Save Lake Calhoun, Respondent, vs. Sarah Strommen, et al., Appellants.
A18-1007
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
May 13, 2020
Lillehaug, J.; Dissenting, Gildea, C.J., Anderson, J.
Court of Appeals. Filed: May 13, 2020 Office of Appellate Courts
Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.
Lewis A. Remele, Jr., Mark R. Bradford, and Colin S. Seaborg, Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minneapolis Park & Recreation Board.
S Y L L A B U S
- A petition for a writ of quo warranto is an appropriate method to challenge the authority of the Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources to issue an order changing the name of a lake.
- The Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources had authority under
Minnesota Statutes § 83A.02 (1), (3) (2018) to issue an order changing the name ofa lake. That authority is not limited by Minnesota Statutes § 83A.05, subd. 1 (2018) , which prohibits a county board from changing a lake name “which has existed for 40 years.”
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
O P I N I O N
LILLEHAUG, Justice.
On January 18, 2018, the Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources (the Commissioner) issued an order changing the official name of a well-known Minneapolis lake from Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska. The Commissioner invoked his authority under
We conclude that, in this case, the writ of quo warranto is an appropriate method to challenge the Commissioner‘s authority. But we decline to issue the writ because the Commissioner has statutory authority to change the names of Minnesota lakes, including those with names existing for 40 years or more. Under Minnesota law, the body of water that was Lake Calhoun is now Bde Maka Ska.
Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals in part, reverse in part, and remand.
This case is about the legal name of a lake entirely located within the City of Minneapolis. Among the names by which Native people knew it was Bde Maka Ska. In the 1820s, white people began to call it Lake Calhoun, and eventually that became the official name of the lake. The name has been in existence for considerably more than 40 years.
In April 2015, the Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board passed a resolution to develop a master plan for the Chain of Lakes Regional Park, which includes the lake at issue. The plan, approved in 2017, proposed to change the official name of the lake from Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska.
After approving the master plan, the park board directed its staff to circulate and forward to the Hennepin County Board, via filing with the county auditor, a petition to change the lake name signed by at least 15 registered voters. The idea seems to have been to initiate a name change under
The petition was filed and presented to the county board. But the county attorney advised the board, citing section 83A.05, subdivision 1, that the board did not have the authority to change a lake “name which has existed for 40 years.”
So, the county board took another tack. After public notice, public comment, and a public hearing, the county board passed Resolution No. 17-0489 on November 28, 2017,
The county submitted the resolution and other supporting documents to the Commissioner. The Commissioner received comments supporting and opposing the name-change, including a petition from Save Lake Calhoun submitted on behalf of homeowners near the lake. After considering the submissions, and invoking his authority under
In response, Save Lake Calhoun petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of certiorari. The court of appeals dismissed the petition because the Commissioner‘s order was not a reviewable quasi-judicial decision. In re Proposed Renaming of Lake Calhoun, No. A18-0261, Order at 4 (Minn. App. filed Mar. 6, 2018).
On April 25, 2018, Save Lake Calhoun petitioned the Ramsey County District Court for a writ of quo warranto. Save Lake Calhoun argued that, because the Lake Calhoun name had existed for more than 40 years, the Commissioner had exceeded statutory authority by changing the name. The Commissioner moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, to change venue. By order filed June 15, 2018, the district court denied the petition for a
Save Lake Calhoun appealed. The court of appeals reversed the district court and directed that judgment be entered for Save Lake Calhoun. See Save Lake Calhoun v. Strommen, 928 N.W.2d 377, 390 (Minn. App. 2019). The court determined that the writ of quo warranto was available because the Commissioner‘s action was an ongoing exercise of power. Id. at 385–86. Reaching the merits of the case, the court concluded that the Commissioner lacked the authority to change a lake name in existence for more than 40 years. Id. at 388–89. The Commissioner sought review, and we granted it.
ANALYSIS
I.
The
Although we have original jurisdiction to issue the writ, in Rice v. Connolly, we instructed that petitions for the writ should be filed in the first instance in district court. 488 N.W.2d 241, 243–44 (Minn. 1992). Consistent with that instruction, Save Lake Calhoun commenced this quo warranto matter in the district court. The district court
The Commissioner argues in three respects that quo warranto is not—or should not be—available in this case. First, the Commissioner argues that Save Lake Calhoun cannot use a writ of quo warranto to challenge official misconduct. But Save Lake Calhoun‘s petition alleges more than mere misconduct; it alleges that an official has acted without legal authority. State ex rel. Lommen v. Gravlin highlights this distinction. 295 N.W. 654, 655 (Minn. 1941).
