247 F. 712 | E.D. Pa. | 1917
The considerations which lead to the disposition to he made of this motion are of the very broadest and most general character. Every legal controversy of sufficient importance to be taken seriously presents two phases. It has its practical side, involving very practical consequences, and its legal side, involving the formulation of legal principles and their application, and these may be approached through forms of procedure, and raise questions of the appropriateness of the special remedy invoked. These purely professional or legal considerations are also of importance because they directly affect or indirectly influence the development of the science of the law and enter into the building up of our system of laws. In this molding process, the legal profession, as well as the courts, cannot avoid having a part and are expected to have a part. The profession can make its influence felt only through the courts, and the courts must stop short of any invasion of the proper domain of the Regislature. Even when the power of the Regislature is not in question, wisdom would dictate that there should be no purely arbitrary interference on its part with the natural growth and development of the remedial side of the law along proper and approved lines. This freedom to grow and develop is one of the many claims to merit which the so-called common-law system possesses. To it we are indebted for many of our most effective and efficient legal and equitable remedies. The possession of this judicial power has led, it is true, to the courts being subjected to general criticism for being overconservative, and in notable specific instances to the charge of usurpation of power. On the whole, however, it has worked to the common good, and as the Regislature has amply adequate defensive power at its command there is little practical danger of permanent harm from judicial action.
Our present equity rules show a like attitude in the permission given by Rule 22 (198 Fed. xxiv, 115 C. C. A. xxiv) for such transfers. To •those of us who have been schooled in the older and more strictly logical system of practice, these new doctrines may seem almost heretical; but, however reluctant an acquiescence in them, we cannot refuse recognition of the fact that they have been accepted, and further cannot deny to them the merit of bringing good results. Numberless precedents establish the facts of such acceptance from the multitude of which we cite at random one as an illustration, although perhaps not the best illustration. Stokes v. Williams, 226 Fed. 146, 141 C. C. A. 146.
Our conclusion is that these precedents establish the jurisdiction and power of the court to appoint receivers in proceedings such as the
This disposes of the present motion to dismiss, so far as it is based upon absence of jurisdiction.
1. The bill is substantially for the appointment of a receiver as a caretaker of the assets of the corporation within this district, and to enable it to perform functions which are of real public character. It is itself, strictly a holding company, but it in effect performs strictly public functions. Whatever criticism on general legal and equitable principles the practice of appointing receivers in the cases of private corporations may invite (and we think the critics are justified), such practice in cases of corporations of the character of this defendant has been too firmly established by a long line of precedents to be judicially condemned. This court does therefore have jurisdiction of the subject-matter and admittedly has jurisdiction of the parties.
2. The jurisdiction of this court is not affected by the fact which does not appear by this bill that by reason of the conduct of its affairs, its.insolvency, or otherwise, it has subjected itself to liability to a proceeding under the New Jersey Statute for its dissolution.
In reaching those conclusions, we have had in mind the distinction between the power of a court to appoint a receiver when such appointment is merely ancillary to the exercise of undoubted jurisdiction of
The motion to dismiss is denied.