177 Iowa 218 | Iowa | 1916
Lead Opinion
The abstract in this ease contains 80 pages. Appellee’s denial of appellant’s abstract contains 56 pages. Two amendments by appellant contain, respectively, 7 and 22 pages. This voluminous presentation of the record has made it somewhat difficult for this court to reach and, reaching, dispose of the real questions in dispute. The fact is that, the controversy is not very complicated. The disposition of this case really requires the consideration of but two propositions: (1) That the salary of the plaintiff was fixed for 2% months only; that his salary- for any time longer than that was contingent upon the plaintiff’s raising the money himself with which to pay his own salary, after paying the other expenses of his employer; (2) that the alleged loan of $500 made by the plaintiff to the defendant could not be authorized by the defendant for the purposes to which the loan was to be, and was, appliedin fact, that the loan was not authorized at all. Defendant also alleges that it received no benefit from the transaction, and has not ratified it. It is practically upon these assertions that appellant bases his claim that the judgment below is erroneous.
As to who had the preponderance of the evidence upon the record made, this was a question for the jury. It was their duty to solve the conflict and determine the truth out of it all. They were the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their "testimony. They resolved it against the defendant. • The trial judge who passed upon the motion for a new trial heard these witnesses, observed their demeanor upon the stand, saw them in the act of testifying, and he, undoubtedly, was in a better position to judge this question rightly than are we. He determined appellant’s controversy against it. We, therefore, are not disposed, to take issue with the jury and the trial court upon •these disputed questions of fact.
On the issue as to what the salary was or was to be, the testimony being in sharp conflict, we cannot interfere with the disposition of that .issue made in the court below.
But, while one is not bound to repay an advancement merely because he is advised, after all is done, that it has been made and expended, notice thereof may be one item in the proof that some affirmative action which’ the actor was at liberty to do or not to do, and which it did with knowledge of the facts, operated as a ratification. There is one outstanding fact to which the appellant itself calls attention, the effect of which it seems to misapprehend. In an amendment to abstract filed by it, we find this statement:
“Exhibit 13 of evidence (that being a daybook of appellant), shows cash received by appellant on November 3, 1910, as follows: 1910, November 3d, cash by Dr. Batten, Marshall-town, Trieket’s meeting, $27.87.”
There* is undisputed evidence that Dr. Batten, an officer of the defendant, attended the Trieket meeting at Marshall-town, and from there .remitted to defendant half the proceeds collected. As seen, there is undisputed evidence, that this remittance was received and spread upon the books of appellant. It appears that appellant knows of it and puts it into the record here. There is no claim that it or any other like remittance was ever returned to this plaintiff, or offered. As said, the question is not what is the evidence, but what construction the law shall put upon it. Appellant insists that the Trieket venture was a financial failure. This, taken in connection with the concession that something was received by the defendant from these meetings, seems to make clear that, in the opinion of appellant, the advancement of the $500 and its expenditure were not ratified'because the defendant received less from the venture than it is asked to pay on account thereof. We think this is not the law. Batification is not a matter of sizes, nor does it depend upon its being
“Now on the motion of defendant for a new trial, the court having listened to the arguments of defendant and plaintiff on said motion, the said motion is overruled on condition that plaintiff accept in full satisfaction of said verdict,
The plaintiff thereupon signifying his election to accept the payment of $500, with interest thereon, in full satisfaction of said verdict, the motion was overruled, and judgment entered for the plaintiff for $500, with interest.
.It will be noticed that the court did not arbitrarily fix the amount which plaintiff was entitled to recover, nor did the court arbitrarily say that the ’plaintiff should recover less than the amount fixed by the verdict, but simply gave to the plaintiff the option of taking judgment for $500, thus giving the plaintiff the option to remit what the court deemed excessive in the verdict, or take a new trial. The plaintiff accepted the first alternative, and the court entered judgment accordingly.
We think the action of the court finds support in Carmichael v. Bettendorf Axle Co., 171 Iowa 221, and that no reversible error can Be predicated upon this contention of the defendant’s. On plaintiff’s appeal, the cause is also affirmed.
“All objections to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain an appeal must be made in printed form stating specifically the ground thereof and served upon the appellant or his attorney of record not less than 10 days before the date assigned for the submission of the cause.”
This is what is known as the Peterson Act, and we take it that the purpose and object of the act is to protect litigants from having causes dismissed in this court on the simple ground that the abstract fails to show in all their fulness the facts upon which jurisdiction rests. We are not presumed to know what the facts are touching the service of notice, except as the abstract exposes this fact to our view.
In the record before us, the abstract discloses a notice sufficient in form and substance, addressed to the proper parties, but fails to disclose that the notice was signed by appellant or his attorney, and fails to disclose the fact of service. Whether this notice was signed and served or not is a question of fact, independent of any showing of the fact upon the abstract. It may be a fact that the notice was signed and was served, though the abstract does not disclose it, and that jurisdiction was conferred upon this court thereby. As said before, we cannot know this fact except from the abstract. To defeat jurisdiction on the ground that the abstract does not show the fact, the party who desires to avail himself of a plea of want of jurisdiction must follow the course pointed out in this Peterson Act; otherwise, this court
But it is said that, if the court discovers the fact that the abstract fails to show the jürisdietional fact, it is the duty of the court to act upon the assumption that the abstract is a complete expose of what was done, especially when there is an attempt to set out the notice in full, and, as set out, it shows no signature. As a general rule of practice, the court confines its attention and its investigation to the matters to which its attention has been challenged by the parties to the suit, and disposes only of those matters so called to its attention; and we think it would not be contended that, if the court’s judgment was not challenged to the want of jurisdiction, and the court failed to discover that the abstract did not show all the jurisdictional facts, the party whose duty it was to challenge the jurisdiction could, after a final disposition of the cause, raise the question.