In Lommen, the plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto to prevent the Commissioner of Administration from purchasing uniforms without competitive bidding. Id. at 654–55. We explained that a writ of quo warranto cannot be used as “preventive of, or remedy for, official misconduct and [may] not be employed to test the legality of the official action of public or corporate officers.” Id. at 655 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In that case, neither party questioned the official‘s legal authority to purchase uniforms. Instead, the issue was whether the official could properly exercise that authority without using the competitive-bidding process.
By contrast, Save Lake Calhoun alleges that the Commissioner exceeded the statutory authority of the office, usurping the power held by others. A petition for a writ of quo warranto properly challenges this type of action because it concerns whether legal authority exists, not whether legal authority has been misused.
Sviggum arose out of a government shutdown. Id. at 315. Because the Legislature did not appropriate funds for necessary executive functions, a district court issued an order authorizing the finance commissioner to fund those functions. Id. Subsequently, the Legislature passed an appropriations bill that retroactively funded those same functions. Id. at 316. Because the Legislature‘s bill was retroactive, it—not the district court order—funded the executive functions and effectively mooted the district court‘s order. Id. at 323. Accordingly, the court of appeals dismissed the petition for lack of a case or controversy. Id. Sviggum is weak support for the Commissioner‘s position here. This case is not moot; the Commissioner‘s order remains in effect.
Our precedent confirms that quo warranto is an available remedy to challenge the type of conduct at issue in this case. In State ex rel. Palmer v. Perpich, 182 N.W.2d 182, 183 (Minn. 1971), we considered the lieutenant governor‘s statutory authority to call the senate to order and require each senator, when called, to present a certificate of election. See
Here, Save Lake Calhoun asserts that the Commissioner exceeded the Commissioner‘s statutory authority by changing the name of the lake to Bde Maka Ska. Like the lieutenant governor in Perpich, and like the village officers in Danielson, quo warranto is available to decide whether the Commissioner exceeded statutory authority.4
Third, the Commissioner urges that we abolish the common-law writ of quo warranto. We decline to do so. We made clear in Rice, in 1992, that the writ “exist[s] side
II.
Having established that the writ is available if the Commissioner exceeded statutory authority, we turn to the merits of the dispute. Did the Commissioner have the statutory authority to change a lake name in existence for 40-plus years?
A.
In this case, the relevant facts are undisputed, so the question is one of law that we review de novo. State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Minn. 2016).6 The legal issue is whether the Commissioner exceeded authority by failing to heed a statutory time limitation. This issue is a matter of statutory interpretation. Our role in interpreting statutes “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”
In determining a statute‘s plain meaning, “words and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.”
With these canons of statutory interpretation in mind, we turn to the parties’ arguments on how to interpret the lake-name statutes. Save Lake Calhoun‘s position is straightforward; it contends that the controlling statute is
Save Lake Calhoun acknowledges that the Commissioner has authority to change a lake name, but argues that this authority is limited by sections 83A.05 to 83A.07. Save Lake Calhoun points specifically to
The Commissioner responds that section 83A.05 does not bind the Commissioner. Instead, chapter 83A establishes two avenues for changing a lake name: the process in sections 83A.05 to 83A.07 that addresses county board determinations; and a separate process in sections 83A.02 to 83A.03 that gives the Commissioner the power to determine the names, not just of lakes, but of streams, places, and other geographic features.
In particular, the Commissioner points to two paragraphs of section 83A.02. Paragraph 1 says that the Commissioner shall “determine the correct and most appropriate names of the lakes, streams, places and other geographic features in the state . . . by written order.” Paragraph 3 provides that the Commissioner shall change names “in cooperation with the county boards and with their approval . . . with the end in view of eliminating, as far as possible, duplication of names within the state.” The Commissioner asserts that the power bestowed by paragraph 1 is independent of the Commissioner‘s power bestowed by paragraph 3 and may be exercised without the involvement of county boards. In any event, the Commissioner argues, the 40-year time limitation in section 83A.05, subdivision 1, does not limit the Commissioner‘s power granted by paragraphs 1 and 3 of section 83A.02.
B.
After a careful review of the entirety of chapter 83A, and reading the chapter and its sections as a whole, we conclude that the Commissioner had the authority to change the name of the lake from Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska, even though the Lake Calhoun name has existed for more than 40 years.
