Savings & Loan Society v. Austin

46 Cal. 415 | Cal. | 1873

Lead Opinion

By the Court, Crockett, J.:

In these cases, the defendant, who is Tax Collector for the City and County of San Francisco, appeals from an order refusing to dissolve an injunction obtained by the plaintiffs, enjoining the defendant from the collection of certain State and county taxes, assessed to the plaintiffs for the current fiscal year. The validity of these assessments is assailed on the several grounds to be hereafter noticed; one of which involves the question of the legality of the entire assessment of taxes for State purposes for the current fiscal year. If this should be decided for the plaintiffs, it may be unnecessary to determine the other questions discussed by counsel; and it will, therefore, be first considered.

The Political Code, adopted at the last session of the Legislature, establishes a State Board of Equalization, whose powers and duties are minutely prescribed. As its title imports, the purpose for which the Board was established, was to equalize the, assessment of taxes in the several counties, so as to cause them to approximate as nearly as possible to the equality and uniformity enjoined by the Constitution. It had become apparent in this, as in many other of the States, that when the value of property for the purposes of taxation was to be ascertained and finally determined by the local Assessors, subject only to a limited control by the County Boards of Supervisors, the grossest inequality frequently existed in the valuations in different counties, *474whereby the requirement of the Constitution that “taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State ” was practically abrogated. As was observed by Chief Justice Breeze in People v. Salomon, 46 Ill. 337, “the small proportion which the actual revenue of the State bore to the real value of the property of the State, under the operation of laws, which, pretending to carry out the behests of the Constitution, that all taxes should be levied by valuation, so that every person and corporation should pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or her property, to be ascertained by some person or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly might direct, created widespread alarm and dissatisfaction, rendering it an absolute necessity that some effective mode should be devised, by which this constitutional provision might be carried out in its true spirit.”

It was to remedy this great evil, that the State Board of Equalization was established; and on which is devolved the duty of supervising the assessments in the several counties, so as to approximate as nearly as possible to equality and uniformity in the imposition of the burden of taxation upon the property of the citizen in proportion to its value. The dominant idea of the Constitution on the subject of taxation is, first, that it “shall be equal and uniform throughout the State;” and second, that “all property in the State shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law; ” and, as a part of the system for producing equality and uniformity, it provides that “Assessors and Collectors of town, county, and State taxes, shall be elected by the qualified electors of the district, county, or town in which the property taxed for State, county, or town purposes is situated.” The argument for the plaintiffs is, that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the term “Assessor” had a definite and well understood meaning, importing that he is an officer appointed or elected to ascertain and determine *475the value of property for the purposes of taxation; and that in requiring such an officer to be elected in each ‘ ‘ district, county, or town in which the property taxed for State, county, or town purposes is situated,” the inference is necessarily implied, not only that he is to make the valuation, but that, when made, his determination as to the value is final; and that the valuation cannot be changed, altered, or in any respect modified, unless possibly by some superior Board or officer, to be elected for that purpose by the electors of that district, county, or town. In support of this view, we are referred to the fact that this provision is peculiar to our Constitution; and, it is claimed, was inserted ex industria in deference to the wishes of the native Californians, who were then the proprietors of large landed estates, and were apprehensive that unless the valuation for taxing purposes should be made by local Assessors, to be elected by the people of the district, the burdens of taxation might be imposed chiefly on their lands and herds, to the exclusion of other property.

Whatever weight may be due to this argument, it can hardly be deemed of such conclusive force as to preclude an examination of other provisions of the Constitution in order to determine whether the construction now contended for would not or might not be subversive of one of its fundamental principles. As already stated, the governing rule ordained by the Constitution—the central idea which pervades that instrument in respect to taxation—is that it shall be equal and uniform, and that property shall be taxed in proportion to its value.

As one of the necessary steps towards ascertaining its value, local Assessors must be elected, who shall make the primary valuation. But there is nothing in the instrument to indicate that this valuation was intended to be final. On the contrary, it is expressly provided that the valuation is to be ascertained “as directed by law”—which is an explicit *476recognition of the power of the Legislature to provide appropriate methods for ascertaining the value, subject only to the limitation that the primary valuation shall be made by local Assessors to be elected by the people of the district. It may be further observed that, when the Constitution was adopted, the term “Assessor ” was not understood as defining an officer whose valuations were to be necessarily final. On the contrary, from the earliest period in our American jurisprudence, Assessors had been employed in almost every State for the purpose of making the primary valuation of property for taxation, and in none of them, so far as we are advised, was this valuation final, but was subject to correction and alteration by some supervisory Board or officer. In employing the term “Assessor” the framers of the Constitution must be understood to have used it in this its popular sense. We are, therefore, of opinion that it is competent for the Legislature to provide appropriate methods for equalizing assessments in the several counties.

2. But the validity of the assessments now under consideration is assailed on the further ground that by section three thousand six hundred and ninety-six of the Political Code the Legislature delegated to the State Board of Equalization the power to fix the rate of taxation, and it is claimed that the act is, pro tanto, unconstitutional and void. That section is in these words:

“At the same time the Board must determine and transmit to the Board of Supervisors of each county the rate of the State tax to be levied and collected, which, after allowing for delinquency in the collections of taxes, must be sufficient to' raise the specific amount of revenue directed to be raised by the Legislature for State purposes.”

We do not understand it to be seriously contended that if the Legislature had authorized the Board, on ascertaining the total value of the taxable property in the State in the *477manner prescribed by law, and also the amount of the appropriations for the fiscal year, to determine and fix the rate of taxation necessary to produce the requisite amount to meet the appropriations, that this would have been liable to any constitutional objection. The value of the taxable property and the aggregate amount of the appropriations having been ascertained, the rate of taxation requisite to produce the given amount would have been merely a matter of arithmetical computation, involving no exercise of discretion. But the section we have quoted, authorizes the Board, in making the calculations, to make an allowance “for delinquency in the collection of taxes,” and it is said that this necessarily involves an exercise of discretion by the Board in a matter materially affecting the rate of taxation, and is, therefore, a delegation of purely legislative power.

That the Legislature cannot, in a general sense, delegate its legislative authority—its power to enact laws—is a proposition which, at this day, no one will question or deny. But whilst the proposition is undoubtedly true in its more general sense, it cannot be maintained in its most restricted sense. As was observed by Mr. Justice Caton, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois in The People v. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 12:

“We may well admit that the Legislature cannot delegate its general legislative authority; still, it may authorize many things to be done by others which it might properly do itself. All power possessed by the Legislature is delegated to it by the people, and yet few will be found to insist that whatever the Legislature may do, it shall do, or else it shall go undone. To establish such a principal in a large State would be almost to destroy the Government. The Legislature may grant ferry privileges, or it may lay out roads and specify their metes and bounds; and yet, who will deny that it may delegate this power to others, either by general or *478special laws? So, also, it may pass all the laws requisite for the government of a particular city or township or school district, and who will doubt the propriety of its authorizing this to be done by the people within the limits of the city, town, or district, by their local representatives, or even directly. This is making laws, and laws, too, of as binding efficacy as if passed directly by the Legislature. They are dependent upon the Legislature for their vitality and force, through the act of incorporation or law under and by virtue of which they are made. Necessarily, regarding many things, especially affecting local or individual interests, the Legislature may act either mediately or immediately. We see, then, that while the Legislature may not divest itself of its proper functions, or delegate its general legislative authority, it may still authorize others to do those things which it might properly, yet cannot understandingly or advantageously, do itself. Without this power legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile. Local laws almost universally call into action, to a greater or less extent, the agency and discretion either of the people or of individuals, to accomplish in detail what is authorized or required in general terms. The object to be accomplished or the thing permitted may be specified, and the rest left to the agency of others, with better opportunities of accomplishing the object or doing the thing understandingly.”

We have quoted thus copiously from the opinion, not only because it comes from a Court of high”authority, but also because the propositions it announces appear to be particularly germane to the question we are considering. This case and the reasoning of the opinion were approved in the late case in the same Court of the People v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 54.

In Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 654, the controversy grew out of an Act of the Legislature imposing a tax on the lands in certain counties for repairing and maintaining a levee on *479the Mississippi River, but subject to a proviso that the tax “shall first be submitted to the legal voters in the district of country proposed to be taxed, * * * and if a majority of the legal voters residing in the district of country proposed to be taxed vote against the said tax, then the same shall not be levied or collected.” Those resisting the tax contended that the statute delegated to the voters the power to decide whether the tax shall be levied and collected, and was therefore void. But the Court, in an able and exhaustive opinion, reviewing the adjudications on this point, upheld the validity of the tax, on the ground that there was no delegation of legislative authority to the voters, but only a condition contained in the statute that the tax should not be enforced if a majority of the electors voted against it. The same proposition has been maintained by the Courts of Pennsylvania, New York, Delaware, Vermont, Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio, Maryland, Alabama and Virginia, and may now be considered as firmly established.

