28 N.H. 419 | Superior Court of New Hampshire | 1854
The firs! objection to the tax under which the defendants justify, is that the warrant for the town-meeting was not posted in a public place. It is returned to have been posted at the Baptist meeting-house. It is said such a meeting-house is not necessarily a public place, and this is true. But we understand it to have been settled here that houses of public worship are ordinarily and prima facie to be regarded as public places. In Tidd v. Smith, 3 N. H. Rep. 181, Richardson, C. J., says," the general understanding of the community on a question of this nature is entitled to much respect, and it is believed that this understanding has viewed as public places houses of public worship, inns, and perhaps, in some places, shops where goods are retailed.”
There are but few towns in the State where there are to be found any places of a more public character than meeting-houses ; and our impression is that so extensively has
Where a warrant, then, is returned to have been posted at a house of public worship, it will be prima facie taken to be a public place, and the party who objects that from the character of the town or of the house, it is not properly to be so considered, is bound to show the grounds of his objection. In the case of Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H. Rep. 175, it was held that the return must show that the warrant was posted in a public place, but the ease there was that of a dwelling-house, and we think the case of houses of public worship may v/ell form an exception to that general rule.
But it is otherwise with the county tax. 6 N. H. Rep. 191. The authority to assess that tax must be proved. In this case it was not proved. The parties made an agreement as to a substitute for that proof, but the defendant has been unable to comply with it. The court cannot extend this agreement beyond its natural import, nor exercise their judgment as to what proof may reasonably be substituted. The plaintiff, as to that, has, as he claims, a right to the verdict of a jury.
“ Due Sophia Gordon [the said widow] ten thousand dollars, to be paid for her support, as needed, and if no part is needed, no part is to be paid.
Stephen Scammon.”
This is but a special agreement, and by no means a promissory note. It is not a contract to pay ten thousand dollars, constituting the signer the debtor of that sum, nor Mrs. Gordon, his creditor, for that amount, though the first clause seems designed to carry that impression. It is merely an agreement to pay to Mrs. Gordon, for her support, as she should need it, to the amount of ten thousand dollars, if she needed it. If she did not need any part of it, no part was to be paid. It was not, therefore, evidence of any debt. Still less was it evidence either of the payment of interest or of any liability to pay it. There can be no Interest, properly speaking, unless there is an indebtedness for principal. No mention of interest is made in the writing itself. It is limited to the payment of $10,000, without interest. The court below, therefore, properly declined to give the instruction to the jury, which was requested by the plaintiff’s counsel.
Verdict set aside.