76 Ohio St. 3d 553 | Ohio | 1996
Lead Opinion
We are asked to decide whether Mrs. Schaefer’s personal injury claim and Mr. Schaefer’s loss of consortium claim share a single per person limit of uninsured motorist coverage, or whether they each have available to them a separate per person limit to provide compensation for their
In construing provisions in an automobile insurance policy, we are mindful of the basic tenet that the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage and its mandatory offering is “to protect persons from losses which, because of the tortfeasor’s lack of liability coverage, would otherwise go uncompensated.” Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. Co. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 478, 480, 639 N.E.2d 438, 440, citing Abate v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co. (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 161, 165, 51 O.O.2d 229, 231, 258 N.E.2d 429, 432. Furthermore, since R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) is remedial legislation, it must be liberally construed in order to effectuate the legislative purpose. Martin, 70 Ohio St.3d at 480, 639 N.E.2d at 440, citing Curran v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 33, 54 O.O.2d 166, 266 N.E.2d 566. An insurance policy provision will be deemed unenforceable if the provision is contrary to the statute and its purpose. Martin at 480, 639 N.E.2d at 440. With these principles in mind, we now turn to the insurance policy which Allstate provided to its insureds:
The policy at issue contained the following pertinent provision, included within its Uninsured Motorists Insurance Coverage:
“Limits of Liability
“The coverage limit stated on the declarations page for:
“(1) ‘each person’ is the total limit for all damages arising out of bodily injury to one person in any one motor vehicle accident.
“(2) ‘each accident’ is the total limit for all damages arising out of bodily injury to two or more persons in any one motor vehicle accident.” (Emphasis added.)
Although this provision clearly states that Mr. Schaefer’s claim for loss of consortium, arising from the bodily injuries sustained by his spouse, shares her single per person limit, nevertheless, Mr. Schaefer contends that he and his wife are not subject to a single $100,000 per person limit of liability. Instead, he believes that he should be compensated for his own separate claim and be awarded an additional $100,000 for his loss of consortium claim. He argues that such a result is dictated by our decision in Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993),
Dues and Tomlinson do indeed support Allstate’s position. However, based upon our decision in Savoie and cases culminating in its decision, we need to revisit Dues and Tomlinson to determine whether they comport with the current law of our state.
In Dues, we held that “[a]n insurance policy provision that limits recovery for all causes of action arising out of bodily injury to one person to a single limit of liability is a valid restriction of uninsured motorist coverage.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. In so holding, however, Dues overruled Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 156, 10 OBR 490, 462 N.E.2d 396, which had held that a separate per person limit of uninsured motorist coverage must be available to provide compensation both for the personal injury claim brought by a father on his son’s behalf and for the father’s own derivative claim for the loss of his son’s services. In Auto-Oumers, the court had reasoned that “[w]ere this not the rule, [an insured] could conceivably be in the position of having less coverage than he paid for, despite the fact that [the insured] has individual claims arising from” the accident which physically injured his son. Id., 10 Ohio St.3d at 161, 10 OBR at 495, 462 N.E.2d at 401.
As its rationale for overruling Auto-Oumers, the court in Dues merely stated that “R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) does not indicate that it was intended to override reasonable limitations on the amount of coverage.” Dues, 36 Ohio St.3d at 49, 521 N.E.2d at 793. However, such an interpretation disregards the rule that language in an insurance policy must be read strictly in favor of the insured and contravenes the public policy concern that uninsured motorist coverage is to protect motorists from the dangers of uninsured motorists.
Applying Dues, Tomlinson, 44 Ohio St.3d 11, 540 N.E.2d 716, held that an insurer may, by appropriate language, limit all claims arising out of a single bodily injury to a single per person limit of coverage. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
In an effort to bring stability, consistency, and clarity to the state of automobile insurance law in Ohio, this court decided Savoie, supra. In Savoie, we held that beneficiaries in a wrongful death action each are entitled to a separate per person limit of coverage under an uninsured motorist policy. Id., 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809, paragraph one of the syllabus. In so finding, we recognized that R.C. 2125.02(A)(1) created separate rights to recovery. Id. at 504, 620 N.E.2d at 812. However, we believe that the logic of the decision in Savoie should now be applied to loss of consortium claims in personal injury cases.
