*1
Argued Sept. April Filed *2 Ober, Reading, for appellant. Paul R. Sol., Schmehl, Reading, appellee. L.
Jeffrey BECK, POPOVICH, KELLY and JJ. Before *3 BECK, Judge: Forrest the Judge President Schaeffer of
Appellant, County, of the denial appeals Court Pleas Berks of Common Berks against County for relief request injunctive of his Deeds, Judge to sought of Linda Schaeffer Frey. Recorder of the Berks cutting further prohibit any to county repro- a contract part deed books as of County find deed onto microfilm. Because we duce the books required in order to has not met the standards appellant relief, we the trial court’s order. injunctive affirm awarded facts, generally undisputed, are as relevant which are The into a Berks entered contract December County follows. onto micro- reproduced county have to Deeds, of a County film.1 Berks Recorder Appellee, the officer, County’s named as Berks duly elected In supervisor. and as the contract agent for the contract County authority reproduce deed books onto the Berks 1. The to 63.1, applica- upon 65 P.S. 63.1 Section class, is based microfilm any except first authorizes counties of the ble to all counties copy where copy microfilm a document officer clear, County copy. is a produces permanent Berks accurate county of the third class.
56S osier microfilming tina accomodate process, some her®, deed book» hare debcund2 AImoistthree years after the initiation of the contixct, and after approximately total 1016 deetf books had microfilmed, been appellant, spimie% Sim entered a temporary rektrainfng (“TEG”) order prohibiting the Beeoiihv Deeds from farther cutting breaking bindings of the deed books. The temporary rem,tuned restraining order hi effect thirty days. After lapse TEG, Judge Schaeffer filed the subject equity action requesting a preliminary permanent in junction enjoin any continuation of the debinding, break- lug, cutting, or pages removing- from the Berks deed boefe without the oppress aiqorovai of the court of common pleas.
As part action, instituted equity evidentiary hearing war. held before a judge.3 Testimony present ed by appellee Drey, linda appellant Judge Schaeffer, Wil liam Campbell, the County Controller, Berk» and Frank Johns, the Berks County District Court Administrator. As a result of hearing, the lower court (1) determined Berks* microfilming contract was autho properly law, rized (2) 65 P.A 6*8.1; appellee had acted in w«g Jaw; accordance with the (8) there no destruction of the deed records that are within the responsibility of appellee; (4) appellant had failed demonstrate any irreparable harm if injunction granted. was not Therefore, court denied: Schaefferis request for injunctive relief. This timeiy appeal followed.4 iWr,
2. The clearly evidence irarecord explain not how the deed books have bean debomieL hi evidentiary the lower court hearing, there *4 questioning rotating extensive “cutting" to the of the deed record gages Mnuiimg:-, (N.T. 23-40). However, Irma ihe book at details of process “cutting" this were not introduced into the record. It is clear pages the deed wart' book binding removed from the book page each separately (NX photographed. 33-36). at Beckeri, Judge judge senior presided from County, Bucks over the equity hearing. party 4. Neither to this «ppepi objected has jurisdiction, to our opposed court, to that of the counwwiwesith to consider this matter. Therefore, vested, jurisdiction perfected, ouc has may and we 564 specific raises issues our review.
Appellant
two
First,
he has
Schaeffer contends
Judge
irreparably
been
books,
by
debinding of the deed
harmed
because
exercising
judicial
him from
discre
precludes
Second,
to 16 Pa.S.A.
he
granted pursuant
tion
irreparably
by
he has been
harmed
the debind
argues that
ing of the deed
because
books are within
court;
therefore,
protection
knowledge
debinding of the books without
court
confidence
the court.5
erodes and undermines
grant
of a trial court’s
denial
scope
Our
review
is limited. Crozer
Medical
Chester
relief
injunctive
1377,
51, 55,
May,
v.
352
506 A.2d
1379
Center
Pa.Super.
1986);
denied,
Buttonwood
(Pa.,
10,
(1986),
Dec.
appeal
Carson,
312, 315,
Farms,
v.
Pa.Super.
329
478 A.2d
Inc.
484,
“is restricted to
(1984).
appeal,
485
On
this court
ground[s]
reasonable
any apparently
there were
whether
Beck
Computing
court
by
for the action taken
below.”
505,
990,
Anderson,
508, 524 A.2d
v.
Serv.
Pa.Super.
362
Chester, 352
56,
(1987);
506 A.2d at
Crozer
Pa.Super.
