79 N.J.L. 382 | N.J. | 1910
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The writ brings up an order of revocation of prosecutor’s license to sell intoxicating liquors made by the
The first point made by prosecutor is that the complaint is defective in stating April 17th as the date of the alleged offence and that the defect was not amendable. We think that the
The next reason is that the complaint does not specify the names of persons to whom sales were made, nor that they were unknown to complainants, citing Roberson v. Lambertville, 9 Vroom 69; Greeley v. Passaic, 13 Id. 87, and Flanagan v. Plainfield, 15 Id. 118. This would of course be fatal in an indictment; but we are unwilling to set aside the present proceedings on the ground that such particularity should be required in a complaint to the excise board. The point is not decided, as our disposition of the case turns on other grounds.
Next it is objected that the board of excise had no jurisdiction to revoke the license until there had been a conviction by a competent tribunal of such a violation of the act as would justify under it a forfeiture of the license; in other words, that the board had, itself, no jurisdiction to adjudicate that the act had been violated. We think there is nothing in this objection. It is true that section 3 of tire supplement of 1906 provides that the license “shall thereupon, upon conviction, become forfeited and void;” but a reading of the language following makes it clear that the conviction meant is that following the complaint and other proceedings before the court “or other body by which the license was granted.”' We are therefore of opinion that an adjudication of guilt by the board which granted the license, when had upon proper complaint, notice and hearing, is such a conviction as is contemplated by the statute, and that upon such conviction the board may properly proceed to adjudge a forfeiture.
It is further urged that the complaint is bad in charging a violation of section 10 of the supplement of 1906, when there is no such section.
The act of 1906 is an amendment of several sections of the act of 1888, already cited. Its first section amends section 1 of the old act; the second amends section 3 of said act; the
But there is one defect in the proceedings which appears to us to be fatal; and although it is not relied on in the reasons, we feel constrained to consider it in justice to the party whose rights were prejudiced by the judgment without notice or hearing, viz., the owner of the premises. The act provides that in such eases as this a copy of the complaint and order to show cause shall be served upon the owner of the premises; and that in case of revocation, not only shall the licensee be disqualified from receiving any other license for a year, but “for the same period no license shall be granted to sell spirituous, vinous, malt or brewed liquors in the premises for which the forfeited license was granted.” The purpose and propriety of requiring service of the papers on the owner of the premises are therefore plain. The judgment of forfeiture is manifestly prejudicial to him; and the disqualification of the premises by such judgment is so interwoven with that of the licensee that in our view a proper judgment of forfeiture cannot he pronounced unless both licensee and owner are in court and have had their hearing. This was held in Tindall v. Monmouth, Pleas, 47 Vroom 71; and though, as remarked in Cuirczak v. Keron, Id. 380, perhaps not necessary to that decision, and though raised, but not decided, in the Cuirczak case, our present consideration of the subject confirms the view expressed in Tindall v. Monmouth Pleas, and leads us ■to the conclusion that on account of this radical defect in the procedure, the judgment of forfeiture in the case at bar must be set aside.
The judgment of forfeiture and proceedings on which it is based must be set aside.