The question presented in this case is whether the District Court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s petition for want of prosecution, and in overruling plaintiff’s motion to rescind the order of dismissal. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Harold W. Schaeffer, plaintiff and appellant herein, filed this action to recover damages for the breach of an alleged oral agreement between himself and B. K. Hunter, defendant and appellee herеin. The oral agreement was allegedly made in 1964 in connection with a lease of real estate under which the plaintiff was the lessee and the defendant was the lessor, and which lease was terminated by the defendant on July 16, 1969. Plaintiff filed his petition on July 6, 1973.
Between the filing of the petition and October 17, *222 1974, the defendant demurred to the рetition, the demurrer was overruled, the defendant filed a motion to make the petition more definite and certain, and the plaintiff amеnded his petition. On February 25, 1975, the trial court noted that no action had been taken since October 17, 1974, and ordered the case stricken frоm the trial docket without prejudice unless good cause be shown why it should not be so stricken within 60 days. On motion of the plaintiff, the case was reinstated on the trial docket on September 9, 1975. The defendant filed an answer on October 1, 1975.
On March 2, 1976, the trial court again found that the case should be dismissed within 60 days unless good cause was shown why it should be retained on the trial docket. Apparently this order was made because the рlaintiff’s attorney did not appear at the court call on March 2nd. On April 23, 1976, the case was reinstated on the trial docket on motion of the plaintiff. The parties then continued with discovery proceedings. The last filing of papers in the court with respect to discovery wаs on June 9, 1976, when the defendant filed answers to plaintiff’s interrogatories.
On March 15, 1977, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant appeared at thе court call. The District Court noted that the petition was filed on July 6, 1973; that the answer was filed on October 1, 1975; and that two “60-day Dismissal Orders” had been entered previously. The court ordered that the petition be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff immediately filed a motion to rescind the order of dismissаl, stating in support thereof that his counsel was unable to attend the court call on March 15, 1977, because of the conflict of a heаring in another court; that the case was ready for trial; and that a dismissal of the case would deprive the plaintiff of his substantive cause оf action. The latter claim was based on the fact that plaintiff’s claim would be *223 barred by the statute of limitations if his original petition were not reinstated and he were required to initiate a new action. On April 12, 1977, the trial court overruled plaintiff’s motion to rescind the order of dismissal.
Plаintiff has appealed from the order of dismissal and the overruling of his motion to rescind that order. Plaintiff contends that the District Court had no authоrity under its own rules to dismiss the case; that the District Court may not exercise its power to adopt rules of procedure in such a manner as tо arbitrarily deprive litigants of a judicial determination of substantive rights; and that dismissal for want of prosecution is improper in a case where the statute of limitations would bar the filing of a new action, and the dismissal has the effect of a final judgment.
Section 25-1149, R. R. S. 1943, authorizes the District Court to рrovide for dismissing actions without prejudice for want of prosecution. Rule X (11) of the Rules of Practice of the District Court for the First Judicial District рrovides that whenever the trial of an action is neglected or delayed the court may upon motion of a party or upon its own motion either dismiss the action, or strike it from the docket. In any event, trial courts have the inherent power, independent of any statute or rulе of court, to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute with due diligence. See, Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.,
Plaintiff argues that dismissаl in the present case constitutes an abuse of discretion because the statute of limitations bars the filing of a new action. In Flannagаn v. Elton,
The entry of an order dismissing a case for failurе to prosecute is not controlled by the fact that a new suit would be barred by the statute of limitations. See, Hoad v. Spier,
We cannot conclude in the present case that the
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trial court abused its discretion. The order of dismissal was entered not only because plaintiffs counsel had failed to appear at the court call on March 15, 1977, but because the case had been filed in July 1973, and two orders of dismissal had been entered previously, and then rescinded- Thе case was reinstated for the second time on April 23, 1976, and the last filing of papers with respect to discovery was on June 9, 1976. The final order of dismissal was not entered until March 15, 1977, more than 9 months after the last filing, 1 year and 5 months after the answer was filed, and almost 4 years after the petition was filed. The responsibility rests on the plaintiff to prosecute his case with reasonable diligence. See, Cukrowski v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, Inc.,
Affirmed.