It is said, however, that the question before us is not whether the statute shall take effect or may be defeated on the happening of a future contingency, but whether the : Legislature can empower the Board to exercise its judgment and discretion on a subject materially affecting the rate of taxation throughout the State. As already stated, we entertain no doubt whatever as to the power of the Legislature to provide such methods as it shall deem appropriate for equalizing and correcting the valuations in the several counties as a basis for equal and uniform taxation, during each fiscal year. It is equally clear that it is the duty of the Legislature to impose no greater burdens on the people, in the shape of taxation, than shall be reasonably necessary to meet the exigencies of the Government. To perform this duty intelligently, it must first ascertain the total value of the taxable property after the valuations have been equalized. But, as this value is constantly fluctuating, and the taxes *480must be paid annually, whilst the Legislature meets only biennially, it is obvious that it is not possible for the Legislature to fix the precise annual rate of taxation understandingly, and without incurring the hazard of either exacting from the people much more than will be required to meet the wants of the Government, or much less than its necessities will demand. If it were to attempt, under these circumstances, to prescribe the precise annual rate, it -would act without the necessary data to enable it to form an intelligent judgment, and its conclusions on a subject so vitally affecting the interests and welfare of the people would be founded on a vague conjecture or a blind guess as to the value of the taxable property in the State. But when the annual assessments have been equalized and the value of the taxable property thus ascertained, it would become a mere matter of arithmetical computation to determine what rate of taxation would produce the requisite amount of revenue, were it not that delinquencies, to a greater or less extent, invariably occur in the payment of taxes. To obviate this difficulty section three thousand six hundred and ninety-six of the Political Code, authorizes the State Board of Equalization, in determining the rate of taxation which will produce the requisite amount of revenue to meet the appropriations, to make such allowances as they shall deem sufficient to cover delinquencies. If this can be deemed, in any just sense, a delegation of legislative authority, it is only in that restricted sense referred to by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the People v. Reynolds, supra, when it says that it is competent for the Legislature to “authorize others to do those things which it might properly yet cannot understandingly or advantageously do itself. * * * The object to be accomplished, or the thing permitted, may be specified, and the rest left to the agency of others, with better opportunities of accomplishing the object, or doing the thing understandingly.” In the statute we are consider*481ing, the object to be accomplished was specified, and only the precise method of accomplishing it was left, in an unimportant particular, to the Board, which had better opportunities of accomplishing the object and could do it more understandingly. We are, therefore, of opinion that this objection to the statute is not well taken.

The plaintiffs also insist that so much of the contested tax as is sought to be collected for city and county purposes is void, because not levied in accordance with what is known as the ‘ ‘Consolidation Act” and the amendments thereto. The argument is, that the general revenue system provided in the Political Code is not applicable to the City and County of San Francisco, which, it is claimed, has been expressly or by necessary implication exempted therefrom. By section nineteen (1 Political Code, p. 10), it is provided that “nothing in either of the four Codes affect any of the provisions of the following statutes, but such statutes are recognized as continuing in force, notwithstanding the provisions of the Codes, except so far as they have been repealed or affected by subsequent laws:

“1. All Acts incorporating or chartering municipal corporations, and Acts amending or supplementing such Acts.
“2. All Acts consolidating cities and counties, and Acts amending or supplementing such Acts.”

The next preceding section provides that ‘‘no statute law or rule is continued in force because it is consistent with the provisions of this Code on the same subject, but in all cases provided for by this Code, all statutes, laws, and rules heretofore in force in this State, whether consistent or not with the provisions of this Code, unless expressly continued in force by it, are repealed and abrogated.” If these two sections stood alone and unexplained, it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that it was intended to continue in *482force the Consolidation Act and all the amendments thereto, including the machinery therein provided for the levying and collection of city and county taxes. But we are satisfied such was not the intention of the Legislature. The Code provides a complete revenue system, manifestly intended to apply to every county in the State, and which was especially designed to obviate the great inconvenience which had resulted from a multiplicity of provisions in previous statutes, applicable only to particular counties or cities. This had produced the greatest possible confusion in our revenue system, if such a method of levying and collecting taxes could, with any propriety, be termed “a system.” For the purpose of curing this great evil, the Code provides a general system, clearly intended to have a uniform operation, and to apply to every county in the State. That the Legislature which adopted the Code understood that the general revenue system which it provides was to apply to San Francisco, is clearly apparent from the Act of March 30th, 1872, entitled “an Act to enable the City and County of San Francisco to conform to so much of the Political Code as relates to the public revenue.” (Stats. 1871-2, p. 773.) Under the Consolidation Act, the city and county would have collected its annual revenue, for the fiscal year of 1872-3, in time to meet its necessities for that year. But under the general system established by the Code, the time for the collection of taxes was postponed to a later period; and as the result of this delay the city and county were liable to be greatly embarrassed for want of the necessary funds to meet their current expenses, until the revenue could be collected under the general system provided by the Code. In order to obviate this difficulty, the Act of March 30th, 1872, authorizes the Board of Supervisors to effect a temporary loan, not exceeding nine hundred thousand dollars; and the first section expressly states the object of the Act to be “to enable the City and County of San Francisco to con*483form to so much of the Political Code as relates to the public revenue. ” It is impossible to construe this statute otherwise than as a distinct recognition by the Legislature that the general system established by the Code was to apply to San Francisco. Otherwise there could have been no necessity for a special Act to enable it to conform to that system, a system, which, on the plaintiff’s theory, was to have no effect there. Section nineteen of the Political Code, already quoted, must therefore be construed as though there was excepted from its operation so much of the Consolidation Act and the amendments thereto relating to the levying and collection of taxes as is variant from or inconsistent with the general system- provided in the Code.

The last, and we think the most serious question raised on \ this appeal and discussed by counsel, is, whether a tax on a solvent debt secured by mortgage presents a case of double taxation under our revenue system. If it does, it will be our duty to pronounce it void, and in violation of that clause of the Constitution which requires taxation to be equal and uniform. The question is by no means free from difficulty, and has -been several times before this Court in different phases.

In the People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432, the action was to recover from the mortgagee a tax levied on the debt secured by the mortgage, and one of the defenses was, that inasmuch as the land covered by the mortgage was also taxed, i it presented a case of double taxation. But we held that if the facts presented a case of double taxation, it was only the mortgagor, and not the mortgagee, whose property had been i twice taxed, and that the latter could not complain that the property of the former had been doubly taxed. People v. Whartenby, 38 Cal. 461, was a similar case, and the same point was again decided. But in Lick v. Austin, 43 Cal. 590, it was the mortgagor who complained that his real estate had been taxed at its full value, without deducting *484therefrom the amount of an existing mortgage to which it was subject; which mortgage was a distinct subject of taxation under the statute. It was claimed that if the land was taxed at its full value, without deducting the mortgage, and if the mortgage debt was also taxed, this would be a double taxation of the same subject matter. But we held that it did not concern the mortgagor whether the mortgaged debt was taxed in the hands of the mortgagee, and that he could not complain of double taxation unless his own property was twice taxed. We further held that there is no provision in the Constitution which authorizes the mortgaged debt to be’ deducted from the value of the land in estimating its value for the purposes of taxation. It must be conceded that they effect of these decisions is, that neither the mortgagor or mortgagee can resist a tax, the one upon the land and the [f other upon the mortgage debt, on the ground.that there has been a double taxation of either. But, in all these cases, the Court apparently proceeds upon the ground that the t complaining party is not entitled to relief unless the property has been twice taxed in his hands; that it is no concern of the mortgagor whether a mortgage debt held by another person has been taxed, nor of the mortgagee, whether a piece of land on which he holds a mortgage lien, has been taxed for its full value, or otherwise. But this view of the case does not meet the difficulty. The real point to be decided is, whether the same property has been twice assessed for the same tax; for it is obvious that, if the subject matter of the tax is the same, it cannot be twice assessed for the same tax; and it is immaterial, in such a case, by whom the title is held. If, for example, the statute should provide that all lands should be assessed on the first of March in each year to the then owners of them, and that if any land thus assessed should be conveyed during the fiscal year, it should be again assessed to the new owner, no one would doubt that, under our Constitution, the second tax would be *485void, as violating the principle of equality and uniformity prescribed by that instrument. (People v. Kohl, 40 Cal. 127.) And yet, in such a case, if the first tax had been paid by the former owner before the conveyance, so that it was no longer a lien upon the land, it might be said that it was no concern of the purchaser that his vendor had been once taxed, nor of the latter that his vendee had been again taxed on the same land. But in such cases, the true point for inquiry is, has the same property been twice assessed for the same tax? and in solving this question the fact whether the x property belonged to one person or another, is a false quantity. The tax being upon the property itself, the inquiry is, whether it has been twice taxed, and in solving this point the question of ownership is immaterial.