991
704(a) (1978) (provid-
42
properly
appeal.
Pa.C.S.A.
review this
See
appellee
objection to
ing
to file an
failure of an
that ‘‘[t]he
may
specified
jurisdiction
appellate
within such time as
of an
rule, shall,
orders,
appellate court otherwise
by general
unless the
jurisdiction
appellate
appellate
operate
perfect the
such
vesting jurisdiction of
notwithstanding any provision of this title ...
court");
(reiterating
appellate
Pa.R.App.P.
appeal
741
in another
such
Hausman,
Pa.Super.
704(a) language); see
v.
378
also Oswald
the §
Thorn,
245,
2,
594,
(1988);
v.
n. 2
Newman
359
n.
548 A.2d
597
250
to,
1231,
(1986),
274, 280,
v.
Thorn
Pa.Super.
518 A.2d
1235
transferred
642,
(1988);
Newman,
Rosenberg Holy
v.
565
253, 256,
1379;
Pirkle, 346 Pa.Super.
v.
Ogontz Controls
593,
(1985).
499 A.2d
595
unless
record
erroneous,
ruling
palpably
shows that the trial court’s
discretion,
law,
misapplication
a
or a manifest abuse
court’s decision. Crozer
this court will affirm
lower
55-58,
1379-80;
Chester,
Pa.Super.
352
at
506 A.2d at
Farms,
315,
329
at
A.2d
Pa.Super.
Buttonwood
478
at
foundation,
a
this standard
review as
have
With
arguments.
appellant’s
reviewed
relief, in particular a
Injunctive
preliminary injunc
tion, is “considered an
extraordinary remedy
may only
right
if
clear
granted
plaintiff
be
has established a
Club,
sought.”
the relief
v.
Soja
Factoryville Sportsmen’s
473, 477,
1129,
361
522 A.2d
1131
In
Pa.Super.
Pennsylvania,
preliminary injunction
granted
a
will be
prerequisites.
where a
can demonstrate certain
party
(1)
irreparable
There must exist
a threat of immediate and
harm,
(2)
by damages;
injury
that cannot
remedied
be
denying
injunction
greater
result
must be
would
relief;
(3)
than
injury by granting
equitable
restore the
grant
injunction
properly
parties
must
alleged
prior
wrongful
the situation as it existed
to the
Pirkle,
Pa.Super.
conduct.
346
at
Ogontz Controls Co.
Homes,
256,
(1985) (quoting
Appellant’s 9872, statute enacted 1827 and originally on 16 P.S. as it relates to the recorder of deeds.6 repealed, except later provides part: Section 9872 relevant originally enacted as P.L. on March Section 9872 Counties, was transferred to Title in 1981. 1827. The statute * * * At it shall every year, least once in each be the deeds, each of the aforesaid ... recorders of ... duty of commonwealth, of this the several counties submit *6 of to their offices to belonging the records several judges pleas the the court of common inspection duty and it shall be the of the said proper county; the books, in order direct such of the said as court to anew; also, it, require their to be bound opinion may wanting, in be to order and may all cases where the same indexes of the matters contained complete direct full time prepared, in to made and within such said books think may as the said court reasonable. repealed part by 42 P.S.
16 P.S. § 20002(a)[108] Appellant contends Berks Coun- § thereby irreparably section 9872 and ty contract violates to the court pleas. court of common The harm harms the is, “places section 9872 argued by appellant, as because integrity of deed books within responsibility physical Pleas —not discretionary the Court Common Appellant, of Deeds.” Brief of at with the Recorder argues that the (emphasis original). Judge in the Schaeffer microfilming resulting and the de- Berks contract statutory his irreparably thwarts binding of deed books and, if inspect required, rebinding order duty to appellant, because the deed books presented by As books. debound, no can be longer are “books” which they are Moreover, appellant contends inspected by court. for the responsibility accords him the section 9872 because the books safeguarding contract, his approval, without part as of the Berks the public and erodes confidence irreparably diminishes disagree. We the court.7 statutory language was under Title Prior to the identical statute, Records, currently promulgated, The § Court Act, Repealer Judiciary Act
applies of deeds. See to the recorders 20002(a)[108] (1978). P.S. § Judge argues grants although Schaeffer note that We records in the over the deed of common office, inspect the deed and that the court should of deeds recorder argument We conclude Schaeffer’s is without sup- port pleas’ because court of common statutory authority over the recorder of deeds and the deed records in the recorder’s is limited. custody as determined the lower there has been no of a demonstration destruction of deed records held the recorder deeds. Because the appeal issues involve statutes and a office county began with the creation of our commonwealth, must, briefly, least return to the constitutional and statutory language creating the initially of, of, position and the duties the recorder of deeds. holding The individual the office of recorder of deeds is constitutionally recognized as being officer. Pa. Const, art. 4. The recorder of deeds is elected at municipal elections and holds his or her office for four years. Id. Significantly, this court has stated specifically *7 that the recorder of deeds is not judicial a officer.8 Custer Glessner, 60, (1917) Pa.Super. (the v. 68 61 recorder of “is, in deeds no accurate use of language, officer of the court”).
