7209 to 7215, inclusive. While the reasoning of the court in Englund v. Lewis would indicate the necessity of a bond similar to that- required under § 7209 for money judgments, in addition to the bond given in this case under § 7212, yet nowhere is the bond that was given. declared to he improper for the purposes for which it was executed, namely, as a supersedeas bond in the vendor’s lien ease, and to that extent Englund v. Lewis is authority for the, construction we adopt, that the bond to be given herein is required under § 7212 staying execution of the judgment to sell and deliver the realty involved in this action. And later California cases have so applied Englund v. Lewis as supporting the requirement of a supersedeas bond to bo given for waste, occupancy and deficiency taken under practically the provisions of § 7212 as in the instant case. See Boob v. Hall, 105 Cal. 413, 38 Pac. 977, in the opinion of which we find: “When the case of Englund v. Lewis was decided, although the law of
The later California cases are in accord with Boob v. Hall, above cited. See also Kreling v. Kreling, 116 Cal. 458, 48 Pac. 383, in which case a judgment very similar to the one under consideration, in -which the supersedeas writ was opposed on the same grounds as urged by re
In the light of the foregoing decision, appellant may contend that the same does not apply to the question under consideration as in Schafer v. Olson, owing to the form of the judgment; that it is not a judgment for deficiency, but instead one wherein a judgment for money is rendered and the proceeds of the premises liened are, according to its terms, to be applied thereon; and that the question of deficiency is not involved, and hence the holding in Kreling v. Kreling does not apply. This is effectually answered in Owen v. Pomona Land & Water Co. 124 Cal. 331, 57 Pac. 71, where this claim was urged in a judgment rendered in the identical form as in Schafer v. Olson, and is disposed of against the contention of appellant herein by the following from the opinion: “But respondent claims that the judgment here is one which 'directs the payment of money’ within the meaning of § 942 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that there should have been an undertaking in twice the amount found due from defendant. This claim is based upon the following language in the first part of the judgment:
In the case before us for determination appellant vendee of the prom
Appellant cites federal cases in support of his contention, a leading one of which is a decision by Judge Jenkins in Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Pope, 20 C. C. A. 253, 46 U. S. App. 25, 74 Fed. 1, and also by Judge Taft in the case of Fuller v. Aylesworth, 21 C. C. A. 505, 43 U. S. App. 657, 75 Fed. 694. These do line a judgment for the recovery of money within the meaning of supersedeas bond required under the provisions of the United States Bevised Statutes and Suprimió Court rules ; hut the requirements are so different from our statute that the cases have no application. The supersedeas required in Federal practice is based on the following provision of rule 29 (108 U. S. 590, 20 L. ed. 907, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. xvi) of the Supreme Court: “Such indemnity (referring to supersedeas bond) where the judgment or decree is for the recovery of money not ol.Jierwi.ne se,cured must be for the -whole amount of the judgment or decree, including just damages for •delay and cost and interest on the appeal.” The words “not otherwise secured” make the cases cited based thereon not applicable to a case wherein a foreclosure is ordered on property securing the judgment.
Our conclusion is that the judgment of the district court requiring the undertaking from appellant, conditioned that during his possession of the real estate the subject-matter of the action pending his appeal.herein, he will not commit waste nor suffer waste to he committed, and that he pay the value of the use and occupation of the property pending said
Therefore the order to show cause is dismissed, and the order approving the supersedeas bond given by appellant, Olson, is affirmed, with costs to respondent.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). After giving the opinion of Judge Goss very careful consideration, and examining all the authorities cited therein, and the statutes on which they are based, and comparing the; same with the provisions of our own Code thought to be- applicable, I find myself unable to concur therein. In my judgment the trial court liad no power, on the undertaking furnished, to order a stay of all proceedings on the judgment and decree rendered in that court, and its order should be modified so it may supersede only the part of the judgment which I shall denominate “decree”- — that, is to say, that part directing a sale of the premises in the manner usually followed in the foreclosure of mortgages — or the appellant should be permitted to file an additional bond appropriate to stay a money judgment on appeal to this court.
With great deference for the opinions of my associates, I am constrained to conclude that their decision rests upon authorities no one of which is in point, for the reason, if for no other, that they all depend upon statutes which differ radically from our own. The only authorities I find bearing on the subject, on statutes either identical with, or in substance the same as ours, are in harmony with my conclusions. It must be borne in mind that, since the adoption of the Code, causes of action which had theretofore been denominated legal and those called equitable may be united in proper cases. It necessarily follows that a
In the case at bar the lien depends on the debt, and not the debt on the lien. The lien is only an incident of the debt. The issues should not be lost sight of. The plaintiff sold a tract of real property to the defendant for a cash consideration and delivered the deed. The defendant placed the deed on record and immediately mortgaged the property so purchased to one Lord. The plaintiff brought this action to recover the purchase price which had not been paid to him, as held by the trial court, and to have it adjudged a vendor’s lien and as taking precedence to the mortgage to Lord, and for the foreclosure of such lien. The contests in the trial court in no manner related to the vendor's lien, except incidentally. The questions litigated were whether a bank in which the defendant had deposited the purchase price was the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s agent. If it was the plaintiff’s agent, payment had been made; if the defendant’s, the purchase price had not been paid; and if the latter to determine the priority between the vendor’s lien, which followed as a matter of course, and the mortgage which in the meantime had been given. The trial court fottnd that the bank was the defendant’s agent, and that therefore the purchase money had not been paid to .the plaintiff, but that Lord, the mortgagee, was an innocent incumbrancer, and that his mortgage had precedence to the vendor’s lien held by the plaintiff. Judgment was entered in the usual form of a money judgment, as stated in the main opinion. This was followed by a decree establishing the lien, providing for the sale of the premises and the application of the proceeds, and execution for the deficiency, if any. It will thus be seen that it was a dual judgment, or, in technical language, the first provision was a judgment and the remaining provisions a decree in equity., all proper under our system and as held by numerous authorities.
