15 S.C. 337 | S.C. | 1881
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J. Waddy Thomson departed this life July 5th, 1868, leaving a will bearing date September 30th, 1845. The questions raised by this appeal depend for their solution upon the proper construction of the ninth and tenth clauses of the will, which are in the following words :
“ Ninthly. I give, will find devise to M. Caroline Thomson my interest or legatee’s part of the Walker and Tuck bottoms, joining-her lands, or my part of the mill-tract of land and mills in Union district on Thickety creek, and one hundred dollars worth in property or money, just as may suit my executor best. Now I give this property, land, &c., to my sister during her natural, life and no longer, and at her death to be and belong to my ex*350 •ecutor and sons. This being all I desire she shall ever have of my estate.
“ Tenthly. I give, will and devise to Henry Hopson Thomson and his children all the balance of my lands, and all of my negroes, and all the rest and residue of my estate of all kinds whatsoever, both personal and real, which I now have, or which I may hereafter own, or which I may own at the time of my death. It is my wish and desire that he shall keep all I have here willed him, and not sell it off, but he can give or divide it as he may think best. I also request him to take special care of my old, faithful, favorite negroes, and not separate them, hereafter named.”
By the last clause Henry H. Thomson was appointed executor. The life tenant, M. C. Thomson, and the executor, Henry H. Thomson, both predeceased the testator. At the date of his will the testator owned an undivided" one-eighth of the mill-tract —the land which is the subject matter of the present controversy —as one of the devisees under the will of his father ; but subsequently, to wit, in 1852, under proceedings for partition, the mill-tract was sold and J. Waddy Thomson became the purchaser, thus acquiring a right to the remaining seven-eighths of that tract. Henry H. Thomson, the executor, at the time of his death left four sons — H. H. Thomson, J. S. R. Thomson, W. W. Thomson and R. L. Thomson — and three daughters, the plaintiffs in this action. After the death of J. Waddy Thomson the four sons went into possession of the mill-tract under a claim ■that it passed to them, to the exclusion of their sisters, under the ninth clause of the will, and shortly afterwards J. S. R. Thomson bought the interest of H. H. Thomson in the mill-tract and took a deed from him, dated December 5th, 1868, for an undivided one-fourth of the same. About the same time proceedings •were instituted for the partition of the real estate of J. Waddy Thomson, consisting of many tracts, amongst the plaintiffs and their brothers, but the mill-tract was not only not mentioned among the tracts subject to such partition, but it was'declared in the bill for partition to be the property of the brothers, and was expressly excepted in the prayer for partition. To these proceedings the plaintiffs were made parties — Mrs. Nowell and Mrs. Mills being minors at that time, by guardian ad litem, and Mrs.
On September 22d, 1874, W. W. Thomson conveyed to the defendant Fowler an undivided one-fourth interest in the mill-tract, who soon afterwards entered' into negotiations with the heirs of R. L. Thomson for the purchase of his interest, which resulted in his taking an assignment from the plaintiffs and H. H. Thomson of the amount “ arising from the sale of the one-fourth interest in the mill-tract belonging to the estate of R. Tewis Thomson.” In this assignment it was stipulated that it was to be void in case Fowler failed to bid off the property. For some reason this assignment never took effect, and when the interest of R. L. Thomson was subsequently offered for sale at public outcry it was bid off by the defendant Spears, and on December 7th, 1874, the heirs of R. D. Thomson conveyed to him the interest of their intestate in the mill-tract, describing it as a one-fourth undivided interest. Subsequently, but at what particular time is not stated, J. S. R. Thomson, under the belief that he •owned a one-half interest in the mill-tract, (one-fourth as devisee under the ninth clause of the will, and one-fourth as purchaser of the share of his brother, H. H. Thomson,) conveyed to Fowler and Spears each a one-twelfth interest, so that J. S. R. Thomson, Fowler and Spears now claim to be the exclusive owners of the mill-tract, the share of each being one-third. These parties claim to have expended large sums of money in repairs and improvements, made, as they allege, under the belief that they were the .sole owners. , As has been stated the plaintiffs, Mrs. Nowell and Mrs. Mills, were minors at the time of the partition in 1868, the former not having attained the age of twenty-one years until February 14th, 1870, and the latter on April 6th, 1872. J. S. R. Thomson was the guardian of Mrs. Nowell and had a full and satisfactory settlement of his guardianship accounts with her a few days after she attained her majority.