The
of the
primary duty
recorder of deeds is to serve the
public
receiving and
in-
by
duly recording any recordable
struments so as to serve the future necessities of the law.
(1715),
16 P.S.
9701
repealed where inconsistent with
§
4, 1955,
Aug.
308, 3;
Act of
P.L.
76 C.J.S. Registers
§
of
1, 10(b) (1952) (stating
Deeds
the recorder’s
“is to
duty
§§
deeds,
record
and
mortgages,
affecting
other instruments
in the official
realty
provided
kept
books
and
for such
books,
As the
purpose”).
recording
custodian of the
records,
deed
obligated
the recorder of deeds “is
protect
to
annually,
appellee
appellant
they
both
testified that
do not
having
inspected,
requesting
inspect
recall
the court
ever
the
79,
(N.T.
135).
deed books.
have
Sister states
also held that
the recorder of deeds is not a
judicial
Bergerman
Byrnes,
officer.
114 N.Y.S.2d
421
aff'd,
Bergerman,
305 N.Y.
Our court, officer of the but the records held by not an noted by of deeds are not court As recorder .records. law, Custer, which, “the records recorder of by court [the keep, the records of required safely is deeds] [are not] court____ [t]hey are or decrees judgments people county of the transactions history Pa.Super. to land.” 68 at 61. affecting the titles deeds, the recorder of as the custodian We conclude duty has the deed custody. deed records within her safeguard the the recorder of deeds not an officer because are not custody records within the recorder and the records, or control the court of common any authority over recorder of deeds or pleas may have conferred stat the recorder must be books retained ute. primarily relies on P.S. appellant
Because the Berks argument continuation of support of his *8 debinding of the deed books county contract and County turn an pleas, of common to harms court irreparably of that statute.9 analysis support his in of § also cites 16 P.S. 9876 in brief Schaeffer provides: injunction. request Section 9876 for an his duty several counties It shall be the the commissioners commonwealth, necessary by it be whenever shall deemed this proper county, to of common or district court manner, transcribed, legible any copied fair and to be or in a cause offices, public of record contained in the several dockets books funds, counties, paid out respective to for in their
569 take it We as that in 1827, uncontroverted deed qua books, books, were the means of primary permanently recording deeds and other for instruments future refere The nce.10 deed books held by the recorder of deeds were the method of systematically recording and permanently retaining organized history of the real estate transac tions a The county. within clear intent of section 9872 was to ensure the organized integrity system of record ing deeds. Section in 1827, enacted created a procedure to ensure that deed books that needed “to be bound anew” because of continued public and extensive use could be systematically rebound.11 Within this statutory procedure, the court of common pleas has the discretionary if authority any determine are in such a condition that they need to be By providing rebound. a procedure books, checking the deed integrity of if necessary, their ordering repair, legislature en suring that would have access to and could orders drawn on commissioners the treasurer of the county. proper (1827), repealed 20002(a)[108] part by 16 P.S. 9876 42 P.S. § language We have considered in 9876 and that conclude any support appellant’s it argument does not offer additional over provided by that § 9872. today, comparison 10. We note that "books” are not the primary recording many means of documents in in the counties January commonwealth. Since all deed records filed in Berks microfilm; is, solely are made on there have been no books, qua deed (N.T. created Berks after December 1986. 18-19). many 11. We note that the older cases uncovered in our research petitions requesting reveal to the court the creation of new indices of records, See, repair e.g., listings. Transcription of old index In re Dockets, (1902) (“[the] Perry County Judgment Index Dist. 557 prothonotary presented petition setting ... his to the forth that Judgment decay Index “G” and "H” Dockets were so affected with of matter properly records therein contained would be lost unless for’’); Dockets, Reindexing Judgment Dauph. cared (1898) (“the Matter presented petition setting bar ... forth several reasons desirable”); why judgment Spong, new were indexes McCommon v. 453, —, us, (1888) (“a petition presented Sad. 14 A. signed by county, setting great the bar of the forth the of an need records”). index of *9 570 use the records that are in the recorder’s
effectively deed office. creating enacting procedure, section 9872 and
By intended to court of legislature grant conclude the role with deed supervisory pleas respect common a to the find within a language support records. We no 9872 to pleas intent common legislative substitute court of for the recorder of deeds as the custodian the control with and over the records. referring find further for our conclusion support by
