DERON B. SAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. HOLLY SAYLOR, n.k.a. HOLLY LEWIS, Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL NO. C-190463, TRIAL NO. DR-1502089
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO, HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
July 8, 2020
2020-Ohio-3647
CROUSE, Judge.
Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division; Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Deron B. Saylor, pro se,
Blake P. Somers, L.L.C., and Blake P. Somers, for Defendant-Appellee.
{1} The case before us concerns post-decree proceedings in a divorce case. The parties filed several motions with the trial court concerning issues regarding contempt and parental rights and responsibilities, including custody, residency, and parenting time. The parties resolved the motions through an agreed entry. Plaintiff-appellant Deron Saylor then filed additional motions seeking to modify parental rights and responsibilities. The trial court limited its consideration of his motions to events that occurred after the parties signed the agreed entry. The court then denied Saylor‘s motions and ruled in favor of defendant-appellee Holly Lewis.
{2} Saylor has appealed, arguing in two assignments of error that the trial court erred: (1) in finding that the agreed entry resolved all issues pending before the court, and that the agreed entry was the point from which he was required to demonstrate a change of circumstances; and (2) by failing to properly weigh the evidence as required by Ohio law and local rule. We overrule Saylor‘s assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Factual Background
{3} Holly Lewis and Deron Saylor were divorced in May 2016. They have three children, twin boys N.S. and G.S. (born July 2003) and daughter A.S. (born April 2006).
{4} The boys’ use of the internet and social media for pornographic and sexual purposes has been an issue throughout the case. For that reason, the boys were assigned a guardian ad litem (“GAL“) who recommended that the boys’ access to the internet and social media be restricted. The divorce decree included a shared-
{5} On August 1, 2017, Saylor filed a motion for a change in parental rights and responsibilities (custody). He alleged that Lewis had enabled the boys to continue to use social media for sexual and pornographic purposes. On October 18, 2017, Saylor filed a motion for contempt alleging harassment by Lewis. Lewis had filed a motion to terminate shared parenting on May 3, 2017, and a motion to amend/clarify on March 1, 2018. The parties convened for trial on March 13, 2018, to resolve the four pending motions. A partial trial was conducted, but was continued in progress until the next day, at which time the parties came to an agreed entry resolving all pending motions before the court. The court accepted the agreed entry and concluded the trial.
{6} On December 21, 2018, Saylor filed two motions—a motion for “contempt of parenting time, reimbursement of attorney fees, harassment,” and a motion for a change of parental rights and responsibilities (custody). Saylor‘s appeal is based upon his motion for change of parental rights and responsibilities, in which he argued that circumstances had changed since he “agreed with Mrs. Lewis to work together to resolve all issues” on March 14, 2018. He claimed that Lewis had failed to work with him and that she continued to allow the boys to access pornography and engage inappropriately with strangers over social media. For those reasons, he asked the court to grant him sole custody.
{8} The court held that the March 14, 2018 agreed entry resolved all of the issues that were pending at the time, and that it was permanent, despite the inclusion of the word “temporary” in its allocation of custody and residency. The court held that it would not hear evidence from before March 14, 2018, in its consideration of Saylor‘s December 21, 2018 motions. On July 18, 2019, the court denied Saylor‘s motions.
First Assignment of Error
{9} The thrust of Saylor‘s first assignment of error is that he was denied the ability to present his case. He argues that the trial court erred where it found that the March 14, 2018 agreed entry resolved all issues pending before the court, and that he must demonstrate a change of circumstances after March 14, 2018, in order to achieve a modification to custody.
{10} Generally, custody decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. “Custody issues are some of the most difficult and agonizing decisions a trial judge must make. Therefore, a trial judge must have wide latitude in considering all the
{11} However, where the question is whether the trial court correctly decided a question of law, such as its interpretation of the agreed entry, we review de novo. See Shah v. Smith, 181 Ohio App.3d 264, 2009-Ohio-743, 908 N.E.2d 983, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.); State v. Ushery, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120515, 2013-Ohio-2509, ¶ 6; Mangan v. Mangan, 2d Dist. Greene No. 07-CA-100, 2008-Ohio-3622, ¶ 6. Thus, we review the trial court‘s decision to limit Saylor‘s ability to present his evidence de novo.
