Scerri v. WalshScerri v. Walsh
The Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiffs established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the defendants were aware of their dog‘s “vicious propensities” (Bard v Jahnke, 6 NY3d 592, 599 [2006]; see Bernstein v Penny Whistle Toys, Inc., 10 NY3d 787, 788 [2008]; Marek v Burmester, 37 AD3d 668, 669 [2007]), with evidence that the dog had bitten, “mouthed,” growled, or “snapped” at three other children prior to the instant attack (see Collier v Zambito, 1 NY3d 444, 447 [2004]; Dykeman v Heht, 52 AD3d 767, 769 [2008]; Seybolt v Wheeler, 42 AD3d 643, 644 [2007]). In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Galgano v Town of N. Hempstead, 41 AD3d 536 [2007]; Longstreet v Peltz, 33 AD3d 673 [2006]). Accordingly, the court properly awarded summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiffs.
Contrary to the defendants’ argument, the plaintiffs showed “good cause” in the form of a “satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness” of their summary judgment motion (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; see
In light of our determination, the defendants’ remaining contention has been rendered academic. Skelos, J.P., Angiolillo, Balkin and Lott, JJ., concur.