We analogous concerning related case to an statute and law 17, of Title indexing records. Section 1981 1891, provided enacted proper county hereby pleas
The court common ad- appear and whenever it shall empowered authorized and indices inspection on of the books records visable of deeds belonging to the several offices ... recorder counties, order, and alter the by change of such its in one or preparing keeping mode of and said indices said to direct the mode in which said more of offices and prepared kept. indices shall thereafter be 1978, 28, repealed (1981), April 1981 Act of 17 P.S. § 53, 42 replaced by 202, No. 2(a)[770] P.L. 323, 912, (1978). supreme Pa.C.S.A. 4301 Our §§ Raker, Nicely Pa. 95 section 1981 interpreted the coun- Nicely dispute between A. 556 involved controller, recorder pleas, common and the court of ty court of common deeds. Pursuant to section into a contract ordered the recorder of deeds enter The indexing county. the mode of deeds in the change Id., accordingly deeds let such a contract. recorder of Thereafter, 388-89, 556-57. 95 A. at Pa. contract, under the payment refused to approve
controller
to direct a
authority
“the
without
contending
court was
Id., 250 Pa. at
reindexing
of the records
contract.”
The
court’s
A. at 557.
court affirmed
lower
supreme
contract,
noting
that section
approving
judgment
altering
changing
in the court the sole
“vests
the mode of preparing
keeping
indexes
in the
Id.,
several
offices of record.”
[a]s below, learned court after having determined there ought change to in be the method of keeping the records statute, referred to in the to enter an order or decree requiring the same should directing be done and the manner in which the indices were thereafter to kept. making order, With the of power that the upon conferred It the court the by statute would apparently end.... not purpose the the legislature, as expressed in of act, the the to take language away the recorder from deeds, instance, records, the the custody the for security which he responsible by law. Id., Pa.Superior added). 62 (emphasis Ct. at As inter- preted the by authority and control extended section 1981 to the court of pleas common was limited to statute, that specifically is, described the to order change the and alteration of the of preparing mode keeping deed indices. Upon entry of an order pursuant to section power court’s was thereafter limited to its supervisory role. Section 1981 did grant not the court of pleas common powers broad custodial control records, nor legislature did the intend restrict or amend the recorder of deeds’ authority or responsibility over the deed records in his or her custody.
Section as relied on by appellant, is a similar grant of limited power to the court of statutory common pleas. As provided by section the court of common pleas has the to order discretionary authority rebinding of the deed However, need to be bound anew. section 9872 grant does not the court the custody and Likewise, for the deed books. section 9872 grant does not the court the power prohibit the lawful of deed Pursuant to section microfilming books. merely given power has been pleas common are in need of binding order the anew of deed books that language suggesting find no section 9872 rebinding. We away intended “to take from the record- legislature that the deeds, Custer, custody records.” er ... Pa.Super. at 62. does not accord the conclude section 9872
Although we powers common broad custodial over court of records, holding emphasize deed’s that this recorder of say] that the court is without is “not to be understood [to a contract made any supervise event if it exhibit an intent to waste officer should proper Custer, at 63 Pa.Super. public money.” squander *11 added). that the court emphasize we (emphasis to an clearly power enjoin is not without pleas of common to restricting public is access improperly officer who records.13 records,12 improperly destroying public or who —, 14 A. 263 10 Sad. at Id.; Spong, v. McCommon 453, 14 10 Sad. A. Spong, cites Appellant McCommon argument his that the court support in 260 for the deed statutory responsibility has the common McCommon, the issue of In the court addressed books. authority had the recorder wills the incumbent whether order of the court by contract entered into to rescind a suggests deed books are Although appellant in his brief that microfilmed, they evidence public have been to the after inaccessible hearing, evidentiary from which the lower court was introduced at original can access the find that members of could (N.T. photographed. at they and after have been debound even finding. 59-61). supports such a The record assertion, agree contrary appellant’s infra, to note 13. As we finding there has been no demonstration court’s that with the lower Therefore, appellant’s records. irreparable of the deed destruction granted prohibit further injunction argument should that an cutting and books because of the of the deed irreparable destruction irreparable appellant cannot show merit. Where is without Controls, harm, Ogontz injunction not be awarded. will at Pa.Super. 