Ohio common law recognizes that when one spouse is injured, the other spouse is also damaged and may assert his or her own cause of action against the tortfeasor for those damages — ie., a claim for loss of consortium. Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc. (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 65, 74, 51 O.O.2d 96, 101-102, 258 N.E.2d 230, 235. “Consortium consists of society, services, sexual relations and conjugal affection which includes companionship, comfort, love and solace.” Id., paragraph three of the syllabus. Even though a loss of consortium claim is derivative in that it is dependent upon the defendant’s having committed a legally cognizable tort upon the spouse who suffers bodily injury, Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 84, 93, 585 N.E.2d 384, 392, it is nonetheless legally separate and independent from the claim of the spouse who suffered the bodily injury. Id.
The fact that loss of consortium is a creation of the common law does not meaningfully differentiate spouses bringing those actions from spouses who are beneficiaries under the wrongful death statute. It is the separate injury which parties to both kinds of claims suffer that entitle them to separate per person limits. Thus, we see no valid reason to distinguish between 'wrongful death
Applying our holding to the facts of this case, we find that Mr. Schaefer’s claim for loss of consortium is subject to its own per person limit of liability. Thus, the jury award to Mr. Schaefer in the amount of $100,000 is reinstated. The court of appeals’ decision overturning this verdict is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
. Mr. Schaefer also argues that the policy provision is invalid under State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 397, 583 N.E.2d 309, since it improperly reduces or eliminates uninsured motorist coverage for a claim arising from a recognized tort. However, it is unnecessary to address this argument as Savoie is dispositive of the issue presented in this case.
. See, also, Cole v. Holland (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 220, 667 N.E.2d 353, which applies paragraph three of the syllabus of Savoie to hold that in a personal injury case, an insurer’s setoff applies against the insured’s damages, not against the policy limit of uninsurance/underinsurance coverage. Thus, Cole also expands the logic announced in Savoie to cases involving nonfatal injuries.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. I concur with the majority. I write separately to respond, in part, to the dissent of Justice Cook. That dissent says that the majority “depart[s] from the sound reasoning contained in Dues and Tomlinson.” I respectfully submit that the majority is doing no more than returning the law to where it was before Dues and Tomlinson were decided. The change in the law was brought about by intervening elections which placed new justices on this court. If the often-quoted (when convenient) rule of stare decisis had been followed, then the law in the case now before us would have remained as it was pre-Dues and Tomlinson.
The statute in question, R.C. 3937.18(A)(1), provides that insurance policies issued in this state must include uninsured motorist coverage “for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury * * * suffered by any person insured under the policy.” In this case, we know (1) that the policy in question contains an uninsured motorist provision; (2) that Mr. Schaefer is an insured under that policy; and (3) that he is legally entitled to recover damages for his loss of consortium claim (his damages) from the uninsured motorist tortfeasor. These are the only qualifications. The statute
In Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 431, 23 O.O.3d 385, 433 N.E.2d 555, a father had a derivative claim arising out of the death of his seventeen-year-old daughter, who was killed as a result of an automobile accident caused by an uninsured driver. In a four-to-three vote, this court held that the father had a separate claim under his own insurance policy even though the daughter was not an insured under the terms of the father’s policy. This court did so in interpreting R.C. 3937.18.
Two years later, in 1984, this court decided Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 156, 10 OBR 490, 462 N.E.2d 396. Between the decision in Sexton in February 1982 and the decision in Lewis in April 1984, the election of November 1982 took place. In that election one of the dissenting votes in Sexton was replaced by a new justice, who then voted with the majority in Lewis. In Lewis, this court held in paragraph two of the syllabus, unambiguously and unequivocally, that “[w]here separate and independent causes of action arise from injuries caused by an uninsured motorist and such injuries are covered by the uninsured motorist provision of an automobile insurance policy, the policy limits applicable to uninsured motorist coverage will be available to each cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) The vote was five to two, with the two dissenters being two of the three dissenters in Sexton, continuing their dissent.