The plaintiffs contend that by reason of the alteration of the •estate, by the sale for partition in 1852 and the purchase under it by the testator, the devise in the ninth clause of the will was
The Circuit judge held that the purchase by the testator at the sale for partition in 1852 did not operate as a revocation of the ninth clause of the will; that under that clause the “sons” took only one-eighth of the mill-tract, and that the remaining seven-eighths must be equally divided among all of the children of Henry H. Thomson ; that J. S. R. Thomson’s plea of the statute of limitations should be sustained, except as to the claim of Mrs. Nowell; that the plaintiffs can make no claim against the defendant Spears as to the one-fourth conveyed to him by the deed in which the plaintiffs joined ; that the plaintiffs are entitled to an account of the rents and profits for a period beginning four years before the commencement of the action ; that the defendants are not entitled to any compensation for the improvements, and that there is nothing in the testimony to estop the plaintiffs.
From this decree both parties have appealed upon various grounds, which raise the following questions : 1st. Did the purchase by the testator at the sale for partition in 1852 operate as a revocation of the ninth clause of the will ? 2d. What interest did the “ sons ” take,iunder the will, in the mill-tract — the whole or only an undivided one-eighth ? 3d. Is there anything in the case which will estop the plaintiffs from making any claim to the mill-tract ? 4th, Should J. S. R. Thomson’s plea of the statute of limilations be sustained as to all or any of the plaintiffs ? 5th.
1. In considering the first question — that of revocation — we shall not attempt to follow the counsel in a detailed consideration of the numerous authorities cited, but will content ourselves with extracting from these authorities what we regard the fundamental principles established by them, and then apply these principles to the case in hand. The doctrine-of implied revocation arising from an alteration of the estate of the testator, rests' upon two principles. First. That where there has been such an alteration in the estate of the testator after the making of the-will, as would naturally imply an intention to revoke the whole or any part of the will, such an intention will be respected and the alteration will effect a revocation either in whole or in part, as the case may be. If the testator, while being possessed of a certain estate in a particular piece of property, makes a disposition of it by will, and afterwards either parts with that estate or converts it into an estate of a different nature or quality, this, of itself, may imply an intention to revoke the devise; for the fact that he has indicated an intention to give an estate of a particular nature or quality to a particular object of bounty, does not warrant the belief that he intended an estate of a different nature for the same object of bounty. Therefore, where there has been a change made by the testator in the subject of the gift, and no change made in the will, either by codicil or simple republication an intention to revoke may be implied by such alteration in the subject of the gift. But, secondly, the authorities cited show that even where the testator, after the making of his will, parts with the estate devised “ and then takes it back by the same instrument, or by a declaration of uses, it is a revocation, because he once parted with the estate.” Hence, not only where the alteration of the estate was such as to indicate an intention to revoke, but even where the alteration was such as would not imply any such intention, the rule applied, and a revocation would be implied from the simple fact of the alteration. This rested upon a second principle, that a devise was in the nature of a conveyance, and, therefore, an estate acquired after the making of the will could
In addition to this view of the question, we find that the doc
We are not, however, prepared to assent to the proposition that the testator ever did part with his original interest in the
2. The next question is, what interest did the “sons” take under the ninth clause of the will, in the “Mill Tract”— the whole or only one-eighth ? The determination of this ques» tion involves a consideration of the proper construction of the-will. We must first endeavor, if practicable, to ascertain the real intention of the testator, and, unless it is in conflict .with some rule of law, give it full effect. To ascertain the intention we must resort, not to conjecture as to what was likely to be the-wishes of the testator, but to the words in his will, and the circumstances by which he was surrounded at the time, and from these sources deduce his intent. We are to examine the will as-a whole, and, from its terms, as applied to the surrounding circumstances, determine what was in the mind of the testator at the time he executed his will. For while it is true that in a certain sense a will speaks at the death of the testator, yet, as it-was well put in the argument of one of the counsel, it speaks then what was in the mind of the testator when his will was signed. Wé cannot conceive how it can be otherwise. If it be-
Another well-settled rule of construction is, “ that all the parts ■of the will are to be construed in relation to each other, so as, iff possible, to form one consistent whole,” (2 Jarm. on Wills 741). and if there is an apparent conflict or inconsistency between the different parts, such a construction must be given, if practicable, ■as will reconcile such conflict and give effect to each part.