499 A.2d at Id. at —, common 9872.14 pleas pursuant section A. pleas, response at 260-61. The court of common to a bar, petition from the ordered the creation of indices for the wills, records held the recorder of recorder of wills. The task, Spong, began was chosen to undertake such a and he general election, the work. At the next a new recorder of wills, McCommon, elected, who then refused to permit —, Id. Spong indexing to continue with the at contract. A. argued at 261. McCommon that he was entitled to any wills, profits ascribable to the office of the recorder of therefore, indexing given contract should be to him. court, The trial supreme appeal, upheld and the court on Id. original Spong. —, contract with at 14 A. at 262. The trial opinion, adopted by supreme court’s explained that the enactment of section 9872 “imposed upon power duty directing making courts the indexes, complete legislature] full and certainly [and contemplated should have the [the courts] competent intrust the labor to could persons.... It not legislature have been intended the courts were compelled person to commit it to the who happened McCommon, be the incumbent the office.” Sad. ——, 14 A. at 261. We do not find McCommon to be apposite. McCommon
The court specifically addressing dispute between the recorder of wills and the former re- *12 corder of working wills who was under a court order to create new indices for the will record books. The former recorder, Spong, indices, was working to create new record under court order. The court of common pleas had the 9872, authority, pursuant to section to order the creation of contracted, the new indices. Once ordered and it was not within a later elected recorder of wills’ to authority modify the court order. 154, 4, analyzed
14. The statute is McCommon referred to as P.L. § above, Act of March 29. As noted P.L. 4 was later § repromulgated as 16 P.S. McCommon inapposite is to the case at bar. The instant and to or attempt modify case not involve an order does McCommon it. do not read to importantly, alter More pleas, pursuant hold court of common to section that the authority prohibit to the recorder power has the and the reproduce deeds a valid contract continuing from microfilm, microfilming the county deed books onto where the deed records. process destroy does not contract Judge also contends the Berks Schaeffer eroding the of common pleas by harms court irreparably argued court. As undermining public confidence the is appellant, statutorily under 16 P.S. the court granted responsibility protect the deed books. the Therefore, the without the debinding the deed knowledge public erodes express approval find appellant’s confidence in the court. We support. Not has argument completely to be without his no erosion of appellant presented support evidence but, above, argument, confidence as we concluded argument is merit to his that the court of common there no has, authority custodial pursuant section over deed records. We responsibility specifically that the recorder of deeds is the deed records have found protect safeguard the custodian with deed records. brief, argues the appellant debinding In his further destroyed the deed books irreparably deed books has destroy remaining deed books irreparably threatens to microfilming permitted Ap- if contract to continue. Schaeffer, Brief, argued As at 13-15. pellant’s microfilming pro- of the deed books for the are records” because the “destroys public cess Id. being after debound. not accessible “books” court that no was presented The trial held evidence deeds, any acting “or one establishing recorder behalf,” destroying sense any unlawfully on her was in Moreover, Opinion, Trial at 24. public records. Court presented found from the evidence “specifically *13 there was nothing cutting that could be construed as a or destruction of any of the volumes contained in the [appel- office.” carefully Id. After and thoroughly review- lee’s] ing language, record and all relevant we statutory agree with the lower court. no remotely
We note that evidence was introduced that records, suggests wording pages the deed or on the has off, destroyed, been will be cut torn or mutilated. The evidence from presented pages was that the deed removed, means, cutting books were or other from the then binding, photographed, placed loose back into the (N.T. 25-87). and binding, finally wrapped paper. brown more, Without we can not conclude that the above debind ing microfilming process pursuant undertaken to a contract, irreparably destroying valid the Berks County deed books.15 We find that under the applicable law, books, County pursu the Berks deed contract, ant to proper lawful to accommodate the micro filming process, does not constitute a destruction of the deed or records.16 Appellant argues County also that the Records Committee Manual books, books, qua permanently. states that deed must be retained Brief, Appellant’s ual, (citing County at 9-10 Records Committee Man- 6B, 6-B-l). chap. by appellant While the table noted does state grantor grantee perma- deed books and indices must be “retained Manual, 4(a), nently," appellant chapter paragraph we refer 