The county board process does not apply to lakes whose official names have been in existence for 40 years. The plain language of section 83A.05, subdivision 1, makes clear that a lake name “may be given or changed under sections 83A.05 to 83A.07 except that a name which has existed for 40 years may not be changed under the provisions of sections 83A.05 to 83A.07.” (Emphasis added.) The two specific references to “sections 83A.05 to 83A.07” demonstrate unambiguously that the 40-year limitation applies specifically and solely to the county board process, and not to the rest of chapter 83A. Put another way, the 40-year limitation is a check on the county boards, not on the Commissioner.
The other avenue to change a lake name—what we will call the Commissioner process—is found in sections 83A.02–.03. Paragraph 1 of section 83A.02 gives the Commissioner authority to “determine the correct and most appropriate names” of lakes.
The dissent sees section 83A.02(1), the Commissioner‘s power to determine, as a “record-keeping function.” But paragraph 1 expressly gives the Commissioner the power to decide, not just the “correct” name, but the “most appropriate name.” And the other uses of the word “determine” in chapter 83A do not smack of mere record-keeping. See Minn.
Significantly, nowhere in the sections regarding the Commissioner process is there a word, or even a hint, about any time limitation on the power to determine. To the contrary: the 40-year limitation in section 83A.05, subdivision 1, is expressly confined to sections 83A.05 to 83A.07, the county board process. This shows that the Legislature knew very well how to limit public officials’ authority to change long-existing lake names. But it did not so limit the Commissioner.8 Therefore, the Commissioner had authority under section 83A.02(1) to “determine the correct and most appropriate name[]” of the lake.
Because the Commissioner had, and exercised, authority under paragraph 1 of section 83A.02, we could avoid the question of whether the Commissioner also had authority under paragraph 3 of section 83A.02, which has the stated purpose of involving county boards when “the end in view” is “eliminating, as far as possible, duplication of
We are not persuaded by this contention. Again, section 83A.05, subdivision 1, expressly restricts the 40-year time limitation to the county board process. By contrast, section 83A.02(3) requires county board “approval,” but it does not incorporate—expressly or impliedly—the county board process in sections 83A.05–.07.10 Nor does paragraph 3 state the form of approval required.11 In the legal world, “approval” means “[t]o give formal sanction to; to confirm authoritatively.” Approval, Black‘s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). Here, there is no question that the county board formally approved the change in
Accordingly, the Commissioner had authority under either and both paragraphs 1 and 3 of section 83A.02 to change the lake name, and the 40-year time limitation in section 83A.05, subdivision 1, did not apply to that decision.
C.
The dissent agrees that the plain language of chapter 83A controls, but reads the chapter to apply the 40-year limitation to the Commissioner. For the reasons already explained, this reading is unreasonable, so the statute is not ambiguous. See Henderson, 907 N.W.2d at 625 (“A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.“).
Despite acknowledging that a plain-language statutory reading makes the legislative history irrelevant, the dissent devotes five pages to that history. In the interest of completeness, we have carefully examined that history. Not only does it fail to undermine our plain-language reading, rather, it firmly supports it.
The county board process, including the 40-year time limitation, was enacted in 1925. Act of Apr. 8, 1925, ch. 157, 1925 Minn. Laws 146–48. It eventually became part of Minnesota Statutes chapter 378, which dealt with county board powers and duties relating to bodies of water.
Nowhere in chapter 354 did the Legislature place any time limitation on the state board‘s power over names. To the contrary, it granted to the state board the same broad powers regarding the names of lakes and streams as to the names of places and geographic features. At the same time, the Legislature further restricted the power of county boards over names of bodies of water, as follows: “No county board shall order the change of or establish the name of any lake, river, or other body of water without the written approval of” the state board.
The question of whether the state board could change the name of a body of water without regard to the 40-year limitation found in chapter 378—the county board process—arose soon thereafter, in 1940. Op. Att‘y Gen., No. 273a (Apr. 26, 1940). The issue was whether Gnatt Lake (unfortunately-named almost half a century before) could be given a more pleasant moniker. Id. at 1. The question was answered quickly and definitively by a letter opinion of the Attorney General. Id. He opined that there was no
The final relevant pieces of legislative history do not help the dissent‘s analysis, either. In the 1960s, chapter 354, containing the state board process, became chapter 83A. In 1969, all of the state board‘s powers were transferred to the Commissioner.