It is also well established that, while as a general rule parol evidence is not admissible in the construction of a will, yet, as said by Wardlaw, Ch., in McCall v. McCall, 4 Rich. Eq. 455: u In ascertaining the subject of a testator’s disposition, the court may inquire into the situation of his estate, and into every material fact which is auxiliary to the just interpretation of his words, for the purpose of identifying the thing intended by the words employed.” And again, at page 456, “ any evidence is admissible which merely tends to explain and apply what the testator has written, and no evidence can be admitted which merely shows what he intended to write.”
We must also bear in mind the fact that the language of the act of 1858, (12 8tat. 700,) which was the law in force at the time this will took effect, differs somewhat from the language
Guided by these principles, let us consider whether the interest which the testator acquired in the mill-tract, subsequent to the execution of his will, passed under the ninth or the tenth clause of his will. What intention do the words used by him, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, indicate ? It appears, from the testimony, that at the time he made his will he only.owned one-eighth of the mill-tract, and that he subsequently acquired the remaining seven-eighths. We think it absolutely certain that the testator intended to give, by the ninth clause, to the remaindermen, (the “sons,” as the event has proved), precisely the same portion that he intended for the life-tenant. He gives to her “ my interest or legatees part of the Walker and Tuck bottoms, joining her lands, or my part of the mill-tract, * * * just as may suit my executor best.” Now, the first inquiry which presents itself upon reading this language is, did the testator design to give the life-tenant a different proportion of the Walker and Tuck bottoms, in case the executor should prefer for her to take that, from that which he intended her to take in the mill-tract, if that should be the one selected by the executor as the subject of the gift, or was the change of phraseology from “ my interest or legatee’s part” to “my part,” merely accidental, or such as persons are apt to make when referring a second time to the same thing for the purpose of avoiding sameness of expression ? We confess that we are unable to discover anything in the will which would indicate an intention to give different proportions of the two tracts of land referred to in this clause to the objects of bounty there named, and the most natural inference is, that the testator, knowing that he only owned an undivided interest in these lands, and having, in the first instance, specified what that interest was — his “ legatee’s part ” — ■ he afterwards simply referred to such undivided interest as “ my part,” without again explaining what that part was. This view is in accordance with “ the situation of his estate ” at the time
But, in addition to this, the testator in the same clause uses this language: “ This being all I desire she shall ever have of my estate.” Now, to give to the ninth clause the construction contended for by the defendants would be, in contravention of one of the settled rules of construction, to deprive the language just quoted of any force or effect whatever. At the time that the testator used these words it is very clear that he did not intend that the life-tenant should have any more of his estate than the proportion which he then specified, which, as we have seen, was only one-eighth of the mill-tract, and any construction which would give her more would be not only not in accordance with the intention of the testator, but absolutely subversive of it. Practically the testator declares that all she shall ever have of his estate, that is, all which, under any circumstances, she can have, is his “ legatee’s part,” or one-eighth of the mill-tract, and to give her the remaining seven-eighths would be to make a new will for the testator.