I come now to the point,, whether a tax on land at its full ,, value, and a tax on a debt for money loaned, secured by a mortgage on the land, is, in substance and in its legal effect, a tax on the same property. We all know, as a matter of general notoriety, that almost universally, by a stipulation between the parties, the mortgagor is required to pay the tax both on the land and mortgage, and that, practically, he is twice taxed on the same value. If he has still in his possession the borrowed money, to secure which the mortgage was made, the law taxes in his hands both the money and land, and by his stipulation he is required to pay the tax on the mortgage debt also. If the money has passed out of his hands into the possession of some other taxpayer, it is taxed in the hands of the latter; so that the money bears its share of taxation, and the land its share, in the hands of whomsoever they may happen to be. It is very true, as was said in People v. Whartenby, and in Lick v. Austin, that a voluntary agreement on the part of the mortgagor to pay the tax on the mortgage debt cannot improve his status. The State was no party to the contract, and is not bound by stipulation inter alios. The burdens of tax*486ation cannot be shifted from those on whom the law imposes them, by stipulations between private persons.” But, in the absence of such a stipulation, an inexorable law of political economy would impose upon the mortgagor the burden, in a different form, of paying the tax on the mortgage debt. Interest on money loaned is paid as a compensation for the use of the money, and the rate of interest, ad agreed upon, is the amount which the parties stipulate will be a just equivalent to the lender. If, however, by the imposition of a tax on the debt, the Government diminishes the profit which the lender would otherwise receive, the rate of interest will be increased sufficiently to cover the tax, which, in this way, will be ultimately paid by the borrower. The transaction would be governed by the same immutable, inflexible law of trade by reason of which import duties on articles for consumption are ultimately paid by the consumer, and not by the importer. The rate of interest on money loaned is regulated by the law of supply and demand, which governs all articles of commerce; and burdens imposed by law, in the form of a tax on the transaction, which would thereby diminish the profit of the lender, if paid by him, will prompt him to compensate the loss by increasing to that extent the rate of interest demanded. If his money would command a given rate of interest, without the burden, he will be vigilant to see that the borrower assumes the burden, either by express stipulation or in the form of increased interest. This is a law of human nature, which statute laws are powerless to suppress, and which pervades the whole realm of trade, governed by the law of supply and demand. Nor would the enactment of the most stringent usury laws produce a different practical result. Human ingenuity has hitherto proved inadequate to the task of devising usury laws, which were incapable of easy evasion; and wherever they exist they are, and will continue to be, subordinate to that higher law *487of trade which ordains that money, like any other article of commercial value, will command just what it is worth in the market—no more, and no less. Assuming these premises to be correct—and I am convinced they are—it results that it is the borrower, and not the lender, who, in fact, pays the tax on borrowed money, whether secured by mortgage or not. But if secured by mortgage, he is taxed not only on; the mortgaged property, but on the debt which the property represents, and which is held as a security for the debt. But in solving the question of double taxation on a debt for money loaned, the true point of inquiry, as I conceive, is not whether the debt is or is not secured by mortgage, but whether the money for the use of which the debt was created is taxed in the hands of the borrower, or of some other taxpayer, to whom he has paid it. The money is the substance, of which the debt is but the shadow and representative; and though in a general, and, perhaps, in a strict sense, it is property, it is so only because it is capable of being again converted into money. Nevertheless, it but represents the sum originally loaned; and a tax upon the latter is substantially a tax upon the former. This may be illustrated by a supposed case. The lien for taxes attaches on a particular day—say on the first Monday of March—on which day A. borrows from B. one thousand dollars, and executes his promissory note for the amount. Neither is richer or poorer by the transaction. A. has one thousand dollars in money, but he owes that sum to B., who has parted with the money, but is compensated by the obligation of A. to repay it. No new value has been created, nor, indeed, could be, from the very nature of the transaction. If A. is taxed upon the money, and also upon the note, as he would be in the form of an increased rate of . ' interest equal to the tax, as has been already demonstrated, is it not clear that he would be twice taxed on the same subject matter, to wit: the one thousand dollars which he *488had borrowed? And if, on the same day, A. should loan the same money to C., and take his note for it, C. would also be taxed both on the note and money. This transaction, in my opinion, would present a clear case of double taxation, and may serve to illustrate the views I have endeavored to present.

In the briefs of counsel the question is discussed whether an injunction is the proper remedy in this class of cases. But at the oral argument the counsel united in a request that we would decide the cause on its merits, and not alone on the question of the remedy. In accordance with this request, and in view of the importance of an early decision of the questions involved in the cases, we have considered the cause on its merits. But lest our silence on the question of the remedy might be misconstrued, we deem it proper to dispose of that point also. In these cases there has been no sale of property to satisfy the delinquent tax, and the averment is, substantially, that the title of the plaintiffs to their real estate has been clouded by the assessment and supposed lien for the taxes claimed to be due and remaining unpaid; that the Collector has advertised the property to be sold for the satisfaction of the tax, and will proceed with the sale unless restrained; that if the property is sold there will be numerous purchasers, against whom the plaintiffs may be compelled to bring a multiplicity of actions to recover it back.

If the tax were conceded to be illegal, it does not necessarily follow that, for that reason alone, the plaintiffs would be entitled to an injunction. In Dows v. City of Chicago, 11 Wallace, 110, Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the Court, says: ‘Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the. taxes, may derange the operations of Government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public. No Court of equity will, therefore, allow its injunction to issue *489to restrain their action, except where it may be necessary to protect the rights of the citizen whose property is taxed, and he has no adequate remedy by the ordinary processes of the law. It must appear that the enforcement of the tax would lead to a multiplicity of suits, or produce irreparable injury, or where the property is real estate, throw a cloud upon the title of the complainant, before the aid of a Court of equity can be invoked.”

This, we think, is a correct statement of the rule, as established by the weight of authority; and it only remains for us to inquire whether the plaintiffs have brought themselves within it. There is no averment that irreparable injury will ensue if the sale is allowed to proceed; but in the case of the Savings and Loan Society, they allege that if the defendant is permitted to sell, “it will cause plaintiff to have divers litigations and suits against the various purchasers at such sale, which will be attended with great expense, harassment and delay to remove the cloud thereby cast upon said real estate, and will prevent plaintiffs from selling said real estate or any part thereof at the cash value.” In the complaint in the case of Doe, there is no averment of this character; but only an allegation that by the Political Code the tax purporting to have been assessed is attempted to be made a lien” upon the real and personal property of the plaintiffs. This averment is clearly insufficient to support the injunction, as it fails to aver or show that the plaintiffs will suffer an irreparable injury, or that any cloud has been imposed on their title, or that the injunction will prevent a multiplicity of suits. Nor are the averments in the case of the Savings and Loan Society sufficient to authorize an injunction. The allegation that if the sale is allowed to proceed, they may be involved in litigation with the purchasers, is a mere speculation as to probabilities which may or may not occur. Non constat that a purchaser will be found, or *490that there will be more than one, or that the purchaser will claim the benefit of the purchase, or that he will accept, or that the collector will ever execute a deed for the property. If averments of this description are sufficient to authorize an injunction, the levying of the assessment, and every act performed by the Assessor might be arrested in the same way, on the ground that they were the initiatory steps in a proceeding which might culminate in a sale and Sheriff’s deed, and thereby ultimately produce litigation and create a cloud on the title. Probabilities of this kind are too remote to justify the Court in interposing by injunction to arrest the collection of the public revenue.

The orders refusing to dissolve the injunctions are reversed and the causes remanded.






Concurrence Opinion

Rhodes, J., concurring specially:

I concur in the judgment and in the opinion, except that portion which holds that property of the kind mentioned in the opinion is not subject to taxation.

*491[After the delivery of the foregoing opinions a rehearing was granted, and after argument on rehearing the following-opinions were delivered at the October Term, 1873.]