Section TOJO, Nev. Codes 1905, requires judgments to be entered by the clerk upon the order of the coirrt or judge thereof. Section T0T9
No specific provision has been made by the legislature of. this state for the foreclosure of vendors’ liens, and we cannot look to the provisions of our Code relating to foreclosure of mortgages for light on the subject. Section 7082, supra, seems to indicate in as clear, explicit language as could be employed, that when a judgment is filed directing-in whole or in part the payment of money, and docketed, it becomes a lien upon all real property except the homestead, of the debtor in the county, and he can only be relieved from it by the undertaking on appeal requisite to stay execution. The judgment in the instant case must certainly come within the definition of one which directs in whole or in part the payment of money. If considered as one judgment, it directs it in part; if considered as a dual judgment, as held by many authorities, or as I have technically designated it, as a judgment and as a decree, the judgment is in whole for the payment of money. Now if my conclusion is correct, and under this section the judgment in this •case for money became a lien on all the real estate of the defendant
This section is in harmony with § 7082, supra. The first provides for a lien when the judgment is for the payment of money in whole or in part, and the last for a stay of exeention when the judgment directs the payment of money; hut it is said that § 7212 is the only section having any application to this judgment and decree because it provides for staying the sale or delivery of possession of real property, except for foreclosure of mortgages, when the judgment appealed from directs it. This ignores the money judgment. When the judgment is dual, one part a judgment for money, the other directing the sale of real property, this only has application, as is clear, to the decree directing the sale. It has no application to the money judgment. They arc two distinct entities so far as necessary to consider in this case.
The court was asked to enter a money judgment; it did so. It was asked to enter a decree, and it did so; and, if the defendant wishes to supersede the money judgment, he must give an undertaking appropriate to the money judgment. If he wishes to prevent the sale, he gives ■an undertaking appropriate to do that; but the latter alone does not release the lien of the money part of the judgment, nor prevent levy of execution thereon. That the form of the money judgment in this case is in personam and appropriate to such actions cannot he questioned.
Now with reference to the authorities relied upon in the majority opinion: The provisions of the California practice act of 1851 were to all intents and purposes, so far as applicable herein, identical with our own at the present time. Section 204 of that act corresponded to § 7082 of our Code, and provided that immediately upon filing a judgment roll the clerk should make the proper entries of the judgment-under appropriate heads in the docket kept by him, and that “from the mme the judgment is docketed it shall become a lien upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in the-
The sections relating’ to undertakings on appeal were, barring some verbal changes, identically our own. In fact, such -provisions were incorporated into the Code of Dakota Territory from the California practice act, which had long prior to that time been construed by the supreme court of California. Until 1860 and 1861 the California practice act had contained no prohibition from maintaining at the same time more than one suit to enforce liens or collect the debt secured thereby. In this respect it was like the Code of this state at the present time, with the exception of provisions relating to the foreclosure of mortgages. Authorities on foreclosure of mortgages in California before 1860 and 1861 are in point. In Rollins v. Forbes, 10 Cal. 299, Judge Field, writing the opinion, held as against a demurrer that in an action to foreclose a mortgage the equitable relief follows as a consequence of the existence of the debt and as security for its payment; and that there was no objection to the formal rendition of a judgment for the amount found due in such actions. And the same court, through Field, Oh. J., in 1859 held that on an appeal from an order setting aside'a money judgment in foreclosure proceedings, on the ground that such judgment could not be rendered in the foreclosure of a mortgage, the court erred; that the parties were at liberty to adopt in such actions the course pursued under the old chancery system and take a decree adjudging the amount due upon the personal obligation of the mortgagor and directing a sale of the premises and the application of the proceeds to its payment, and apply, after sale, for the ascertainment of any deficiency and execution for the same; or that they might take a formal judgment for the amount due in the first instance. Rowland v. Leiby, 14 Cal. 157.