In 1990, the Legislature transplanted the county board process from chapter 378 into chapter 83A, by adding sections 83A.05 to 83A.07. Act of Apr. 6, 1990, ch. 391, art. 8, § 7, 1990 Minn. Laws 354, 693–95 (codified at
Finally, a few words are necessary in response to the dissent‘s fear that the Commissioner, an “unelected officeholder in St. Paul,” will use “absolute power” to change
In any event, who should have the power to name lakes, and whether all 40-year-old names of bodies of water, places, and geographic features, should be permanent, are matters of policy for the Legislature. If the Legislature sees or foresees excessive name-changing, it can legislate to curb it.14
In sum, when we interpret chapter 83A as a whole and read the plain language of its sections, we conclude that the 40-year limitation on a lake name-change applies only to county boards, not to the Commissioner. Applying our interpretation to the undisputed facts of this case, we conclude that the Commissioner had statutory authority to change the name from Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals in part and reverse in part, and remand to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of appellants.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
GILDEA, C.J. (dissenting)
D I S S E N T
GILDEA, C.J. (dissenting).
The lakes in Minnesota are one of our greatest resources, and much of our State‘s identity is bound up in our justifiable and collective pride in our lakes. See, e.g., Petraborg v. Zontelli, 15 N.W.2d 174, 182-83 (Minn. 1944) (“Our North Star state has been called the Land of 10,000 Lakes. It has a remarkable natural endowment of lakes, rivers, waterfalls, and woodlands . . . . These lakes constitute the outstanding natural attraction of our state. An enlightened public opinion has been aroused to an appreciation of the extent and importance of this endowment.“). With respect to our lakes, the majority‘s decision today wrests some measure of control over this resource from those with the greatest tie to it—those who live on or near the lake—and gives over that control to an unelected officeholder in St. Paul—the Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources (“DNR“).1 As a result of today‘s decision, the DNR has unbounded power to change the name of every lake in Minnesota, at any time and for any (or no) reason. Under today‘s decision, if the DNR desires to change the names of Lake Vermilion, Lake Minnetonka, Lake of the Woods, Gull Lake, etc., it can do so without any input from the communities where these lakes are located.
This decision should upset and unsettle every Minnesotan and most especially those who live in a community with a lake. Hopefully, the Legislature will correct the majority‘s
This case is about chapter 83A. In this statute, the Legislature addresses lake-name changes in two places. In section 83A.05, voters are given the power to initiate lake-name changes. If 15 or more voters in a county with a lake desire to change that lake‘s name, they can petition the county board to make the change.
The other place where lake-name changes are referenced in the statute is section 83A.02(3). In this provision, the DNR is authorized, “in cooperation with the county boards and with their approval,” to change the names of lakes to avoid name duplication.
Neither of these provisions authorize the DNR to do what it did here.
I begin with the lake-name-change provision in section 83A.05 and John Adams’ reflection that “[f]acts are stubborn things.” Frederic Kidder, History of the Boston Massacre, March 5, 1770; consisting of the narrative of the town, the trial of the soldiers: and a historical introduction, containing unpublished documents of John Adams, and explanatory notes, 3 (Joel Munsell ed., 1870). The facts in this case compel the conclusion that the lake-name change was a change made under section 83A.05. Accordingly, I would hold that the DNR‘s action here—changing the name of a lake that is more than 40 years old—is unlawful.
The petitioners—people who live and work on and near the lake at issue—brought this action arguing that the lake‘s name could not be changed because the lake had been named “Lake Calhoun” for more than 40 years. The petitioners relied on
The majority comes out differently, holding that the 40-year limitation does not apply because the name change here was not, as a factual matter, a name change under the provisions of sections 83A.05-.07. Rather than a change under sections 83A.05-.07, the
The parties agree that Lake Calhoun has been the name of the lake for more than 40 years. And, as the majority acknowledges, the process to change the name of Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska did not begin with the DNR; it began in 2015 when the Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board began developing a master plan for the Chain of Lakes Regional Park.
The park board wanted to change the name of the lake, and it asked its legal counsel to research whether it had authority to do so. The park board‘s counsel concluded that the “park board lacked the authority to change the name of the lake” and highlighted that the only process to change a lake name in Minnesota is the county board process under sections 83A.05-.07. Save Lake Calhoun, 928 N.W.2d at 380.