1 of the “[tjhe provides which electronically fact that information is created and stored paper bearing or on microfilm rather than on no has on its retention status.” We conclude that the rule to retain deed books permanently apply only consisting paper does not records, bindings, applies electronically and created, microfilmed, but to all deed whether paper. or on Although we find in this case there has been no demonstration of a emphasize destruction of deed records or is not to be read as an historically that this decision approval disposal of the destruction or acknowledge completely valuable documents. We support solely retention records for their value as historical Committee, County We pursu- records. ant to 16 P.S. the records tion of records of Manual, note that the Records created 13001-06 has §§ stated that the establishment of was, disposition program part, preserva- to “ensure the permanent value.” Records Committee 1A, 3(b), chap. para. at l-A-2. we note that the schedules, mandatory Records Committee has set to be ad- *14 conclude, has not estab- appellant summary,
In we caused harm irreparable immediate and form of any lished find that contract. We microfilming the Berks by part as deed books debinding county constitute a destruc- contract not microfilming does lawful find that the debind- public records. tion of common harm the court irreparably not ing process does the deed inspecting from the court precluding pleas by that, in binding any anew ordering books and we con- Finally, need to be rebound. opinion, the court’s deed books of the Berks clude that the not common does of the court of the approval without eroding public confidence the court harm irreparably the court. is affirmed. relief injunctive
The denial of POPOVICH, J., dissenting opinion. a files POPOVICH, dissenting: Judge, circumstances, proba- majority would ordinary Under standing the issue of opines it correct when bly be Dilliplaine under therefore waived not raised and A.2d 114 Co., Pa. Valley Trust Lehigh ordinary circum- However, present does not this case rare, exquisitely unique, if an Indeed, it is a not stances. citizen) individual, on (not private as an judge when a event toward anoth- litigation directed initiative institutes his own public perceived to redress a entity er official said, concerned, with the let it be I not here wrong. am of the sub- assessment Schaeffer’s correctness rather, is the is bothersome what complaint; of his stance invocation sponte that his sua that it is assumed notion the issue simply condoned because the court is was a though judge as raised heretofore not litigant. common any county disposing records. when officers
hered to all Id. See case equity a routine here not with dealing areWe to whom of the Commonwealth citizens ordinary between equally. system apply judicial rules of our the laws and analysis requiring special a scenario special This is a factual We, disputes. of common resolution not necessary Court, intermediary appellate Superior judges ultimate, Court, consti- Supreme to the step way on the sys- judicial of our unified supervisor tutionally ordained with the to scrutinize tem, inherent have an in his involving judge cases a uncommon utmost care those litigant. public role as controversy facts or a present does not
While case it never- participants, anyone except that would arouse *15 conclude, Thus, I far-flung implications. has theless to ensure its treatment special case demands special this correctness. result is not correct because is that analysis
My Schaeffer, majority approval least the without at Judge The statute bring his action. authority had no his request injunc- based his Judge Schaeffer upon which 9872, which, in pertinent part, pro- is 16 P.S. tive relief § vides: * * * it shall be every year, once in each and At least deeds, recorders of ... of each of the aforesaid ...
duty commonwealth, to of this submit in the several counties to their several offices belonging of records the books common of the the court inspection judges it duty and shall be proper county; books, as and direct such of the said court to order said it, anew; and to be bound opinion may require in their wanting, be also, may in all cases where the same the matters complete and indexes of order and direct full within prepared, to be made and contained said books reasonable, (em- think may such time as the said court added) phasis indicates that President
Nothing the record colleagues his ever authorized Schaeffer was Forrest to file this County of Berks of Common Pleas the Court suit. Nor is President Judge granted Schaeffer the power to take such an action on behalf of the Berks Court of Common 325(e)(1). Pleas. See Pa.C.S.A. As 16 P.S. clear, 9872 makes abundantly it is the Court of Common Pleas of Berks has which to take action statute, under this not President Judge acting Schaeffer alone. I would further comment that such under authority, our system, unified could prior derived from the and Supreme advice consent of our Court. I
Accordingly, quash appeal. would
Superior Pennsylvania. Court
Argued March April Filed