By the Court, Crockett, J.:

After a careful consideration of the able and exhaustive arguments which were had in these cases since the former opinion was delivered, I see no reason to doubt the correctness of the conclusions announced in that opinion. I adhere to the following propositions: 1st. That the plaintiffs have not made out a case which entitles them to the remedy by injunction. 2d. That the City and County of San Francisco is not exempt from the operation of the general revenue system established by the Code. 3d, That the Act establishing the State Board of Equalization is not unconstitutional on any of the grounds or for any of the reasons alleged, and is a valid and constitutional enactment. 4th. That if a debt for money lent and secured by mortgage be taxed, and if the mortgaged property be also taxed, the same value and subject matter has been twice taxed, and it presents a case of double taxation.

In respect to the first three points I do not propose to discuss them anew, having fully expressed my views upon them in the former opinion. But, as the fourth point presents a question of much difficulty and of great practical importance, I deem it proper to develop somewhat more fully the reasoning in support of the views expressed in the former opinion on this point.

In all countries the principal subject of taxation is property in its various forms, and in well regulated Governments the purpose is to impose the burden as equally as possible, so that each parcel of property shall bear its just proportion of the tax.

Having this fundamental principle in view, our Constitu*492tion provides that “ taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State. All property in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law." (Article XI, Sec. 13.) In construing this section we have several times decided: First, that all the property of the citizen must be taxed, and that it is not competent for the Legislature to exempt from taxation any particular class or species of property held in private ownership. Second, that a solvent debt secured by mortgage is property for the purposes of taxation, within the meaning of the Constitution. (People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432; People v. Whartenby, 38 id. 461; People v. Eddy, 43 id. 331; Lick v. Austin, 43 id. 590.) But we have not in any case heretofore decided whether or not a tax on the mortgage debt is practically a tax on the property mortgaged; and whether, if each be separately taxed, it presents a case wherein the same value or subject matter has been twice taxed. The question is therefore res integra in this Court; and though it has frequently engaged the attention of legislators and political economists, it is to be regretted that it has been very little discussed in the Courts. It may be observed in limine that in examining the question I shall confine myself to the case of a solvent debt for money lent, secured by mortgage, which is the case before us. As already stated, it has been settled by the decisions of this Court that a solvent debt is “property,” in the sense of the Constitution, for the purposes of taxation; and a solvent debt for money lent, secured by mortgage, stands upon the same footing with other solvent debts, unless it can be demonstrated that a tax on the mortgage debt is, in effect, a tax on the property mortgaged; and that if each be separately taxed there will be a double taxation of the same value or subject matter. In considering this question I shall lay out of view, as not affecting the legal proposition, the well known fact that in a vast majority of cases the borrower is required to stipulate that he will *493pay the tax on the mortgage. If he voluntarily assumes a burden which the law does not impose upon him, it will be due to his misfortune or his folly, and cannot be imputed to the law as a fault. But assuming that the borrower refuses to stipulate that he will pay the tax, eo nomine, on the mortgage, he pays it, nevertheless, in another form, to wit: in a higher rate of interest. This must be the inevitable result, so long as the rate of interest, like the price of any merchantable commodity, is regulated by the law of supply and demand. If flour is abundant in the market, the price is correspondingly low; and as the supply diminishes, the price advances; so, if money is abundant the rate of interest is low; but if the supply is diminished the rate will advance in a corresponding ratio. In other words, the current price to be paid for the use of money, like the current price to be paid for flour or rice, is governed by the law of supply and demand, which is as inflexible in the one case as in the other. Both being subject to the same laws of trade, the same result must ensue if the Government imposes a burden upon transactions in each. If, for example, the current market price of sugar would otherwise be ten cents per pound, and if the State imposes a tax of one per cent on the seller for every pound of sugar sold, two results would certainly follow: first, the price of sugar would immediately advance one per cent; and second, the purchaser would pay the tax in the form of an increased price for the commodity. This must be apparent to the dullest comprehension. For precisely the same reasons, it is clear that if the current rate of interest be ten per cent per annum, and if the State impose a tax of two per cent per annum on the lender, the rate of interest will immediately advance two per cent and the borrower will pay the tax in the form of interest. So long as the use of money, like any merchantable commodity, has a current market value, regulated by the law of supply and demand, it is obvious that a tax imposed by the State on *494loans must not only to that extent increase the current rate of interest, but it is equally clear that the tax is paid by the borrower and not by the lender. The amount of revenue which the State may raise by taxation is limited only by the discretion of the Legislature, and an emergency might possibly arise in which it would see fit to impose a tax of five per cent on all loans of money, to be assessed to the lender. Can any one doubt that the current rate of interest would immediately advance five per cent, and that the tax would in fact be paid by the borrower, though nominally assessed to the lender ? Indeed it would appear to be a self-evident proposition, which no amount of argument could make plainer, that a tax on loans imposed on the lender must necessarily to that extent increase the rate of interest to be paid by the borrower; who, therefore, in fact, pays the tax, though nominally assessed to the lender.

There* are, doubtless, exceptional cases, in which, from motives of friendship, or other causes, money is loaned on mortgage without interest, or at a conventional rate, having no reference to the current market rate. But, in a large majority of cases, loans are made at current market rates, which are as definite and as easily ascertained as the current market price of any merchantable commodity, and are governed by the same rule of supply and demand. If money is sometimes loaned at rates above or below the current rate, it is equally true that staple articles of merchandise are often sold above or below the current price. But this does not tend to prove that, as a general rule, the tax on the transaction is not paid in the one case by the borrower, and in the other by the purchaser.

I conclude, therefore, that a tax on loans made in the usual course of business, is paid by the borrower; and if the debt be secured by mortgage, he also pays the tax on the mortgaged property. He is twice taxed—once on the property, and once on the debt which the property represents—and *495yet no new value has been created by the transaction. He is no richer, and has no more property than he had before; and if the money which he received from the lender remained in his hands, it is also taxed. If the money has passed into the possession of another taxpayer, it is taxed in his hands; so that the property and the money are each separately taxed; and if the mere promise or obligation of the borrower to repay the money is also taxed, and the tax is paid by him, as it must be, it is clear that he has been twice taxed on the same value or subject matter. This is a violation of that clause of the Constitution which requires that taxation shall be equal and uniform, and that property shall be taxed in proportion to its value. When the mortgaged property has once paid its tax, it has discharged its full obligation to the State, and the owner of it cannot, and in justice ought not, to be subject to another tax merely because he has borrowed a sum of money, for which the property is pledged as a security.

It is claimed, however, that if the mortgage debt be exempt from taxation, the effect will be to exonerate the rich money lender from taxation, at the expense of the producing classes. But, as has been already shown, the tax on mortgages for money lent is never paid by the lender, but by the borrower; and the effect of the exemption will be, not to relieve the lender from a burden, but to exonerate the borrower from an oppressive double tax. It is the borrower, and not the lender, who is aggrieved by a tax on mortgages for money lent. He has just ground of complaint, for the reason that the inevitable result of the tax is to raise the rate of interest which he is compelled to pay; and in this way the burden falls on him, and not on the lender. There is much justice in the complaint that the capitalist, whose money is loaned out on bond and mortgage, and who is protected by the laws in his person and property, virtually escapes taxation, and is not compelled to contribute his just *496quota toward the support of the Government. No one can deny that this is unjust towards the producing classes, on whom the burdens of taxation chiefly fall. But past experience, here and elsewhere, proves conclusively that the remedy for this great injustice is not to be found in a tax on mortgages. In this State the fact is notorious, that in ninety-nine out of a hundred cases, the borrower is compelled to stipulate that he will pay the tax on the mortgage before he can obtain the money at the current rate of interest; and if he refuses to stipulate, he will be compelled to pay a higher rate of interest equivalent to the tax; so that the borrower, and not the lender', almost invariably pays the tax. In Connecticut, they have usury laws, prohibiting, under severe penalties, the loaning of money at a higher rate of interest than that fixed by the statute. They also imposed a tax on mortgages, to be paid by the holder of the mortgage. Under this system, the burden of the tax necessarily fell upon the lender. He was prohibited from loaning his money at a higher rate of interest than that fixed by law; and if the borrower stipulated to pay the tax, in addition to the interest, it was an evasion of the usury laws, which would vitiate the transaction. In this way the burden of the tax was inevitably fixed upon the lender. The result was, that loans on bond and mortgage were less profitable than loans on other securities which were exempt from the tax, and on which the current rate of interest was paid. The necessary consequence was, that money could not be borrowed on bond and mortgage, for the simple reason that loans on other securities, not burdened with the tax, were more profitable. The owners of real estate, offering the most ample security by way of bond and mortgage, could not borrow a dollar for the improvement of their property, and a large amount of capital was withdrawn from the State to find more profitable employment elsewhere. In order to remedy this state of affairs, the Legislature passed an Act *497providing that “no contract shall be deemed usurious by reason of the borrower’s paying, or agreeing to pay, the taxes assessed and paid on the sum loaned;” the effect of which was to impose the whole burden of the. tax on the borrower. Consequently, one who borrows on bond and mortgage in that State is compelled to pay the current rate of interest, and the tax besides, whilst one who borrows on other securities is exempt from the tax, thus discriminating, against loans secured by mortgage on real estate, which is the best security known, and which should command money at the lowest instead of the highest rate of interest. This state of affairs in Connecticut affords a striking practical illustration of the fact that the tax on a mortgage for money lent, in the usual course of business, is invariably paid by the borrower. It proves further, that if such legislation is had as to fasten upon the lender a tax which reduces the interest he is to receive below the current rate which money commands in the market, he will refuse to loan his money on that class of securities, and such loans will cease. In whatever light the subject is viewed, it is perfectly obvious that the capitalist can never be compelled, by means of a tax on mortgages, to contribute his just quota toward the support of the Government. It is for the Legislature to devise, if practicable, some other scheme which will accomplish the result. But the tax on mortgages, instead of exacting from the lender his just quota of taxes, has no other effect than to raise the rate of interest, and to oppress the borrower. It compels the small land owner, who is obliged to borrow money for the improvement of his property, to r a higher rate of interest than money commands on a .¿rent and inferior class of securities.