In Chapin v. Broder, 16 Cal. 403, that court had under consideration this entire subject. It is there held in a foreclosure suit, when the judgment* simply ascertained the amount due and directed a sale and the application of the proceeds, the recovery of any deficiency, and execution for the same, that the judgment did not become a lien on the real estate of the debtor. It created no lien until the deficiency was ascertained, but that it was perfectly competent for the court in such
These cases indicate clearly the construction placed upon these provisions prior to 1861 in California, so far as they relate to the foreclosure of mortgages. There was then no distinction in this respect, in that state, between the foreclosure of mortgages and of other kinds of liens. The case of Englund v. Lewis, 25 Cal. 337, construes these provisions as they related to foreclosure of a vendor’s lien. It had been foreclosed by action and a decree taken identical in form in every respect with the one in the case at bar. It is true they were, in that case, not foreclosing, but were considering the effect of a foreclosure where such a judgment and decree had been taken; and it was held that a formal judgment in personam might be rendered against the defendant for tíre amount found due, with a provision for its enforcement against the property upon which the lien is established, or a judgment might be entered in accordance with the old chancery practice, enforcing the lien and directing the sale of the property upon which it was established; that if the judgment in personam was rendered, and also one enforcing the lien, on appeal from the whole judgment, proceedings would not be stayed upon the whole judgment unless the appellant gave an undertaking for costs and one appropriate to a personal money judgment, and one for the payment of waste and deficiency; that these undertakings might be in one instrument or several; that, if undertaking was given only for costs and waste and deficiency, an execution on the personal judgment was not stayed pending the appeal. If given for costs and' the amount of the personal judgment, execution for sale of the property under the lien being foreclosed w'as not stayed. This case is directly in point. The law is exhaustively discussed, the reasoning most convincing, it has never been overrtded, but on the contrary has been cited times without number as authority. The effect of it is that, to stay execution on the whole judgment foreclosing a lien when personal judgment is taken, the undertaking appropriate to each phase or part of the judgment and decree must be provided.
Section 7477, N. D. Rev. Codes-1905, reads as follows: “Whenever
In Cormerais v. Genella, 22 Cal. 116, this amendment was construed, and it was held that it did not deprive the court of the powe.r to enter the old-fashioned, connnon-law personal judgment, but that it did prohibit the docketing of that judgment and the creating of a lien or the issuance of an execution thereon until the deficiency, if anyr should be ascertained. To the same effect was Culver v. Rogers, 28 Cal. 520.
In Painter v. Painter, 98 Cal. 625, 33 Pac. 483, we find an action identical in principle with the case at bar. It was an actioii for an accounting and to have the amount found due adjudged a lien upon the real ('state, and the court said that it would have been entirely proper for the plaintiffs to have entered a judgment in personam for the-amount found due, and that upon such judgment they would have heenentitled to an execution against all the property of the defendant as upon an ordinary judgment for the recovery of money, but that, inasmuch as the judgment recovered only recited the amount due and contained specific directions as to how it should be released, the right- of plaintiffs to a personal judgment had been postponed until the interest of the defendant in the property had been sold and a deficiency judgment entered.
.For a discussion of the change occasioned by the amendment of the California practice act, see Cormerais v. Genella and Culver v. Rogers, supra.
The Supreme 'Court of Washington has passed upon the identical question involved in the case at bar, on at least two occasions. True, in the opinion in this case it is said that Washington decisions are not in point because' the statute is not the same. Pray, how does their statute differ from ours ? Simply in this, that for the purpose of fixing
In State ex rel. Washington Bridge Co. v. Superior Ct. 11 Wash. 366, 39 Pac. 644, it was held that a judgment for a specified sum of money and decreeing the foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien is a final j udgment for the recovery of money within the meaning of Statutes 1893, p. 122, § 1, providing that a supersedeas bond on appeal from judgment for the recovery of money shall be in a penalty' double the amount of damages and costs. The court in commenting upon the arguments of counsel says that this is clearly a judgment for the recovery of money and that had it not been intended by the legislature as such it would have been very easy and natural for it to have inserted the word “only,” and thereby make the statute plain. It held the lien purely incidental.
In State ex rel. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Superior Ct. 14 Wash. 365, 44 Pac. 859, it is held that judgment in favor of the plaintiff for money due on a note and for foreclosure of a mortgage securing it is a judgment for the recovery of money within the statute providing that on appeal from such judgment a supersedeas bond shall be double the amount of the judgment; and it was hold also that the court had no authority to fix the amount of such bond. It was again held that the primary object of such a statute was to collect the money found to be due, and that the lien and enforcement of it were only secondary. To the same effect, see 1 Freeman, Executions, § 16. And directly in point to this effect is Bennett v. Morehouse, 42 N. Y. 189.
It has been argued that this construction wo\fld be unreasonable and burdensome upon the appellant. Be it so. The remedy lies with the legislature and not with the courts. On the contrary, let us inquire what the effect of the other construction is in the case at bar; and it might have a similar effect in many other instances. The plaintiff has parted with his land and received but a small fraction of the purchase price. The defendant not only has the land, but he has mortgaged it for nearly, if not quite, the entire purchase price. 'The plaintiff has parted with his real estate, recovered judgment for the purchase price and a lien on whatever trifling equity the defendant retains in it, subject to the mortgage, and he has a bond for $250 on the appeal for costs, and another for $1,000 only to cover waste and use and occupation.
The language of the Code is too plain to require discussion. The-bond given is inadequate to stay either the lien of the money judgment or execution thereon pending the appeal.