81 Misc. 2d 622 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1975
Petitioners have commenced these proceedings pursuant to article 22 of the Village Law, seeking to have declared invalid assessments levied against them by respondents, which assessments purport to defray a portion of the cost of the village parking structure (hereinafter referred to as the structure).
When the petitions and answers were originally submitted to this court, the court treated the matters as motions for summary judgment by all of the parties and in accordance therewith, decided certain of the procedural issues in an opinion dated February 6, 1975. We further, however, ordered an immediate trial pursuant to CPLR 7804 (subd [h]) on the issue of legislative purpose; i.e., whether the assessment of petitioners and the creation of the benefit district by the village board of trustees was done on a rational basis. Trial was held on February 20 and 21, 1975.
At trial, although recognizing that petitioners had the burden of proof on the issue to be tried, respondents nevertheless went forward with the proof in the form of testimony and documentary exhibits purporting to support the action of the village board of trustees. The only witness testifying was Mr. Lowell Tooley, the Village Manager of Scarsdale since 1961. The Mayor of Scarsdale, Mr. Murray Steyer, who was a member of the village board during the period of time in question, was present in court but did not testify. Numerous documents in the form of staff studies, advisory committee reports and reports of architects and plans were introduced by respondents.
Although the petitions, returns, affidavits and trial evidence are voluminous, the facts necessary for determination of the issue tried may be stated briefly. The structure with spaces for approximately 500 cars was opened to the public in January of 1973. Pursuant to a formula arrived at by the village board in 1971 and formally adopted in 1974, a benefit district
Of the approximately 500 spaces in the structure, some 350 consist of long-term parking meters with the rest allocated to permit parking. Every meter in the structure is capable of being fed with coins so as to register up to 12 hours at one time. Although the village never conducted a use survey of the structure after its opening,
Mr. Tooley in his testimony conceded that another factor considered by the board in its determination to create the structure was continuous complaints by residents of the residential areas surrounding the business district concerning parking and traffic congestion on residential streets. It cannot be seriously disputed that the creation of the structure inured to the benefit of these residents.
The method by which the amount of the assessment was arrived at by the village board is also worthy of scrutiny. The amount of $617,000 purports to be Vs of the cost of construction of the structure. Mr. Tooley, in his testimony, conceded that in fact the amount of $617,000 represents the purported short fall in revenues from the operation of the structure projected over a period of years. In other words, the assessment represents the amortization of and interest on the borrowing to cover the cost of construction, plus operating expenses and maintenance, less the projected revenue from the parking meters and sale of permits, projected over a period of years. It is obvious then that the % of the cost of the structure "to be absorbed by the Village of Scarsdale as a whole” was not in fact to be absorbed by the village, but was in fact to be defrayed by the users of the structure and the Vs imposed on the special benefit district is the capitalization of the operating deficit.
This court is cognizant that the decision of the village board to create the structure and a benefit district to defray the cost
This court holds that the assessment against petitioners’ property is illegal at least in part due to the fact that the assessment in fact defrays operating expenses and maintenance of the structure, which expenses are not properly included in an assessment for a municipal parking facility (28 Opns St Comp,. 1972, p 216). Beyond this holding, however, this court is constrained to hold that the assessment against the business district and these petitioners in particular is devoid of a rational basis on this record and cannot be sustained. Petitioners’ contentions that due to the present use of their properties they are not in fact benefited by the structure have been given no weight in arriving at the above stated conclusion. In determining the validity of the assessment actual benefit to present use of a particular property is not the criteria, rather the test is whether as a result of the improvement there would be an increase in the general value of the property, which increase in value could be realized at some future time (Matter of City of New York [Juniper Ave.], 233 NY 387). Had the village board in this case made a determination of an increase in general value of the property in the business district, such a finding might sustain the assessment made. The formula adopted, however, has nothing to do with increase in general value of property, but rather is based on the variable happenstance of income derived from the use of the structure. Under the formula, the assessment upon petitioners’ property would have approached zero, had parking fees been substantially raised, whereas the assessment would have had to be increased nearly threefold if the village had decided not to charge for parking at all. The assessment adopted, having nothing to do with an increase in the general value of petitioners’ property, is illegal and cannot stand.
It is obvious to this court on the record before it that the
Accordingly, this court holds that the creation of the benefit district herein and the assessments levied upon these petitioners were arbitrary and irrational and confiscatory of petitioner’s property. The assessments are hereby declared illegal and void and any of petitioners’ funds derived by respondents as a result of the assessment of July, 1974 must be returned to petitioners. Had the court not reached the conclusion that the assessments against petitioners were void in their entirety, it would nevertheless have been constrained to remit the matter to the village board to recompute the amounts of the assessments since the board erroneously excluded village-owned proprietary property from the benefit district (Hassan v City of Rochester, 67 NY 528) and illegally considered assessed valuation in arriving at the various assessments (Village Law, § 22-2200; Matter of Eckhardt v Zion, 12 Misc 2d 344, affd 6 AD2d 885).
Submit judgment on notice in accordance with this decision and in accordance with the decision of February 6, 1975, which judgment will include decretal paragraphs as to the procedural issues decided in that prior opinion.
In fact, no testimony was adduced which indicated that traffic flow and parking were improved in the business district as a result of the opening of the structure.