If we were permitted to look into the question of State policy in the levying of a tax on loans, it could be demon*498strated; I think, that such a tax, even if constitutional, would be eminently unwise and injurious to the public interest. No one can doubt that the necessary result of such a tax would be to raise the current rate of interest to the extent of the tax; and in a community where interest is already exorbitantly high, public policy demands that it should be reduced rather than increased. But as the consideration of the question as one of political economy belongs to the legislative rather than the judicial department, I forbear to press the inquiry further, except to say that in? certain districts of the States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey the tax on mortgages has been abolished; and the effect on those districts may be inferred from the following extract from the report of a committee, of which David A. Wells was Chairman, appointed in eighteen hundred and seventy-one to revise the laws of the State of New York for the assessment and collection of State and local taxes: ‘ ‘On the other hand, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, with a wiser experience, have, as before shown, entirely exempted mortgages from taxation over a large part of their territory, and will undoubtedly at no distant day make the exemption universal. And here occur points to which special attention should be given, viz: In both of these States it is represented to the Commissioners that the demand for this exemption came not in any degree from the capitalists, but from the small land owners, particularly those of the working classes, and further, that the influence of the exemption has been most beneficial to the districts affected by it—so much so, to use the words of one conversant with the question, ‘that if it were possible to take in, as if from an eminence, a view of the whole State, the counties in which the mortgages were exempt from taxation would be as readily distinguished from the others as would be a field of luxuriant wheat or corn from a field of scrub oaks or brushwood.’”

*499This brings me to the last point which I propose to discuss, viz: whether, assuming a tax on mortgages for money lent to be double taxation, the remedy is to be found in the Courts or rests wholly with the Legislature. Because the same subject matter has been twice taxed, it by no means follows that both taxes are void, and that it must escape taxation altogether. On the contrary it justly owes one tax, and if this be paid it may properly claim exemption from the other. When, therefore, it appears that the tax has" been once actually paid, the Courts in proper cases may afford the appropriate relief against its collection a second time; or if paid under coercion and protest, it may be recovered back by action. As already stated, the facts of this" case do not authorize the remedy by injunction; and this is not an action to recover back taxes paid under protect. discover no reason why the Courts may not afford the appropriate relief in proper cases, when a tax has been once actually paid, against its collection a second time, or for recovering it back if paid under compulsion and protest. But to entitle a party to relief in the Courts in such a case, it must appear that the tax has been once paid or tendered. It is the province of the Legislature to devise a revenue system which will avoid the evils and injustice of double taxation, and the Courts are incompetent to afford relief in that class of cases, except when the tax has been once paid, by one or the other of the parties to whom it was assessed. In the cases before us it does not appear that the tax has been once paid or tendered by any one; and we are asked to restrain the collection of it from the plaintiffs, on the ground that the revenue laws require the same subject matter of taxation to be assessed to other persons; and it is said that if the tax is paid by each, the result will be that a double tax will have been collected on the same subject matter. If all this be conceded, it presents no case for the interposition of the Courts, whose assistance can be invoked *500only after the tax which is justly due has been once paid, and it is sought to be collected a second time. Until this event has happened the plaintiffs have suffered no damage.

Orders refusing to dissolve the injunction in these cases reversed and causes remanded.






Concurrence in Part

Rhodes, J., concurring in the judgment, but dissenting from the opinion in part:

I do not propose to discuss at any considerable length the questions involved in these cases. On some of the questions I have heretofore fully expressed my views in the series of cases from People v. McCreery to People v. Eddy, and after the very exhaustive argument here, I. find nothing in the principles laid down in those cases, which I am prepared to retract or materially qualify. I am also well satisfied with the conclusions announced in the former opinion of Mr. Justice Crockett in these cases, on all the points discussed by him, except one, and deem it unnecessary to add any further reasons in their support. The conclusions to which I refer are: First—That the plaintiffs are not entitled, upon the facts in these cases, to an injunction. Second—That the general revenue law was intended to be operative in all the counties of the State, and that the City and County of San Francisco is not exempt from its operation. And, third— That the statute providing for a State Board of Equalization, and prescribing its duties, is not unconstitutional, on any of the grounds presented by the plaintiffs.

I dissent from a portion of the argument and some of the conclusions of Mr. Justice Crockett, upon his fourth proposition—that in respect to the liability of solvent debts to taxation—and will briefly state some of the reasons which lead me to the conclusion that, under the Constitution, they cannot be exempted from taxation.

The words of the Constitution are so unequivocal, plain, *501and clear, that there is scarcely room for construction. It was conceded by all the counsel for the plaintiffs—and it is beyond all question—that solvent debts are property, within the meaning of the words of the Constitution “all property.’ This proposition being established, it results inevitably and beyond the possibility of question, that solvent debts are subject to taxation.

The mode and manner in which their value, or the value of the interest of several persons therein, is to be ascertained, are committed to the Legislature. The Constitution expressly confers that power upon the Legislature in respect to all classes of property, and it cannot be assumed by the Courts. And unless the Act of the Legislature, under the guise of providing a manner for the ascertainment of the value of property, or of equalizing the value, directly violates the constitutional requirement, that all property shall be taxed, and be taxed in proportion to its value, it is beyond the supervision or control of the judicial department of the Government. The statutes which ostensibly provided for the listing of property, but which, in fact, exempted from taxation mining claims, and debts secured by mortgage, were of the class referred to, and were unhesitatingly pronounced void. A statute will not be held unconstitutional, because it may not produce entire equality and uniformity, for exact equality and uniformity are unattainable. The Courts do not possess the power to abrogate a statute, or any of its provisions, which do, in fact, prescribe the manner in Avhich the value of property shall be ascertained, for the purpose of taxation.

Nor will a statute be declared unconstitutional and void because, under its operation, the same property is liable to be twice taxed. It is insisted that a tax on a debt for money loaned, and a tax on the property mortgaged to secure the payment of the debt, is necessarily double taxation. When a horse is sold, and a promissory note given *502for the payment of the price, it may be said, in a remote sense, that the note represents the horse—that is to say, the value of the horse; but if the purchaser should execute a mortgage of real estate to secure the payment of the note, or should, pledge or mortgage personal property, or give personal security for the same purpose, can it be seriously contended that the mortgaged property, the pledge or the personal security in any sense, even the remotest, represents either the horse or its value ? A note for money loaned may represent, in one sense, the money, but in no sense the property mortgaged to secure its payment.

A debt and the property mortgaged to secure its payment are not the representatives of each other. Conceding, however, that money loaned and the note given for its payment represent the same thing—the same value—has the Court any more power to declare that the note shall not be taxed, because the money is liable to taxation, than to hold that the money shall not be taxed, because the,note is liable to taxation ?—any more power to exempt from taxation a note given on the purchase of a horse, than to exempt the horse?

It was earnestly urged by counsel, that the debt for money loaned should be exempt from taxation, because the taxes must, by the inevitable operation of the rules of trade, be paid by the borrower. Under the operation of the same rules, the consumer pays the tax imposed on all merchantable commodities; and the tenant pays the taxes directly or indirectly on the leased premises. Would that result be urged as a sufficient reason for exempting from taxation all merchantable commodities, and all lands held under lease ? Does the fact that the borrowers from a bank pay indirectly , the taxes on the bank building, afford a sufficient reason for exempting such building from taxation?

