Scasny v. MayfieldScasny v. Mayfield
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-15-841464
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 25, 2016
Bryan L. Carr
1392 SOM Center Road
Mayfield Heights, Ohio 44124
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Frank H. Scialdone
Tami Z. Hannon
John T. McLandrich
Mazanic, Raskin, Ryder Co., L.P.A.
100 Franklin‘s Row
34305 Solon Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44139
Mark V. Guidetti
Joseph W. Diemert & Associates
1360 SOM Center Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44124
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.:
I. The trial court erred when it ruled in favor of the appellees’ interpretation of their Codified Ordinance and in denying the appellants’ request for declaratory judgment.
{¶2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm the trial court‘s decision.
{¶3} The dispute between the parties concerns alterations that were made to a second building on Scasny‘s property. In 2002, Scasny initially obtained approval to construct a 292 square foot detached two-car garage that included a driveway. The two-car garage has now become a 644 square foot two level building with a bathroom that includes a toilet and tub; a kitchen area with a kitchen sink and cooking area; a laundry room with a washer and dryer; a large recreation room with cable television; the two levels are air conditioned; and the building contains a furnace and hot water heater. Scasny now refers to the building as a “little house” and a “man cave.”
{¶4} Despite the disputes over the years between the Village and Scasny regarding the structure, the only issue that remains unresolved is whether Scasny, pursuant to the Village‘s ordinances, should be permitted to have cooking facilities in the structure.3 The Village‘s Board
of Zoning Appeals (“BZA“) denied Scasny‘s request to be able to cook on the premises and the Council affirmed the BZA‘s decision.
{¶5} Scasny appealed the Council‘s decision, and the trial court affirmed, stating as follows:
The court affirms the decision of the Village of Mayfield in prohibiting an electric cooktop or cooking appliances in the secondary building. The court finds the Village‘s ruling was not unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and was supported by a preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.
Journal Entry, September 25, 2015.
Analysis
{¶6} In his sole assigned error, Scasny argues that the trial court erred by agreeing with the Council‘s application of the Village‘s ordinance regarding the prohibition against cooking in Scasny‘s structure.4
R.C. 2506.04
{¶7} Common pleas courts and appellate courts apply different standards of review to appeals brought pursuant to
{¶8} In Henley v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147, 2000-Ohio-493, 735 N.E.2d 433, the Ohio Supreme Court explained the applicable standard of review as follows:
[W]e have distinguished the standard of review to be applied by common pleas courts and courts of appeals in
R.C. Chapter 2506 administrative appeals. The common pleas court considers the “whole record,” including any new or additional evidence admitted underR.C. 2506.03 , and determines whether the administrative order is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence. See Smith v. Granville Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 81 Ohio St.3d 608, 612, 693 N.E.2d 219 (1998), citing Dudukovich v. Lorain Metro. Hous. Auth., 58 Ohio St.2d 202, 206-207, 389 N.E.2d 1113 (1979), * * *.The standard of review to be applied in an
R.C. 2506.04 appeal is “more limited in scope.” Kisil v. Sandusky (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34, 12 OBR 26, 465 N.E.2d 848, 852. “This statute grants a more limited power to the court of appeals to review the judgment of the common pleas court only on ‘questions of law,’ which does not include the same extensive power to weigh ‘the preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence,’ as is granted to the common pleas court.” Id. at fn. 4. “It is incumbent on the trial court to examine the evidence. Such is not the charge of the appellate court.* * * The fact that the court of appeals * * * might have arrived at a different conclusion than the administrative agency is immaterial. Appellate courts must not substitute their judgment for those of an administrative agency or a trial court absent the approved criteria for doing so. Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 261, 533 N.E.2d 264, 267.” Id. at 147.
Although the abuse of discretion standard usually affords maximum defense to the lower court, no court retains discretion to adopt an incorrect legal rule or to apply an appropriate rule in an inappropriate manner. Such a course of conduct would result in an abuse of discretion. See Harsha, William, H., The Substance of Appeal, 17 Ohio Lawyer, No. 6, 17. We make such a determination as with other questions of law on a de novo basis.