But again, while it must be conceded that there are no words in the ninth clause referring, in express terms, to any estate which the testator might acquire after making his will, it is per
But this is not all. So far as the testimony discloses, the only property acquired by the testator subsequent to the making of his will was the seven-eighths of the mill-tract, bought by him in 1852, and if the construction contended for by the defendants should be adopted, the result would be to entirely defeat that portion of the tenth clause by which the testator undertook to dispose of any property which he might acquire after making his will. But under the view which we take, that clause is given its full effect, and at the same time the objects of bounty named in the ninth clause are deprived of nothing which, in our opinion, the testator intended them to have.
The difference between this case and that of Garrison v. Garrison, 29 N. J. 153, the authority principally relied upon by the defendants, is, that here there is a clause in the will — the tenth — which, in express terms, disposed of all after-acquired property, while in Garrison v. Garrison there was no such clause There the residuary devisee claimed the subsequently-acquired property under a general residuary clause, which did not, in terms, refer to subsequently-acquired property, while here the plaintiffs claim under a clause which does, in express terms, not only refer to all subsequently-acquired property, but makes a
3. The next inquiry is as to the estoppel. In Bigelow on Estoppel, 434, it is said that: “It is now a well-established principle that where the true owner of property holds out another, or allows him to appear as the owner of, or as having full power of disposition over, the property, and innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with such apparent owner, they will be protected. Their rights in such cases do not depend upon the actual title or authority of the party with whom they have directly dealt, but they are derived from the act of the real owner, which precludes him from disputing, as against them, the existence of the title or power which he caused or allowed to appear to be vested in the party making the sale.” In Hand v. S. & C. R. R. Co., 12 S. C. 354, this doctrine, in reference to equitable estoppel, is laid down: “ When one seeks to overthrow the state of things which he has actually brought about, to the prejudice of another, a clear wrong is perpetrated, and it is no excuse that he was ignorant of his title, for that ignorance should prejudice him alone as the result of his fault or misfortune; but its consequences should not be cast off from himself upon another, for each one should bear the consequences of his own fault or misfortune. But if silence only is alleged, knowledge of his right must be made to appear, for the possession of such knowledge is an essential element of the question of the wrongful character of such silence.”
Applying these principles to the case in hand, we take it the inquiry is, did the plaintiffs, by any positive acts or declarations, induce the defendants, or any of them, to purchase the land in question or shares therein, under the supposition that the persons from whom they purchased had good right to sell what they purported to sell. The mere silence or non-action of the plain
Then as to the defendant Fowler. At the time he purchased from W. W. Thomson a one-fourth interest in the mill-tract it does not appear that the plaintiffs, or either of them, made any representations whatever to him in regard to the ownership of that property, for it was not until after that purchase that he took from them the assignment of their interest in R. L. Thomson’s share, which in the assignment was stated to be an undivided one-fourth — the deed from "W. W. Thomson having been made on September 22d, 1874, and the assignment on December 5th following. There can be, therefore, no pretence that the plaintiffs, by any positive act on their part, induced Fowler to become a purchaser of an interest in the mill-tract, by holding out to him the idea that they had no interest therein ; and their mere silence, at the time he became such purchaser will not, as we have seen, be sufficient to estop them, when it appears they were at the time ignorant of their rights and had' no intention to deceive or mislead him, especially when, to say the least, it was doubtful whether they knew of the purchase until after it was made, and when they stood in no such fiduciary relation toward Fowler as made it their duty to speak. The case as to J. S. It. Thomson is even stronger, for his purchase of a one-fourth interest from H. H. Thomson was made as far back as December, 1868, and there is no shadow of pretence that he was induced to purchase by anything said or done by the plaintiffs.
The fact that the mill-tract was excepted from the partition made in 1868 can have no effect. No question as to the ownership of that tract was put in issue by the pleadings in that case, and, of course, no such question could have been there decided. Two of the plaintiffs were then under the disability of infancy and the
So, too, we are unable to understand how the fact that the mill-tract was rented to Scaife as the property of the “ sons ” can affect the rights of the plaintiffs. Nothing that Scaife did could operate as an estoppel against Mrs. Scaife, and certainly not as to the other two plaintiffs.