It is also urged, that the contracting of a debt adds’ nothing to the value of the property in the State, and, therefore, the debt should not be taxed. Bills, promissory *503notes, and solvent debts in other forms,' are among the modes and means by which property in all civilized countries, is acquired, held, and distributed. The Constitution did not define property; but that term was used in its popular sense, as indicating that which, in a commercial sense, possesses value. The fact that no new value is created by the giving of a promissory note, has no bearing on the question. It is property in the hands of the holder, and ought to bear its just proportion of the taxes levied for the support of the Government.

It is often said that a system ought to be devised, by which each person should pay taxes on the value of his interest in the property in his hands—that is, the value of his property less his debts, With that matter the Courts cannot deal; but the whole subject is committed to the legislative department of the Government.

In my opinion, a solvent debt is subject to taxation in the same manner as property of any other class or character; and is not entitled to exemption from taxation on the ground that some other property for which it was given, or by which its payment is secured, is liable to taxation.






Concurrence Opinion

Belcher, J., concurring in the judgment;

I concur in the judgment and- in the three propositions first stated by Mr. Justice Crockett, but I do not concur in all his reasoning upon the fourth proposition. It is conceded that a solvent debt is property, and as such is subject to taxation. This being so, the only question is, whether the debts taxed to the plaintiffs, and admitted to be solvent, are doubly taxed. In my opinion, when money is deposited in a savings bank, to be loaned out for the benefit of the depositor, if it is assessed to the depositor and also to the bank, and payment of the taxes is exacted from both, it is double taxation. Nor is it any the less so if the bank has loaned the *504money and is taxed upon the note and mortgage which it has received. Practically the bank is but an agent or instrumentality used to loan the money, and the depositor’s gains are his proportion of the interest received, after the expenses of the bank are paid.

In the case of the Savings and Loan Society, it does not appear that the taxes had been paid by the depositors on any of their deposits, and, therefore, the question of double taxation does not arise.






Concurrence in Part

Wallace, C. J., concurring in the judgment, but dissenting from the opinion in part:

The conclusion to which the Court unanimously arrived in the first argument, and to which we all adhere—that these are not cases for equitable interposition by injunction—would seem to render the discussion of any of the other questions which have been argued unnecessary; but inasmuch as by the invitation of the Court a number of able and distinguished counsel participated in the argument, and discussed at great length, both orally and in printed briefs, the constitutionality of those parts of the Political Code prescribing the duties of the State Board of Equalization, and providing for the taxation of credits, I have thought it proper to examine and briefly to state my views on those subjects.

It is unnecessary to consider at length whether the Act, in so far as it creates the State Board of Equalization, is unconstitutional, or whether the Board might exist for some of the purposes specified in the Act without substantial interference with the revenue system of the State, for I am irresistibly driven to the conclusion that all those sections defining its most important duties—in fact, making up in the main the legislative scheme discernible in the Act—are unconstitutional: First, because the Board is invested with *505the powers of Assessors; and second, because it is authorized to exercise legislative functions.

The Board is not one elected by the people. Two of its members are appointed by the Governor and hold during his pleasure, the Controller of State being ex officio the third member. (Political Code, Sec. 352.) Local Assessors are required to exact from each person, among other things, a statement of ‘ ‘all other facts required by the State Board of Equalization.” (Id., Sec. 3629, subd. 6.) The assessment book in each county must show “the total value of all property after equalization by the State Board,” and “such other things as the Board of Equalization may require.” (Id., Sec. 3650, subds. 13,15.) Each Assessor is compelled to transmit a statement to the Board on the first Monday of July in each year. (Id., Sec. 3655.) The Board is directed “to prescribe rules and regulations to govern Supervisors when equalizing, and Assessors when assessing, ” to equalize the valuation of the property of the several counties in the State, and fix the rate'of State taxation, and to “personally inspect” property in the different counties and “learn the value thereof.’’ (Id., Sec. 3692, subds. 2, 6, 7.) It is authorized to raise or reduce the valuation of property for purposes of taxation in the various districts. (Id., Sec. 3693.) “If the County Auditor fails to forward to the State Board of Equalization the statement provided for in Section 3728, the Board must make the equalization from any information it can obtain.” (Id., Sec. 3694, vide Sec. 3728.) When the equalization is completed, the Clerk of the Board is to transmit to each County Auditor a statement of the “percentum to be added to or deducted from the valuation of the property of the county.” (Id., Sec. 3695.) The Board is to determine and transmit to the Board of Supervisors of each county the rate of State tax to be levied and collected, “which, after *506allowing for delinquency in the collection of taxes must ” be sufficient to raise the specific amount of revenue directed to. be raised by the Legislature for State purposes. (Id., Sec. 3696.) It is allowed to supply the deficiencies of local Boards of Supervisors in the matter of allowing certain expenses connected with the revenue, and the amount of these expenses thus allowed is to be collected through the Controller from the Treasurers of the counties. (Id., Sec. 3704.) By a certified order sent to the Auditor of any county, it may extend the time fixed by the Political Code for the performance of any act to be done during the assessment. (Id., Sec. 3705.) Its action in fixing the rate of taxation for State purposes is, in the absence of action by the Board of Supervisors, a valid levy of the rate established, which-must be enforced by the local officers. (Id., Sec. 3715.) These are the provisions of the Political Code, which figure most prominently in the reasoning through which my conclusion has been reached, and I have italicized those portions which appear to me most important in the discussion. Article XI, Sec. 13, of the Constitution of the State, is in the following language: “Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State. All property in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law; but Assessors and Collectors of town, county, and State taxes, shall be elected by the qualified electors of the district, county, or town, in which the property taxed for State, county, or town purposes is situated.”

It was contended at the argument that the State Board of Equalization was established to secure uniformity and equal taxation throughout the State, and the taxation of all property “in proportion to its value,” and therefore it was claimed that its establishment was authorized by the language of this section of the Constitution. Leaving wholly out of view for the moment the last clause of the section, it may be seriously doubted whether the action of the Board *507according to the requirements of the statute would not have an opposite tendency. It operates not throughout the State as an entirety but in localities within the. State, and there is no limitation upon .the exercise of its discretion. It may raise the valuation of the entire property in Santa Clara County and lower the valuation of the entire property in San Francisco, and this without reference to the fact that an individual taxpayer in the former county may have already been assessed too high, or that an individual taxpayer in the latter county may have already been assessed too low. But irrespective of this injustice likely to accrue to individual taxpayers, the exercise of the power to raise or lower the rate of taxation upon the entire mass of property in each particular locality tends strongly to derange that uniformity and equality in assessments which naturally result from the adoption of local market value as the basis of appraisement. It is indeed self-evident that a revenue system through which the actual cash value of all kinds of property is ascertained by local Assessors must, if honestly administered, produce as nearly a uniform and equal result as any mode of assessment which can be devised; that it fixes the taxation of property “in proportion to its value,” and that its symmetry and completeness must be seriously affected, if not wholly destroyed, by any attempt to reconcile those differences in values which are caused by diversities in business, productive capacity and the geographical situation of the local divisions of a great State-. From this point of view it certainly may be claimed, at least with great plausibility, that the action of the State Board of Equalization, as contemplated by the Act under which it proceeds, tends rather to destroy than promote that equality and uniformity in taxation which it was the design of the Constitution to secure.

But however this may be, the last clause of the section of the Constitution which is inseparably connected with the language to which I have just alluded is clear and decisive. *508The value of property for purposes of taxation is to be “ ascertained as directed by law,” that is in such mode and manner as the Legislature may prescribe, “ but ” through the instrumentality of Assessors elected by the qualified electors” of the assessment district “ in which the property taxed * * * is situated.” The mode and manner in which the valuation is to be ascertained is in a measure, and in a great measure, referred to the legislative judgment, but with the restriction that the officer who is to execute the legislative will in this respect must be one whom the people of the locality to be affected have themselves chosen for that purpose.

It is not necessary to refer to the peculiar condition of property rights in the State existing at the time of the formation of the Constitution, in which condition it is historically well known that this clause had its origin, for the language of the clause itself is so clear that neither argument nor illustration could make it more apparent. To hold, therefore, that in prescribing the mere manner of ascertaining the value of property for purposes of taxation the Legislature is at liberty to supersede the Assessor elected by the people and confer his appropriate functions upon an officer of its own nomination, is to wholly ignore a prominent provision of the Constitution of the State having a known reference to the peculiar local condition of the people by whom that instrument was framed and adopted.