But it is contended that, if the court does discover it, the court must assume, under such circumstances, that it has no jurisdiction and act accordingly. This would leave the
“All objections to jurisdiction must be urged 10 days before the date assigned for the submission of the cause.”
We think the inevitable conclusion from this statute is that the court must assume the existence of the jurisdictional fact, notwithstanding the paucity of the evidence of the fact in the record, in the absence of any objections made as provided in Section 4139, Code Supp., 1913. It is claimed, however, that there is affirmative evidence of the want of jurisdictional facts in the abstract itself. This we cannot concede. The record fails to show all the jurisdictional facts, but it does not negative the existence of the jurisdictional fact.
In so far as State v. Abbott, decided by this court December 17, 1915, 155 N. W. 270, is inconsistent with what we have here said, it is overruled.
We think on both appeals the cause must be affirmed on the merits. — Affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially). — While I agree that plaintiff should take nothing from his cross-appeal, I think that should be effected by a dismissal, and not by an affirmance.
“All objections to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain an appeal must be made in printed form stating specifically the ground thereof and served upon the appellant or his attorney of record not less than 10 days before the date assigned for the submission of the case.”
It will be noticed that this, as said, attempts no change in jurisdictionals, does not say that the court may not raise objections to its jurisdiction sum sponte, and is merely a provision as to the form and time of serving such objections as appellee may make.
To shorten the discussion, I will concede that this has changed the rule that mere failure to show jurisdiction works dismissal, and concede that if, for all that appears on the abstract, there may or may not be jurisdiction, a failure to proceed as the act requires concludes appellee from asserting
II. I see no occasion to devote much time to the second position, and do not care to speculate with the majority on situations wherein a judgment may be held valid if the court makes no discovery that the record has a jurisdictional flaw, whereas one with a like record on appeal is treated as valid because there was not such discovery. The courts have often risked the dire consequences with possibility of which the majority makes an argument. In Iowa City v. Johnson County, 99 Iowa, at 514, an appeal was decided, and later a rehearing granted and a resubmission had. No one made objection to jurisdiction, but this is said on final opinion by Mr. Justice Deemer, for the court:
“We have now discovered that we had no jurisdiction of the case at the time the original opinion was filed, for the reason that the abstract did not show service of a notice of appeal upon the clerk of the district court.”
The appeal was thereupon dismissed. In Ex parte Crenshaw, 15 Peters (U. S.) *119, the head note is this:
“An appeal was prosecuted by the complainants in the circuit court of Alabama, to the Supreme Court, and the cita
The appeal went to decision, and no objection was made until after mandate had issued. The Supreme Court declared that its judgment “was utterly null and void,” and revoked its mandate. In either case, the judgments would have appeared to be effective if the court had not made its discovery. These courts could and did act on their own motion, as I would here. The consequences of discovering and not discovering were the same as now. But said decisions were made before the taking effect of said practice statute. The question is, then, not one of consequences, but of the effect of that statute upon the power of the court to dismiss an appeal on its own motion.
III. Over and again the opinion asserts in various forms of expression that this abstract merely lacks in fullness of jurisdictional recital; that this is a case of silence, rather than an affirmative showing of want of jurisdiction. As I have indicated; it does hold that, if such defect did appear affirmatively, it would not avail without objection under the Peterson Act. But the most insistent and most elaborated argument is in the nature of an avoidance, an assumption that here is a failure to show existence, rather than a confession of want, of jurisdiction. This begs the question. I have no quarrel with holding that mere failure to aver jurisdietionals is no longer a justification for dismissal. But I am unable to agree that the abstract here fails to exhibit lack of jurisdiction affirmatively. The recital is this:
“On November 27, 1914, the plaintiff filed the following notice of appeal:
“To the above named defendant and to Ed. D. Samson, its attorney of record, and to J. P. Maher, clerk of the district court of Polk County, Iowa: You and each of you are hereby
This was filed with the certificate “that the above and foregoing, together with the abstract of the appellant, heretofore served and filed in this case, contains a full, true and correct abstract of the record so far as it is necessary to the determination of the issues in this appeal.”
I am unable to see how this differs from a statement that a true copy of the notice is set out. The recital has quotation marks. That is an assertion that it is a copy. There is a presumption that the abstract sets out all the record correctly. True, that does not include immaterial matter. But under the Daerr case, supra, the signature to the notice is not immaterial matter. The major thought that underlies the opinion is that all this is merely a failure to assert that there was a signature, — a failure to set out what may exist; that, notwithstanding what is, or rather, what is not, set out, the notice may have been signed. As I view it, it is a positive assertion, aided by a rebuttable presumption, that the notice of appeal is exactly what is quoted in the abstract, as to all things that are material in and to such a notice. I am, therefore, constrained to say that there is an affirmative showing that there was no notice of appeal. If that be so, the Peterson Act can be no warrant for entertaining the appeal. If it can be, then it would be one if it appeared that an appeal to this court was taken from the judgment of a justice of the peace. The Peterson Act does not disenable an appellant from dismissing his appeal by his own confession. It may be that failure to assert lack of jurisdiction, where the record does not exhibit such lack, may work an estoppel to question