Safest Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Athens Bd. Of Zoning Appeals, 4th Dist. Athens Nos. 12CA32, 12CA33, 12CA34, 12CA35, 2013-Ohio-5610, ¶ 16.5
{¶10} Scasny clarified at oral argument that he is arguing that the common pleas court incorrectly applied Mayfield Village Codified Ordinance 1113.08(f) to his property.
{¶11} At the outset, we point out that applying the undisputed facts of the underlying case to determine whether the trial court properly applied the ordinance does not turn the issue of statutory interpretation into a question of fact. As the Ohio Supreme Court in Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga Cty. Exec., 142 Ohio St.3d 125, 2014-Ohio-4650, 28 N.E.3d 1182, held:
The county relies on a statement in Henley, 90 Ohio St.3d at 148, 735 N.E.2d 433, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 1260 (7th Ed.1999), that application of a zoning ordinance to the facts “is a ‘question of law‘—‘[a]n issue to be decided by the judge, concerning the application or interpretation of the law.‘” See also Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 70 Ohio St.3d 460, 466, 639 N.E.2d 425 (1994)
(holding that whether a facility was an improvement to real property under
R.C. 2305.131 was a question of law when the facts were undisputed). Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Riedel v. Consol. Rail Corp., 125 Ohio St.3d 358, 2010-Ohio-1926, 928 N.E.2d 448, ¶ 6. The necessity of considering the facts or the evidence to determine whether a legislative act applies to a particular case does not turn the issue of statutory interpretation into a question of fact. Henley at 148.
{¶12} It is undisputed that the property on which Scasny resides is zoned as U-1 residential housing. According to
{¶13} Scasny claims his family is not living in the structure but fails to provide a classification under which the structure would qualify pursuant to the ordinance. Scasny admits in the documents below and in his brief, that it is more akin to a “little house” or “man cave.” Although, admittedly, transients do not use the structure, transients are not material to the definition of an accessory living accommodation.
{¶14}
(a) “Dwelling unit” means space within a dwelling, comprising living, dining, sleeping room or rooms, storage closets, as well as space and equipment for
cooking, bathing, and toilet facilities, all used by only one family and its household employees. (b) “Dwelling” means a building designed or occupied exclusively for nontransient residential use and permitted accessory uses, including one-family, two-family or multi-family buildings.
(c) “One-family dwelling” means a dwelling consisting of a single dwelling unit with the main entrance to its living quarters at ground level.
(1) “Detached dwelling” means a one-family dwelling which is separated from all other dwelling units by open space on all sides.
(2) “Semi-attached dwelling” means a one-family dwelling which is constructed as one of two one-family dwellings attached by a common fireproof party wall.
(3) “Attached dwelling” means a one-family dwelling which is constructed as one of a sequence of three or more one-family dwellings attached by common fireproof party walls.
(d) “Two-family dwelling” means a building consisting of two dwelling units one above the other, having either a separate or combined entrance or entrances.
(e) “Apartment dwelling” means a dwelling comprised of three or more dwelling units arranged one above the other and side by side, with each unit having at least one entrance to a common hall leading to the exterior.
(f) “Accessory living accommodations” means a building, or part thereof, used solely as accommodations for occupants, personal guests, or persons employed on the premises or other nonpaying transients and in which no cooking or similar housekeeping equipment is provided. * * *.6
{¶15} Under the above definitions, Scasny‘s structure qualifies as a “dwelling unit” if cooking is permitted within the building. “Accessory living accommodations” are differentiated from a “dwelling unit” by the fact that an accessory living accommodation does not allow cooking equipment. Thus, by designating Scasny‘s “little house” as an “accessory living accommodation,” Scasny is permitted to keep his expensive upgrades without violating the
{¶16} The Building Commissioner, the BZA, and the Council, would not have the power to reclassify Scasny‘s property to allow U-2 housing. The only way that Scasny would be able to have two dwelling units on his property would be to rezone his property by referendum pursuant to
{¶17} We conclude the trial court‘s application of
Declaratory Judgment
{¶18} We also conclude the trial court did not err by denying Scasny‘s complaint for declaratory judgment. Scasny contends that the Village‘s zoning ordinances regarding the restriction on “cooking” in dwelling units are vague and ambiguous.