There can be no doubt whatever as to the sense in which the word “Assessors'’ is used in the Constitution. It is used there in connection with a proposed system of taxation; but even aside from the purpose most obvious for which the word was employed, as shown by the context, the term possesses a fixed and ascertained legal signification which exactly expresses the popular understanding of its import. It is defined in various expressions, but all the definitions substantially correspond. Thus: “Those that assess public taxes.” (Jac. *509Law Dic.) “In our law an Assessor is one who has been legally appointed to value and appraise property, generally with a view to levying a tax upon it.” (Bouvier's Law Dic.) “An officer chosen or appointed to assess property.” (Burrell’s Law Dic.) In other words, an Assessor may be said to be a person charged by law with the duty of ascertaining and determining the value of property as the foundation of a public tax. This duty necessarily involves the exercise 'of judgment. It is the judgment of the officer making the assessment in the first instance. If his judgment as to value is to be subsequently disturbed, or the valuation which he affixed is to be afterwards altered by the action of another person or Board, it is the substitution of their judgment for his, and the person or Board whose judgment is so substituted are necessarily in the exercise of the powers of an Assessor. It is of no avail to designate this power as not in reality a power of assessment, but one of equalization of valuation merely. Its scope and effect is to fix a new and final valuation upon the property to be taxed. It is certainly not the less the power and function of assessment because it assumes at the outset to. set aside a valuation already fixed by the local officer regularly elected for that purpose. It is indeed apparent that if the State Controller and the two executive appointees composing the State Board can be constitutionally empowered to set aside the action of the local Assessors and' substitute their own judgment of value for his or for that of the local Boards of Equalization elected by the people, they may be constitutionally authorized to make the assessments for themselves in the first instance, and so displace the local Assessors and the local Boards altogether.

The State Board of Equalization, composed of the Controller and the executive appointees, is likened in the argument made for the defendants to the local Boards of Equalization, composed of the members of the Boards of Supervisors in the several counties, and it is claimed that *510the repeated decisions of this Court sustaining the authority of the latter go far to uphold the constitutional validity of the former. I am not impressed with the supposed analogy between the two Boards. I have said already in substance in reference to the State Board, that the power to ‘equalize ” is the power to assess, and that a Board of officers who alter valuations for the purpose of taxation, though called a “Board of 'Equalization,” are in reality a “Board of Assessors.” The local Boards of Equalization or of assessments are composed wholly of officers elected by the people, and quoad the subject matter intrusted to them they are Assessors within the meaning of the Constitution. Attention, however, is called to the fact that it is the habit to elect these officers not for the county at large but by the districts into which the county is subdivided for this purpose, and that it is the practice of each member of the Board to act in equalizing values not alone in the district from which he is elected, but throughout the entire county. However this may be, it is to be remarked that in the local Boards the entire people of the county are represented by officers chosen by themselves, while the State Board has no constituency—its.members are. not elected by the people to perform the duties of Assessors; two of them hold only at the pleasure of the Executive, and the Controller, who is ex officio a member of the Board, holds only by legislative designation, as the Treasurer or Attorney General might have held—none of them having ever been elected by the people as an Assessor. The local Boards of Assessors, called “ Boards of Equalization,” and the State Board of Assessors, called the “ State Board of Equalization,” are therefore wholly unlike in their respective organizations, and derive their respective claims of authority from entirely distinct sources—the former from election by the people, the latter only from legislative designation, or executive appointment. As I have said already, the State Board has no constituency—it represents nobody. Under *511the name of equalization it assumes to assess property and fix values for the purpose of taxation throughout the entire State without having received a single vote at the hands of the people for such an office.

That the State Board cannot become Assessors without the warrant of the popular choice for that office is, therefore, clear under the clause of the Constitution already referred to, and which clause, it may be remarked, is in its general characteristic entirely in accord with the great principle broadly underlying the entire system of our Government, that there should be a corelation between taxation and representation. Indeed a general and persistent opposition to any invasion of that principle has always characterized the people of this country. A reference to this principle in American government will sufficiently account for the provision in our organic law, that for the purpose of taxation property shall be valued by officers elected by the qualified electors in the town, county, or district in which it is situated. It is incumbent upon the Courts to give full force and effect to that provision, and not to permit it to be frittered away under any pretexts. It may be urged, and the argument is not without force, that the Legislature might have effected a complete separation between State and local taxes, in their assessment and collection, and that so far as the revenue for the support of the State Government was concerned, the “district” mentioned in the Constitution might have been coextensive with the limits of the State. But no such legislation has taken place. State taxes are collected through local officers. Thus one system is applied to the assessment of property and the collection of revenue for all purposes; and if the system be altered in any part the entire machinery is affected. And if the State had been constituted one revenue district for the purpose of State taxation, the Assessors and officers charged with the duty of equalizing assessments within that district must *512have been elected by the people. In People v. Hastings, 29 Cal. 450, Mr. Justice Rhodes, in delivering the unanimous opinion of this Court, holds the following language:

“Section thirteen of Article XI of the Constitution of the State is as follows: ‘Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State. All property in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law; but Assessors and Collectors of town, county, and State taxes shall be elected by the qualified electors of the district, county, or town in which the property taxed for State, county, or town purposes is situated.’ The requirement that the value of the property to be taxed shall be ascertained as directed by law, means that the property shall be assessed for the purpose of taxation, and that the taxes may be levied only after the property has been so assessed. An assessment, made as directed by law, is an indispensable basis for the support of the tax that may be levied upon it. The constitutional requirements are not satisfied merely by an assessment made in the manner directed by law, but it is also provided that the Assessors of town, county, or State taxes shall be elected by the qualified electors of the district, county or town in which the property to be taxed is situated—that is to say, that the assessment must be made by a person elected as an Assessor by the qualified electors of such district, county or town. A tax, in order to be valid, must rest upon an assessment made in the mode prescribed by law, and by an Assessor elected as provided for by the Constitution. This proposition requires no argument, for it arises from the plain and unmistakable import of the terms employed in the section cited.”

In People v. Sargent, 44 Cal. 430, the doctrine of the case of People v. Hastings, supra, on this point, was reaffirmed here. If, then, under the sections of the Political Code *513under consideration the State Board of Equalization possesses in substance the powers of Assessors; if it be found, upon examination, that under those sections the Board can change the results arrived at by the Assessors in the valuations of property within their several districts, then unquestionably there is a virtual transfer of the power of assessment, because to change a valuation is certainly, so far as the taxpayer is concerned, to fix a valuation, and to fix a valuation as a basis for the levy of a tax is an assessment.

The Board is authorized to prescribe rules for the government of Assessors in the performance of their duties, and by these rules the valuation of property may be materially affected. The mode prescribed by the Board for ascertaining the cash value of property may be entirely different from that which, but for its interference, would have been adopted by the Assessor, and thus the assessment is, or may be, practically made by the Board, and not by the Assessor. But this transfer of power is seen more conspicuously in other sections of the Code. There being but one assessment, which is the basis of both local and State taxation, the process of equalization, in the manner prescribed by the law, cannot be applied without a disturbance of local valuation. Thus, if the Assessor of San Francisco is directed to add twenty per centum to his valuation of the real property in his district, then not only does the valuation quoad that species of property become that of the Board, and not of the Assessor; but the relative valuations of different classes of property within the same assessment district are necessarily disturbed and altered, the practical result of which is that the owners of real estate will pay a higher tax by twenty per centum, as compared with the owners of personal property in the same district, than they would have paid but for the interference of the State Board. And in the process of *514equalization the Board is governed by no rules except those of its own creation. Its members are required, personally, to inspect the property in the different counties of the State; in other words, individually to perform a most important function of the duties which are, by law, devolved upon the elected Assessors; and upon the knowledge thus acquired, and, in one conjuncture, “upon any information it can obtain,” the so-called equalization by the Board may be founded. This is, after all, really to confer upon the Board the power of original assessment, which is made to supply the place of the assessment by constitutional officers elected by the “qualified electors. ” The subject need not be pursued further. In effect, and to all substantial intents and purposes, those sections of the Code which I have considered constitute the State Board of Equalization a Board of Assessors, and in my judgment are in conflict with the plain provisions of the Constitution.

I am also of opinion that those parts of the law which undertake to vest in the Board the authority and duty to fix the rate of taxation amount to a delegation of legislative power, and are therefore a violation of the Constitution. The portions of the Constitution thus violated are the following :

Article III. “The power of the Government of the State of California shall be divided into three separate departments—the legislative, the executive, and judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.”

