A single justice of this court correctly allowed the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss the petition for a writ of error and entered a judgment accordingly. The plaintiff was convicted of the offense of unlawfully carrying a firearm in 1972 and pleaded guilty to the further allegation in the indictment that the offense was a second or subsequent offense. See G. L. c. 278, § 11A. Although the allegations of the petition, prepared pro se, are obscure, it seems to be agreed that the plaintiff had been convicted in 1961 of unlawfully carrying a firearm in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10. During the time between the plaintiff’s two offenses, G. L. c. 269, § 10, was amended to require a greater sentence for a second offense than § 10 required in 1961. See G. L. c. 269, § 10, as amended through St. 1971, c. 456, §§ 5 and 6, and St. 1972, c. 312, § 5, for the statutory provisions in effect during 1972 and, for earlier provisions, G. L. c. 269, § 10, as amended through St. 1957, c. 688, § 23.
1. The plaintiff claims that the imposition of a sentence for a second offense based on § 10 as amended subsequent to his conviction of the first offense is unconstitutional as an ex post facto law. The claim is meritless. Commonwealth v. Graves,
2. The plaintiff further claims he was advised neither of his right to a jury trial nor that a consequence of his guilty plea was a mandatory five year sentence “without parole.” This question need not be considered on a writ of error and may be presented in the Superior Court by a motion for a new trial. Commonwealth v. Penrose,
Judgment affirmed.
The case was submitted on briefs.