328 F. Supp. 762 | S.D. Miss. | 1971
The plaintiffs institute and seek to maintain this class action for themselves and (in effect) for the ultimate use and benefit of the larger and wealthier of the eighty-two counties in the state of Mississippi who are allegedly discriminated against by three statutes of the state of Mississippi which provide for the allocation and distribution among the counties of excise tax funds collected by and belonging to the state of Mississippi. ' These tax funds never belonged to any plaintiff, and not one of the named plaintiffs or the class of plaintiffs here has any personal interest in, or personal benefit to be derived from the recovery sought.
The threshold question in this case is as to the jurisdiction of this court of such a claim by these parties. The defendants insist that this is a suit by its citizens against the state of Mississippi in violation of the Eleventh Amendment. We disagree with that contention.
There is basically another fundamental reason why this suit cannot be maintained by these plaintiffs who have no right of action against these defendants. They have no standing in this court to sue on a claim in which their interest is the same as that of any other citizen and taxpayer. A Federal court derives its judicial power and authority from Article III, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution which is limited to cases and controversies. The standing to sue rule simply requires that a plaintiff have the right of action which he is entitled to pursue in his own right for relief withheld from him by his adversary.
Nothing herein is decided as to the identity of the real parties in interest or persons having standing to sue, but these plaintiffs before the court surely lack such capacity. A reasonable time is allowed herein for rectification of such deficiency by an amended complaint which must be presented to the court and filed within said time to escape dismissal of this claim without prejudice.
The Director of the Mississippi Highway Department, as a former experienced legislator during recent years in the Mississippi Legislature, made it crystal clear that the statutes attacked had not just one, but several very valid purposes which amply supported the validity of these statutes even with such disparities apparent on the face of these enactments in the allocation of these public funds. Such purposes for the division of such funds related to sound objectives and valid alternatives within the legislative reach and grasp.
A proper order to such effect will be prepared and entered by the court.
. It was provided and agreed in section 5 and section 6 of the Stipulation of counsel for the parties as follows: “5. Plaintiffs do not claim for themselves, or any members of the class purported to be represented by them, that any of
. These statutes appear as § 10013-38(b) Mississippi Code 1942 providing for the apportionment of petroleum taxes, § 10127 Mississippi Code 1942 providing for the allocation of sales taxes in municipalities and counties, and § 8035-01 Mississippi Code 1942 providing for state aid roads in counties and, for a percentage of participation by county.
. The principles enunciated by the court in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 dispel any support for such contention.
. Civil Rule 17(a) provides: “(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute of the United States so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the United States. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and. such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.”
. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 58 S.Ct. 1, 82 L.Ed. 493 provides: “It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 406, 21 S.Ct. 206, 45 L.Ed. 252; Southern Railway Company v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 534, 30 S.Ct. 594, 54 L.Ed. 868; Newman v. United States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 549, 550, 35 S.Ct. 881, 59 L.Ed. 1446; Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129, 42 S.Ct. 274, 275, 66 L.Ed. 499; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 43 S.Ct. 597, 601, 67 L.Ed. 1078.” United States v. 936.71 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Brevard County, State of Florida, et al., 418 F.2d 551, 556 holds: “A party has standing to prosecute a suit in the federal courts only if he is the ‘real party in interest’ as that term is defined under Fed.R. Civ.P. 17(a). The stricture applies to intervenors as well as plaintiffs. Celanese Corp. v. John Clark Indus., Inc., 5 Cir. 1954, 214 F.2d 551, 556. Whether a person is a real party in interest depends upon his substantive rights, which, in diversity cases and cases like the
In Ashwander, et al. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 the Federal Supreme Court said: “The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Tyler v. Judges, etc., 179 U.S. 405, 21 S.Ct. 206, 45 L.Ed. 252; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 621, 35 S.Ct. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained. Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96, 99, 100, 51 S.Ct. 392, 75 L.Ed. 861. In Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 42 S.Ct. 274, 66 L.Ed. 499, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.”
. The basic principles of this rule are stated in Herpich, et al. v. Wallace, et al. (5 C.A.) 430 F.2d 792, 805 thusly: “The law of standing has been concerned almost entirely with public law questions such as determinations of constitutionality and review of administrative or other governmental action. Every plaintiff in the federal courts, however, must satisfy the court that he is a proper party to maintain the action he brings— that he has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1953, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). ‘The various rules of standing applied by federal courts have not been developed in the abstract. Rather, they have been fashioned with specific reference to the status asserted by the party whose standing is challenged and to the type of question he wishes to have adjudicated.’ Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1953, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).” To the same effect see Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc., et al v. William B. Camp, Comptroller, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184.
. A legislature is necessarily vested with a wide discretion in its disposition of public funds. A Federal court is not a watchdog over its processes and statutes. In an attack upon such legislation, the presumption of validity of such a statute is so great that every possible reason supporting its validity must be negated. In Madden v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 60 S.Ct. 406, 408, 84 L.Ed. 590 the court said: “Since the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes. The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”