Sаwyer purchased a recreational vehicle and in June, 1978 executed a conditional sales contract which was assigned to Citizens and Southern National Bank (C&S). In May, 1980 the vehicle was stolen and Sawyer filed a claim with St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul), which had issued an insurance binder on the vehicle some ten days before the theft. Sawyer had completed an application for a policy, but the policy had not been issued when he learned of the loss and notified his agent.
St. Paul filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against
C&S also filed a cross-claim against Sawyer, alleging nonpayment of the conditional sales contract and seeking the amount due under the contract, attorney fees and collection costs. The trial court granted C&S’s motion for summary judgment on the contract claim in the amounts of $45,538.10 prinсipal and $2,994.25 interest, but denied the claim for attorney fees and costs of collection.
C&S and Sawyer moved for summary judgment on their counterclaims against St. Paul; St. Paul moved for summary judgment against Sawyer and C&S on their counterclaims. The trial court granted C&S’ and Sawyer’s motions against St. Paul and denied St. Paul’s motion on the issue of coverage for loss of the vehicle and entered judgment for $62,500 as the value at the time of loss, together with interest. The trial court granted summary judgment on the bad faith claims in favor of St. Paul.
Sawyer appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of C&S on its cross-claim for the contract amount. C&S cross-appeals the denial of its motion for summary judgment on its claim for attorneys fees and collection costs against Sawyer.
St. Paul appeаls from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of C&S and Sawyer on the issue of coverage. Sawyer cross-appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment against St; Paul on the issue of bad faith.
1. Case Nos. 64029, 64030.
Appellant Sawyer contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the contract in favor of C&S. The evidence shows that Sawyer made payments under the conditional sales contract from the time the vehicle was purchased in 1978 until approximately two months after its theft in 1980. Sawyer anticipated an insurance payment by St. Paul on the loss of the vehicle. In February 1981, C&S demanded the accelerated amount due under the contract and gave notice of its right to attorney fees. C&S sent a second demand letter for the accelerated indebtedness, again giving notice of its right to attorney fees, in September, 1981, apparently as a result of having made demand for an erroneous amount in its original letter.
While construing the evidence most favorably to Sawyer as the party opposing C&S’ motion for summary judgment
(Burnette Ford, Inc. v. Hayes,
The evidence, instead, shows a discussion between the parties of a means by which Sawyer might satisfy the indebtedness of the original agreement with C&S. At best, the discussion was an attempt by Sawyer to modify the original contract with C&S by obtaining an extension of time for payment. However, even if the disсussion culminated in an extension agreement, its terms, as described by Sawyer, are too vague, indefinite, and uncertain to constitute a
The trial court, therefore, did not err in rejecting Sawyer’s argument that there was an accord and satisfaction.
b. Sawyer next сontends that an issue of fact remains as to whether the negative credit report placed by C&S was responsible for his failure to obtain other financing, so that C&S’ own conduct prevented Sawyer’s performance of the purported extension agreement and the performance was thereby excused. This contention is withоut merit, for as we held in Division la above, there was no extension agreement to alter Sawyer’s obligation to perform under the original contract.
c. Sawyer also contends that the extension agreement constituted a waiver by C&S of Sawyer’s default and that C&S failed to retract the waiver before sending out its second demand letter stating the correct аccelerated amount due. “Not only did the appellant [Sawyer] fail to plead affirmatively the defense of waiver, but also the evidence introduced on the motion for summary judgment showed that [his] waiver defense was not viable. CPA § 8 (Code Ann. § 81A-108).”
Hall v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta,
d. On cross appeal C&S argues that because the trial court granted its motion for summary judgment on the contract, it was also entitled to summary judgment for attorney fees in the amount of 15%, as provided for in the contract. We agree. C&S presented evidence of compliance with the requirements of Code Ann. § 20-506, and the trial court should have granted summary judgment in favor of C&S on its claim for attorney fees.
Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Berger,
2. Case Nos. 64031, 64049.
a. Appellant St. Paul contends that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment and ruling as a matter of law that there was insurance coverage on the vehicle. The evidence shows that on May 1, 1980 Weathers, an insurance agent, issued a written bindеr on the vehicle providing liability, property damage, medical payments, comprehensive, collision, and uninsured motorist coverage by St. Paul. A written application signed by Sawyer was dated May 14,1980, and the theft of the vehicle occurred on or about May 10,1980. In August, 1981 the vehicle was recovered in a damaged but operable condition.
The parties agree that coverage under the binder was in effect at the time of the loss, but St. Paul contends that this coverage was void ab initio because of Sawyer’s failure to disclose material facts to his agent and to St. Paul. These facts were the driving records of Sawyer and his son; the ownership of the vehicle, which was рurchased, titled, and registered in the name of Sawyer’s unincorporated horse breeding enterprise and “hobby,” Bonnie Brae Farms; and the use of the vehicle in the business activity of showing horses, Sawyer’s regular occupation being the practice of medicine. St. Paul contends that if these facts had been known, the agent would not have issued the binder nor would coverage have been available from St. Paul.
A binder is a contract of insurance, albeit a temporary, sketchy, and informal contract, which is intended to give temporary protection pending the investigation of the risk by the insurer or until issuance of a formal policy.
Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Stuart,
St. Paul has presented no evidence of misrepresentation,
Finally, there is a factual dispute as to the date Sawyer signed the application, which is shown on the face of the document to be May 14,1980. The agent stated in an affidavit it was May 14,1980; Sawyer stated in a deposition it was May 1,1980, which St. Paul points out is the same day the binder was issued. However, in the absence of any evidence showing that the insurer relied upon or acted upon statements in the application in issuing the binder or that Sawyer was informed of the materiality of questions in the application to the issuance of the binder, whether the application was signed on May 1st or 14th is not materiаl to the question of St. Paul’s liability under the binder.
Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact remains as to St. Paul’s liability under the insurance binder and the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Sawyer and C&S, as they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Code Ann. § 81A-156. Thus, St. Paul’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of coverage was properly denied. As there was no evidence of misstatements or omissions of material facts at the time the binder
b. St. Paul also contends that the trial court еrred in granting summary judgment in favor of Sawyer and C&S jointly and severally for the full value of the vehicle. The undisputed evidence supported the amount awarded and the judgment provided for St. Paul to take ownership and possession of the vehicle. On appeal, St. Paul raises defenses of waiver and estoppel to Sawyer’s right to recоver the full value of the lost vehicle and argues that a factual question exists as to what is a “reasonable time” during which St. Paul should be permitted to recover the vehicle and return it to Sawyer before becoming obligated on its full value. However, St. Paul relied on a general denial of liability as its defense, and St. Paul did not raise the affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel in any pleading or in its motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the defenses were waived.
Daniel & Daniel, Inc. v. Cosmopolitan Co.,
c. Sawyer cross-appealеd contending the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment on the question of punitive damages and attorney fees pursuant to Code Ann. § 56-1206. We hold that the trial court was correct in denying Sawyer’s motion on this issue but erred in granting St. Paul’s motion for summary judgment. It is undisputed that Sawyer made a demand for payment on St. Paul (see Code Ann. § 56-1206) and that St. Paul has refused payment. However, a question of fact remains as to whether “such refusal was in bad faith. . . .” Code Ann. § 56-1206. The trial court rejected St. Paul’s defenses to payment by holding it liable for loss of Sawyer’s vehicle under the insurance binder, and we have affirmed this holding in Division 2a above. Therefore, it cannot be said “as a matter of law that [St. Paul’s defense] was a rеasonable defense which vindicates the good faith of the insurer.”
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. McClain,
d. St. Paul contends that Sawyer is not entitled to seek bad faith penalties because less than 60 days elapsed from Sawyer’s demand for payment and the filing of his counterclaim to St. Paul’s declaratory judgment. Code Ann. § 56-1206;
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Hallford,
Judgments affirmed in Case Nos. 64029 and 64031. Judgments reversed and cases remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion in Case Nos. 64030 and 64049.