Nor are we able to perceive how the fact that the plaintiffs stood by and saw the defendants making improvements on the property can operate as an estoppel. According to our view of the rights of the parties the plaintiffs and defendants were tenants in common of the mill-tract, and surely it cannot be contended that the mere fact that one of several tenants in common stands by and sees one or more of his co-tenants enter into possession of the common property and make improvements thereon, will estop him from asserting his right to partition.
So, too, we do not think there is anything in the case to warrant the position that there was a family arrangement by which it was understood that the brothers were to take the mill-tract to the exclusion of their sisters. There is, certainly, an utter lack of any direct evidence of anything like such an agreement, and the facts and circumstances relied upon for the purpose are not, in our judgment, sufficient to establish any such agreement. We concur, therefore, in the conclusion reached by the Circuit judge that there is nothing in the ease to estop the plaintiffs, except as to any claim they may have had against the defendant Spears, as to whom the estoppel is admitted.
4. The next inquiry is as to the plea of the statute of limita- . tions interposed by the defendant J. S. K,. Thomson. We think it clear that the fiduciary relation existing between him and Mrs. Nowell prevented the running of the statute against her until such relationship was terminated, for, until that time, it was his duty to hold for her, and he could not, therefore, be regarded as holding adversely to her. The remaining inquiry on this branch of the case is whether this will protect the other two plaintiffs.
There can be no doubt but that the rule is well established in
This being the principle upon which the rule is founded by which the minority of one of several co-tenants protects those of full age from the plea of the statute, it is difficult to conceive-how we can escape the conclusion that, upon the same principle, the inability of J. S. R. Thomson to plead the statute against
5. The next inquiry is as to the liability of the defendants for rents and profits. The defendants contend that inasmuch as the statute 4 and 5 Anne has been repealed by the General Statutes,
Again: since the adoption of the code of procedure all the previously recognized forms of action have been abolished, and there is now but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of a right or the redress or prevention of a wrong, and hence the repeal of a statute giving a right to bring a particular form of action in a specified case, cannot prevent a party from seeking any relief he may show himself entitled to, either upon legal or equitable principles, by an action under the code. We think, therefore, that the defendants may be required to account for rents and profits of so much of the common property as they may have used in excess of their shares. Valentine v. Johnson, 1 Hill’s Ch. 49; Lyles v. Lyles, 1 Hill’s Ch. 86; Jones v. Massey, 14 S. C. 292. But we agree with the Circuit judge that in taking this account reference must be had to the condition of the property before the improvements were put upon it by the defendants, as they are not to be held liable for such rents and profits as may be due to the improvements put upon the prop
6. The only remaining inquiry is, whether the defendants should be allowed anything for the improvements made by them. It is undoubtedly true, as said by "Wardlaw, Ch., in Corbett v. Laurens, 5 Rich. Eq. 315, (citing the cases,) “ that our cases have settled the question against the right of an improving tenant in common to the exclusive benefit of his improvements,” and with this rule we are entirely satisfied, where the tenant who makes the improvements is aware, at the time, that other persons are entitled to interests in the property so improved. But where one has expended his money in the improvement of property, under the honest conviction of exclusive ownership in himself, it seems to us that there is manifest equity in allowing him the benefit of such improvements, as far as the same can be done without injury to the other co-tenants. As is said by Dargan, Ch., in a note to Williman v. Holmes, 4 Rich. Eq. 476: “ The high equity to be allowed compensation for permanent and valuable improvements should prevail wherever it can be done consistently with the rights of the other parties.” Accordingly, in that case it was ordered that the partition should be so made as to give to the party who had made the improvements that portion of the common property
The judgment of this court is that the judgment of the Circuit Court be modified so as to carry into effect the principles herein