{12}
{13} The trial court determined that Saylor had failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances since March 14, 2018, and denied his motion. Saylor argues that the agreed entry was not intended to be a “prior decree,” from which he must demonstrate a change in circumstances because, (1) the parties did not resolve any issues in the agreed entry, rather they merely committed to working together to resolve the issues, and (2) the provisions in the agreed entry were temporary.
{15} In this case, the agreed entry listed the four motions pending at that time, and stated that the parties “wish to resolve all pending motions under the following terms.” Regarding custody and residency specifically, the agreed entry stated, “The Shared Parenting Plan and Decree between the parties shall be terminated, and Mother shall be designated the temporary residential and custodial parent of [the children] until further order of the court or the agreement of the parties.”
{16} The language employed by the parties demonstrates that the agreed entry was intended to resolve all matters before the court, including the cell phone, social media, and inappropriate-sexual-behavior issues raised by Saylor in his motion to change parental rights and responsibilities. The agreed entry was more than just an expression by the parties to work together to resolve the issues of custody and residency, it actually resolved those issues.
{17} Next, we address Saylor‘s argument that the agreed entry was meant to be temporary. Lewis argues that her designation as the “temporary” custodial and
{18} Temporary orders allocating parental rights and responsibilities are common predivorce decree. They are governed by their own code section. See
{19} We found few cases involving a temporary allocation of parental rights and responsibilities post-divorce decree. In the cases that addressed the issue, it was clear that the court intended the order to be temporary. See Pierson v. Gorrell, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-11-216, 2012-Ohio-3878, ¶ 3 (mother was moving out of state and a determination of custody was required immediately; the court scheduled the matter for a future hearing where it determined that a change in circumstances had occurred warranting a change in custody under
{20} The agreed entry in this case was not clearly temporary like the orders in Pierson and Williams. We are not faced with the issue of a parent moving out of
{21} As the court explained to Saylor during the June 14, 2019 hearing, the allocation of custody and residency was described as temporary because the agreed entry laid out a reunification plan for Saylor, and once Saylor completed the plan, he could petition the court to amend the agreed entry. Saylor had a chance to present evidence of Lewis‘s failure to monitor the boys’ social media and internet usage. Instead, he signed an agreed entry resolving the issues. Saylor‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{22} In his second assignment of error, Saylor argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly weigh all of the evidence. Many of Saylor‘s arguments under his second assignment of error relate back to the trial court‘s determination that it would not consider evidence from before March 14, 2018.
{23} First, Saylor argues that by limiting its review to evidence of events after March 14, 2018, the court violated
{24} Next, Saylor argues that, pursuant to
{25} Next, Saylor argues that the trial court failed to properly consider Lewis‘s actions after signing the agreed entry on March 14, 2018. He contends that her actions demonstrated her unwillingness to cooperate and make decisions jointly, and to encourage love and affection between him and the children as required by
{26} The trial court agreed that Lewis had withheld A.S. from visiting Saylor, but held that Lewis had good reason for doing so. On Easter weekend 2018, there was an incident between Saylor and A.S. in which he told A.S. to “go home,” instead of spending the weekend with him. A.S. returned to Lewis‘s home and
{27} The trial court considered the parties’ lack of cooperation, and found that it was Saylor, not Lewis, who had failed to cooperate and “who has no interest in accepting responsibility for his role in his children‘s behavior or in working with [Lewis] to raise their children.” The court explained that it was “gravely troubled by [Saylor‘s] lack of self-reflection, and the evidence as well as his demeanor at trial lead the Court to conclude that [Saylor], not [Lewis] is uncooperative and disruptive to his children‘s healthy development.” In support, the court cited to Saylor‘s refusal to read the GAL reports, to read Lewis‘s messages, and to cooperate with A.S.‘s counselor, and his attempts to undermine A.S.‘s relationship with Lewis, as evidenced by the card he sent A.S. after the Easter weekend incident in which he wrote, “It is so sad that your mom‘s bitterness and hate is [sic] used to keep you from seeing your father.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was Saylor, and not Lewis, who was being uncooperative and undermining.
{28} Finally, as part of his second assignment of error, Saylor argues that the trial court violated Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division Local Rule 1.13(B) (“Loc.R. 1.13(B)“) where it accepted the agreed entry even though Saylor was not represented by counsel. However, in this assignment of error, Saylor challenges the trial court‘s weighing of the evidence, and his Loc.R. 1.13(B) argument does not pertain to the trial court‘s weighing of the evidence.
{30} Saylor‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{31} Saylor‘s assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
ZAYAS, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.