85 Mass. 331 | Mass. | 1862
The plaintiffs in this suit seek to obtain a decree to reform the deed mentioned in the bill from them to the defendant, on account of an alleged mistake in the description of the land intended to be conveyed by it.
When, in equity, mistake of the parties is expressly charged and put in issue, equity will permit it to be inquired into, and, upon strong and satisfactory proof, to be corrected. Canedy v. Marcy, 13 Gray, 373. This is the only principle upon which the bill can be maintained. The fact of mistake is to be distinctly charged, and then clearly and fully proved. It is laid down as an established rule that relief will be granted, in cases of written instruments, only where there is a plain mistake, clearly made out by satisfactory proofs. 1 Story on Eq. § 157. Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585. And it is a further and very material rule, that the court will not afford its aid or allow a written instrument to be affected by paroi or other extrinsic evidence, unless the mistake is made out according to the understanding of both parties, by proof that is entirely exact and satisfactory. Andrews v. Essex Ins. Co. 3 Mason, 10. And this for the paramount reason, that otherwise if a deed should be reformed and corrected upon proof of the mistake of one of the parties, the great injustice might be done of imposing upon
Applying the rule that the written instrument must be clearly proved to vary from the real contract between the parties, as it was understood by each of them, to the evidence produced at the hearing, we find it impossible to come to the conclusion that the bill can be maintained. The alleged mistake consists in this, that the description in the deed covers a greater quantity of land than was intended to be conveyed ; more than the plaintiffs meant to sell, and more than it was the understanding of the defendant that he had purchased. The grantors and the grantee were the only material witnesses in the case. The deed describes the western boundary of the land conveyed as a line beginning at a point on the highway one hundred and fifty feet from certain bars, “ thence southerly in as straight a line as possible over the highest part of said hill to a large white pine tree.” Each of the plaintiffs testified that, according to the contract, and their distinct understanding of it, the western boundary was to be an absolutely straight line from the point on the highway to the pine tree named; that they sold and intended to convey no land lying on the west of any part of such absolutely straight line. And they stated many facts and circumstances which occurred during the negotiation, tending to confirm their confidence in the accuracy of their recollection concerning this boundary. But the defendant testified with equal positiveness that in all his negotiations with the grantors he understood and explained to them that he must have the whole of the eastern slope of the hill, and that he believed that they so understood it. He further testified that he caused the deed to be prepared according to that understanding; that it was then submitted to them for their examination and approval; that they afterwards signed and executed it in his absence, and then returned it to him without any suggestion that it was in any respect different from the contract, or from what they intended that the description in the deed should be. He also testified that after it was delivered to him, and after he came into possession of the land, he entered upon that portion of it
cited Canedy v. Marcy, 13 Gray, 373; Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585; Pitcairne v. Ogbourne, 2 Ves. Sen. 375; Gray v. Woods, 4 Blackf. 432; Peters v. Goodrich,