Then, in April 1988, this court decided Dues v. Hodge (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 46, 521 N.E.2d 789. Between the 1984 decision in Lewis and the 1988 decision in Dues, two more elections (November 1984 and November 1986) took place. At the 1984 election, two new justices joined the court. The two justices in dissent in Lewis remained on the court. At the 1986 election, two more new justices were elected, replacing two of the justices who were in the majority in Lewis. Combined, these two elections (1984 and 1986) brought about a new majority deciding the issue that is, once again, before us. Thus, in April 1988, in Dues, a majority of this court overruled paragraph two of the syllabus in Lewis (although not doing so in the syllabus of Dues) and held in paragraph two of the syllabus of Dues that “[a]n insurance policy provision that limits recovery for all causes of action arising out of bodily injury to one person to a single limit of liability is a valid restriction of uninsured motorist coverage.” This was, of course, completely opposite to the holding in Lewis (and arguably Sexton), case law that had been in effect only since 1984 (Lewis) and 1982 {Sexton). The only intervening events effecting this change were two elections (1984 and 1986).
Subsequently, in Tomlinson v. Skolnik (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 11, 540 N.E.2d 716, with a visiting judge joining the majority to make four and one of the members of the Dues majority now joining the dissenters (albeit for a different
Now, yet two more elections affecting this equation (November 1988 and November 1992) were held. Today, a new majority (which includes one of the justices dissenting in Dues and Tomlinson), returns the law to what it was {Lewis) before all of this started. Accordingly, I concur.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. The majority in this case holds that “[e]ach person who is covered by an uninsured motorist policy and who is asserting a claim for loss of consortium has a separate claim subject to a separate per person policy limit” and that, therefore, “[a] provision in an insurance policy which reaches a contrary result is unenforceable.” Accordingly, the majority opinion holds that the insurance contract limits in this case for “each person,” as defined in the contract as “all damages arising out of bodily injury to one person in any one motor vehicle accident,” are invalid. I cannot agree with these holdings.
In Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809, this court held that a wrongful death beneficiary has a separate damage claim subject to a separate per person limit. The majority now extends the holding in Savoie to this case where Mr. Schaefer’s separate claim is based upon loss of consortium resulting from physical injuries suffered by his wife in an automobile accident.
Subsequent to this court’s decision in Savoie, the legislature amended R.C. 3937.18. Specifically, R.C. 3937.18(H) provides as follows:
“Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance that includes coverages offered under division (A) of this section and that provides a limit of coverage for payment for damages for bodily injury, including death, sustained by any one person in any one automobile accident, may, notwithstanding Chapter 2125 of the Revised Code, include terms and conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising out of any one person’s bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be subject to the limit of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person, and, for the purpose of such policy limit shall constitute a single claim. Any such policy limit shall be enforceable regardless of the number of insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations or policy, or vehicles involved in the accident.”
Section 10 of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 explains R.C. 3937.18(H) as follows:
“It is the intent of the General Assembly in enacting division (H) of section 3937.18 of the Revised Code to supersede the effect of the holding of the Ohio Supreme Court in its October 1, 1993 decision in Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co.
Although this amended statute was not in effect at the time of the accident or at the time this case was filed, I find it instructive on how this case should be decided. Rather than extend Savoie to the facts of this case in contravention of amended R.C. 3937.18(H), I would reaffirm this court’s holding in Dues v. Hodge (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 46, 521 N.E.2d 789. I would, therefore, find the per person limit language in this policy a valid restriction of coverage. Because Mrs. Schaefer recovered the policy limits under this language for her bodily injuries, I would hold that Mr. Schaefer has no right to recovery for his claim for loss of consortium arising from his wife’s physical injuries under this insurance policy.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
Dissenting Opinion
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.
Neither public policy considerations nor the Savoie case mandates the majority’s conclusion that ignores the plain language set forth in this insurance contract. The Dues and Tomlinson cases were decided correctly and I would not limit or overrule them.
This insurance contract limits “each person” coverage to “the total limit for all damages arising out of bodily injury to one person in any one motor vehicle accident.” Together, our decisions in Dues and Tomlinson hold that a loss of consortium claim is a derivative action and is not a separate bodily injury claim, and, therefore, the policy language at issue here is a valid restriction of coverage. In Dues v. Hodge (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 46, 49, 521 N.E.2d 789, 793, this court stated that “R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) does not indicate that it was intended to override reasonable limitations on the amount of coverage available for each accident.”
Rather than overruling Dues or Tomlinson, Savoie limited the application of the second paragraph of the Dues syllabus to “cases involving a single bodily injury which has not resulted in wrongful death.” Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 509, 620 N.E.2d 809, 816. That is exactly the situation which now presents itself to this court.
With all due respect, I am unpersuaded by the majority to depart from the sound reasoning contained in Dues and Tomlinson. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court.