{¶19} We review a trial court‘s determination on a declaratory judgment action for an abuse of discretion, independently and without deference to the trial court‘s decision. Mid-American Fire & Cas. Co., 113 Ohio St.3d 133, 2007-Ohio-1248, 863 N.E.2d 142, at ¶ 12-14. Our review of the ordinance shows no ambiguity regarding the prohibition against cooking in “accessory living accommodations.”
{¶20} Scasny attempts to create an ambiguity by referring to ordinances that concern “dwelling units.”
{¶21} Additionally, Scasny makes much ado about the fact that the “accessory living accommodation” definition states that “no cooking equipment” is to be “provided.” It does not state that cooking is “prohibited.” However, without providing cooking equipment, no cooking can occur. Thus, the meaning is one and the same. Moreover, because Scasny is the owner of the property, by placing cooking equipment in the structure, he would in fact be “providing” the equipment.
{¶22} Finally, “a zoning regulation is presumed to be constitutional unless determined by a court to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and without substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community.” Goldberg Cos. v. Council of Richmond Hts., 81 Ohio St.3d 207, 209, 690 N.E.2d 510 (1998), syllabus. Here, as argued by the Village before the BZA, allowing cooking in a structure that does not comply with fire and safety protocols that apply to dwelling units creates a safety issue. Thus, prohibiting cooking in “accessory living accommodations” has a substantial relationship to safety. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Scasny declaratory relief. Scasny‘s sole assigned error is overruled.
{¶23} Judgment is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellants costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCURS;
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., DISSENTS;
SEE ATTACHED DISSENTING OPINION
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., DISSENTING:
{¶24} I dissent. The Mayfield Village Codified Ordinances do not prohibit the installation of cooking equipment in a detached structure per se. The Village justified its prohibition based on two sections of its ordinances, section 1157.01 and 1113.08, both of which I would find to be inapplicable.
{¶25}
{¶26} In the agreed judgment entry entered between the Village and Scasny, the parties agreed that the detached structure is not to be used as a second single-family dwelling — a building designed or occupied exclusively for nontransient residential use and permitted accessory uses. A dwelling unit is defined as a “space within a dwelling, comprising living, dining, sleeping room or rooms, storage closets, as well as space and equipment for cooking, bathing and toilet facilities, all used by only one family and its household employees.”
{¶27} Finally, section 1113.08 does not does not prohibit, or even permit, a secondary stand-alone “accessory living accommodation.” It only defines an “accessory living accommodation” to include any part of a building used solely as accommodations and in which no cooking equipment is provided. In light of the undisputed fact that Scasny is seeking to install cooking equipment in his accessory building, it seems logical to conclude that no portion of the detached structure can be deemed an “accessory living accommodation.” Even if it were an “accessory living accommodation,” nothing in the Village‘s ordinances allows residents to maintain an “accessory living accommodation“; the phrase is only defined. The detached
{¶28} This building began its life as a permissible accessory building under the accessory use allowance in section 1157.06. To some extent, the structure retains the vestiges of its utilitarian origin. In the Village‘s decision from which the underlying appeal was taken, the Village mandated that Scasny install fire-code drywall between the tractor storage space and the rest of the area. This, along with the fact that Scasny replaced the overhung garage door with large hinged doors, reflects that the structure retains characteristics indicative of a permissible accessory building. Its use is another matter altogether. Nothing in the accessory use section, however, precludes using the permitted structure in various ways in addition to its defined use. As the Village has conceded, in struggling to articulate a basis to preclude Scasny‘s “man cave,” the addition of any one feature to an existing accessory building, such as a bathroom, T.V., or other amenity, does not transform the structure‘s intended use. It is only the combination of amenities that does this, but the Village‘s ordinances provide for this. A structure, or part thereof, becomes a dwelling unit when it has living, dining, sleeping room or rooms, storage closets, as well as space and equipment for cooking, bathing, and toilet facilities. The absence of any one is enough to prevent the structure from being deemed and used as a dwelling unit. The Village could have simply precluded Scasny from creating a sleeping room if the Village‘s argument is accepted. Section 1157.06 of the Village‘s ordinances does not preclude the installation of cooking equipment. In light of the fact that the detached structure is not a single-family dwelling or a demonstrable dwelling unit, its existence does not violate any of the ordinances cited by the Village.