Article IV, Section 1. “The legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and Assembly, which shall be designated the Legislature of California, and the enacting clause of every law shall be as follows: ‘The people of the *515State of California, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows.’ ”

These provisions of the Constitution are merely declaratory of the most essential principle and the principle most jealously guarded in the American system of Government. It would be useless to enter into an extended argument or to cite authorities in support of a proposition which has been so frequently declared and enforced by the judiciary of the American States that it has really become axiomatic. The application of the principle to the case at bar is the only point upon which anything need be said. How taxation is one of the necessary attributes of sovereignty and the power to lay taxes under our system is one of the powers of Government which does not belong to either the executive or the judicial department, but is vested in the Legislature. “The power of taxation is a necessary incident to sovereignty, and under our system of Government it pertains to the legislative department, for the levying a tax is necessarily a legislative act.” (People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 454.) And that the right to exercise this power cannot be delegated is another proposition so self-evident that I need not delay to consider it in detail, but may confine myself to an inquiry as to whether there has been an attempted delegation of the power of taxation to the State Board. After having performed the functions of assessments (under the name, however, of equalizing assessments) that body is directed to fix the rate “of State taxation,” which, “after allowing for delinquencies in the collection of taxes, ” must be sufficient to produce the “amount of revenue directed to be raised by the Legislature for that purpose.” If the discharge of this duty involved nothing moro than an arithmetical computation based upon the total assessed value of the property in the State, it would be an act of a merely executive nature, and, in my opinion, not open to objection of a constitutional character. As for *516example, if the Board was only required to ascertain by calculation, and thereupon to declare what rate of taxation upon the total assessed valuation would produce a sum equal to the ascertained amount by law directed to be raised for State purposes, it would be but an agency or instrument by which the legislative will and the legislative judgment, already expressed upon the statute book, would be carried into effect. But the scope" of its power as defined in the Code goes clearly beyond this limit, and requires of the Board the exercise of its own discretion and its own judgment in a calculation of probabilities which it is required to make for itself, an estimate or mere conjecture of the amount of taxes that will remain unpaid after the work of collection is finished, and the levy by the Board of a tax sufficient to cover such delinquency as its judgment may anticipate. That this is the real nature of the power asserted for the Board cannot be doubted upon considering the provisions of the statute under which it proceeds. Indeed, much of the argument of one of the learned counsel who defended the constitutionality of the Act practically conceded this point, for it went to show that in the levy of fifty cents upon the one hundred dollars made by the Board to raise money for State purposes, its judgment was exercised with a degree of circumspection which deserved to be commended, that it might tuell have fixed the rate much higher than fifty cents, etc.—all which, is no doubt true, for undoubtedly there was as much power, as much authority in the Board, to fix the rate upon one hundred dollars at fifty dollars at fifty cents. But with whatever degree of moderation or of wisdom the very estimable gentleman who now compose the State Board may have, in fact, proceeded, their action in fixing the rate of taxation in the exercise of their own judgment and to cover their own estimate of delinquencies to occur, was the usurpation upon their part of those powers to be exercised only by the legislative department of the Government. It is *517for the Legislature only—the elected representatives of the people—to determine not only the amount of money to be raised for the support of the State Government and the payment of the public debt, but also the rate of taxation which may be expected to produce the amount; and in making its determination upon the latter point, it is its duty to take into consideration all the elements by which a proper conclusion may be attained, and the average proportion of delinquent taxes, as shown by the collection of former years, should be before the Legislature itself, and should constitute one of the elements upon which its judgment should proceed. If indeed it be competent to the Legislature to substitute the judgment of the State Board for its own in this, the highest function of Government—the imposition of taxation upon the citizen'—it is not perceived why it might not constitutionally abdicate its authority entirely, and confer upon the Board the whole mass of its remaining powers. As before suggested, when the amount to be raised, and the actual value of all the taxable property in the State have been ascertained, the rate of taxation necessary to produce that amount can be determined by arithmetic, and therefore the fixing of the rate under such circumstances would be a merely executive act. But the State Board is not restricted within these bounds. The statute, assuming that a proportion of the taxes will not be collected, refers it wholly to the judgment and discretion of the Board: First, to estimate and determine what the amount of the anticipated delinquency will be; and, second, to increase what would otherwise be the rate of taxation sufficient to cover this estimated delinquency; the result, of course, is that if the judgment of the Board should place the anticipated delinquency at a sum greater than the event proves it to be, the rate of taxation, as fixed by the Board, will be too high, and a larger sum will be collected from the people than the needs of the State require; but the true *518and, in my opinion, the unanswerable objection to the validity of the statute is, that whether the estimate of delinquencies, as made by the Board, proves too high, or too low, or precisely correct in point of fact, the taxes paid by the people are paid, not in obedience to the expressed judgment or discretion of the legislative department of the Government, but in obedience to the expressed judgment and discretion of the Board alone, which, in either of the supposed cases, is the exercise of legislative power by the Board, and therefore unwarranted by the Constitution.

With reference to the question of the assessment, for the purposes of taxation, of credits, or what have been termed in argument “solvent debts,” the proposition contended for by the counsel who assail the validity of the tax, seems to be that the wealth of the State is not increased by local credits, and, therefore, that such credits ought not to be included in the aggregate of the taxable property within the State. This proposition may be entirely sound in a politico-economical point of view; indeed, I am not aware that it has ever- been seriously contraverted by political economists, and so far as my investigation has extended, it has been uniformly accepted by the Legislatures of the other States of the Union.

While, however, it is doubtless true that the material wealth of the State is not increased by such credits, it by no means results that these credits are not to be dealt with as legitimate objects of taxation. So far as an argument may be drawn from the legislation of the other States, it must be acknowledged that all the precedents are in favor of treating such credits as constituting property for purposes of taxation. At the same time, in order to secure as nearly as may be equality in taxation and to prevent double taxation, it has been the practice, in some form, to allow a deduction of the amount of each crecit from the debtor’s estate— in other words, to treat each credit as the taxable property *519of the creditor in making the assessment.' It may well be admitted that to tax property purchased on credit, and also the credit itself, to their full value in the hands of both debtor and creditor, is flagrantly unjust and a clear violation of the proposition, the soundness of which I have conceded; but this, while it goes to show that in this State the Legislature has disregarded a fixed axiom in political economy, does not prove as a judicial proposition that credits are not property, nor that they should absolutely escape taxation. Indeed it would be difficult to maintain that a citizen whose wealth consists wholly of obligations for the payment of money loaned should not in common with other citizens contribute his pro rata share to the support of the Government by which his person and property are protected. The remedy, however, for any supposed injustice of the kind specified, is not with the Courts but with the Legislature. That absolute equality in the burden of supporting the Government, however desirable, is unattainable by even the most carefully adjusted system of taxation is a truth which all human experience has demonstrated; but while this is the case there is no doubt that such equality may be approximated so as to eradicate from our financial system the odious injustice of double taxation, and at the same time to compel the money lender to contribute his just proportion of the general taxation imposed. It is not, howrever, for the judicial department of the Government to project or perfect a system of finance.

If the system adopted by the Legislature operates injustice to any person or class of persons, we cannot for that reason interfere, unless it also appear that some provision of the Constitution has been violated in the enactment of the law; all else is mere legislative policy with which we cannot interfere; hence we have no more authority to say that that species of property known as solvent indebtedness is not taxable to the creditor, because it might amount to “double *520taxation, ” than we have to declare that the amount of his debts should be subtracted from the value of the debtor’s assessable property. The latter would seem the more just mode of procedure, but neither can be judicially prescribed. My conclusion on this point is that in so far as the Code requires credits to be assessed as property for the purposes of taxation it is not in contravention of the Constitution.

These are the general views I entertained upon the first argument of these causes; but the pressure of the business of the Court at that time prevented me from entering upon a discussion of the questions involved in these appeals.

I am of opinion that the orders below should be reversed, because the cases here are not of equitable cognizance, nor remediable by injunction.






Concurrence Opinion

Niles, J., concurring in the judgment, and with Wallace, C. J.:

I concur in the judgment, and agree with Mr. Justice Crockett in the conclusions to which he has arrived, except the one relating to the constitutionality of the Act creating the State Board of Equalization; upon this point I concur in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Wallace.






Concurrence in Part

Wallace, C. J., concurring in the judgment, but dissenting from the opinion in part:

I concur in the judgment, but I dissent from the opinion of Mr. Justice Crockett, which maintains the validity of that portion of section three thousand six hundred and ninety-six of the Political Code, which provides that the State Board of Equalization shall determine the amount of delinquency likely to occur in the collection of taxes. In my opinion it is not competent to the Legislature to substitute the judgment of the Board for its own upon that matter, and I think that its exercise by the Board is substantially the exercise of legislative power in the important respect of fixing the rate of taxation to be levied for the support of the State Government.

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