98 Tenn. 337 | Tenn. | 1897
' This" cause: was'"tried'' upon a state
The complainant and defendant were corporations engaged in general banking operations — the one in Birmingham, Alabama, and the other in Nashville, in this State. They were, at the time of the transaction out of which this controversy arose, and had been for a considerable period antecedent, engaged in mutual correspondence, as the exigencies of their business required or suggested. In the course of this correspondence the complainant bank, as owner and holder, forwarded to the defendant bank for collection a note for $940, drawn by Loventhal & Sons to the order of and indorsed by J. C. Marks & Co., and also a draft for $1,352, drawn by J. C. Marks & Co., and accepted by Sulzbacker Bros., both due and payable on Saturday, June 20, 1891. At 2 p.m. on the day of its maturity, the maker of the note and the acceptor of the draft tendered in payment thereof, to the teller of the Commercial National Bank, their checks for the respective amounts due thereon, drawn on and properly certified by the Nashville Savings Bank (a banking corporation of good standing in Nashville), and these checks were accepted by this officer of the defendant, and the note and draft, after being stamped “paid,” were delivered into the hands of the parties respectively entitled to them. This was done in accordance with a well-established usage or custom of the various banks of Nashville. The checks thus received
The bill in this cause seeks a decree against the Commercial National Bank covering this loss, upon the ground that it had no right, in the absence of express authority, to receive in payment of - this paper anything but money,, and that it cannot excuse itself from liability for doing otherwise by setting up a local custom or usage of which the complainant was wholly . ignorant. The Court of Chancery Appeals
In this decree there was error. The rule which that Court invokes as decisive of this case — that is, that an agent, in the absence of express authority, cannot accept anything in discharge of the principal’s debt except • money — is well settled, and has been frequently announced in such cases as Walker v. Walker, 5 Heis., 425, but it does not control a case like the present. A principal who selects a bank as his collecting agent, thus availing himself of the facilities which it holds out, in the absence of special directions, is bound by any reasonable usage prevailing and established among the banks at the place where the collection is made, without regard to his knowledge or want of knowledge of its existence. Sahlien v. Bank, 90 Tenn., 221; Howard v. Walker, 92 Tenn., 452. This rule regulating the relation of collecting banks to parties who take advantage of the means which they offer in this respect, is founded on sound reason. Every business man knows that in the constantly increasing volume and variety of banking transactions, the larger number of which are settled ‘or disposed of by a simple exchange of credits, methods have been adopted by bankers to economize labor, reduce risks, and simplify dealings with one 'another, and with .their mistomers. ’ Some of These methods are of a general character, while -others are 'dictated by
The decree of the Court of Chancery Appeals is reversed and the bill is dismissed.