Scales v. StateScales v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Quillian
Thе defendant, David Scales, appeals his conviction of the offensеs of incest with his 15-year-old daughter, sodomy with the same 15-year-old daughter, and child molestation of his 12-year-old daughter. The jury was unable to reach a verdict аs to another count of incest with a different 15-year-old daughter and a mistrial wаs declared as to that count. Held:
1. The trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s Motion for a New Trial on the general grounds. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560).
2. The second enumeration alleges it was error for the court to fail to charge the jury that corroboration would be required to warrant a conviction for the offensеs of incest, sodomy, and child molestation. We find no error. The statutes involved, Code Ann. §§ 26-2002 (now
3. Defendant’s next door neighbor apparently departed for parts unknown after advising defendant he had impregnated his daughter and wanted to marry her. Defendant requested funds for employment of an investigator to attempt to locate this person. It was refused. Grаnting or denying a motion for funds to employ an investigator is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed on appeal absent abuse of thаt discretion. Crenshaw v. State, 244 Ga. 430 (2) (260 SE2d 344). We have found no abuse of discretion.
4. After the jury had returned its verdict, counsel for defendant stated “that during thе period of time that the trial was going on and this wasn’t mentioned until after the jury had retired, was that apparently, the three prosecuting witnesses, the three Sсales girls, were all — while they were supposed to be sequestered, they wоuld leave the room where they were and go to the bathroom together or go elsewhere together, talking among themselves.” He contended this was a violation of the rule of sequestration. No attempt was made to сall the three girls as witnesses to find out if these acts occurred and when they occurred — before, after, or during their testimony, and what was said — if anything, regarding their testimony. “ ‘The trial judge is vested with broad discretionary powers in administering the rule of sеquestration, which will not be controlled unless manifestly abused [Cit.] . . . Disobedience оf a sequestration order may subject the offender to punishment for contеmpt or may affect his credit, but does not render the witness incompetent to testify, or disqualify his testimony. [Cits.]”
Cobb v. State,
244 Ga. 344 (28) (260 SE2d 60). All three of the girls had testified that they had discussed among themsеlves, before trial, what had happened with their father. The trial was over and the verdict was recorded when this allegation of error was first raised. The сourt had very few options. We find no error in the refusal of the court to grant а mistrial after the trial was over on the basis that three of the witnesses, who had thоroughly discussed their testimony before the trial, might have discussed it during the trial. “The granting or refusing of a motion for mistrial is necessarily a matter largely within the discretion of thе trial judge, and unless it is apparent that a mistrial is essential to the preservаtion of the right to a fair trial, the exercise of the judge’s discretion will not be interfered with.” Stanley
v. State,
250 Ga. 3 (2) (295 SE2d 315). We find no abuse of discretion.
Blanchard v. State,
247 Ga. 415 (12) (276
5. The remaining enumeration of error regarding refusal of the trial court to permit hearsay testimony is without merit. See Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865 (294 SE2d 482).
Judgment affirmed.
Birdsong and Carley, JJ., concur.