Because it had no authority, the park board placed its hope in the Hennepin County Board. Following the process outlined in section 83A.05, the park board directed staff to obtain and forward to the County Auditor a petition signed by at least 15 registered voters. See
The county board also sought an opinion from its legal counsel, the county attorney‘s office, to research whether it had authority to change Lake Calhoun‘s name. The county attorney concluded that the board had “no role in renaming a water body that has existed for more than 40 years,” citing
In legal terms, and for our purposes here, this should have been the end of the attempted name change: a petition, brought under sections 83A.05, sought to change the name of Lake Calhoun—a name that had existed for more than 40 years. Under section 83A.05, the Legislature has prohibited such a name change, so that should have been the end of the story.4
But, as the majority cryptically confirms, “the county board took another tack.” Put differently, the county board sought an end run around the legal framework. Although the county attorney had concluded that the county board could not change the name of a lake
The county attorney sent a direct inquiry to the Commissioner, Tom Landwehr, asking him to confirm that the DNR would interpret
Although there is no official response in the public record, the Commissioner must have eventually confirmed he would so act because the county board moved forward with Resolution No. 17-0489.5 In this resolution, the county board “recommend[ed]” that the
These facts, stubborn though they may be, lead inescapably to the conclusion that the name change of the lake cannot stand because it violates the statute. See
The majority largely leaves out the facts and proceeds from the premise that the name change was done lawfully under section 83A.02. Even if we could ignore the facts and make the leap that section 83A.02 is relevant, the majority reaches the wrong conclusion under that statute.
In section 83A.02, the Legislature sets out “powers and duties” of the DNR:
The commissioner of natural resources shall:
(1) determine the correct and most appropriate names of the lakes, streams, places and other geographic features in the state, and the spelling thereof by written order published in the State Register. Name designations are exempt from the rulemaking provisions of chapter 14 and section 14.386 does not apply;
(2) pass upon and give names to lakes, streams, places, and other geographic features in the state for which no single, generally accepted name has been in use;
(3) in cooperation with the county boards and with their approval, change the names of lakes, streams, places, and other geographic features, with the end in view of eliminating, as far as possible, duplication of names within the state;
(4) prepare and publish an official state dictionary of geographic names and publish the same, either as a completed whole or in parts, when ready;
(5) serve as the state representative of the United States Geographic Board and cooperate with that board to the end that there shall be no conflict between the state and federal designations of geographic features in the state.
We must interpret the statute so that none of the powers or duties in the statute renders any other power “superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999). In other words, our job is to give effect to all of the provisions in section 83A.02, and that means that the paragraphs in section 83A.02 have to address different things. Bearing our judicial obligation in mind, the statute is easily understood.
Paragraph 1 sets out the DNR‘s obligation to write down the names of the lakes in Minnesota and choose the name in the event that there are competing names for the same lake. Paragraph 2 sets out the DNR‘s power to name lakes that are yet unnamed. And paragraph 3 sets out the DNR‘s power to change the names of lakes.7
The majority ignores our obligation to give effect to all provisions in chapter 83A. Ignoring that judicial duty, the DNR argues (and the majority concludes) that the DNR has sweeping authority to change lake names under both paragraphs 1 and 3 of section 83A.02. I disagree.
A.
Paragraph 1 does not apply at all. Paragraph 1 gives the DNR the task of figuring out the generally accepted name of each lake in the state and recording that name. The DNR must figure out the names of the lakes in Minnesota. In doing so, the DNR must resolve inconsistencies when different names are used for the same lake or when the lake name is spelled in different ways. After resolving those differences, the DNR must publish the names in the State Register.
Exempting the duty in paragraph 1 from chapter 14 and section 14.386 reinforces that the Legislature intended this paragraph to be limited to the task of figuring out the names of Minnesota‘s lakes. This duty may include researching files in various counties or settling disputes about the spelling of the lake name—but it does not encompass simply re-naming lakes whenever the DNR feels like it. Indeed, giving an administrative agency the broad and unbridled authority that the majority vests in the DNR, through its interpretation of paragraph 1, is fundamentally at odds with our representative democracy. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.“); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) (noting that the administrative state “now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life,” which only “heightens the concern that [such power] may slip . . . . from . . . the people.“). Plainly, such is not what the Legislature intended.
But, the majority contends, paragraph 1 gives the DNR the authority to “determine” lake names. The majority discusses the definition of “determine,” and it concludes that its meaning must include “giving” and “changing” lake names. To support that conclusion, the majority cites the use of “determine” in other sections of chapter 83A. And, “[u]ndoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning,” but this “presumption is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent.” Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
Here, it is strikingly clear that the meaning of the word “determine” in paragraph 1 cannot include “give” or “change.” This is true because the DNR‘s authority to “give” lake names is set out in paragraph 2 and the DNR‘s authority relative to changing the names of lakes is set out in paragraph 3.8
Paragraph 3 expressly grants the DNR the power to “change.” If “determine” in paragraph 1 also means “change,” then paragraph 3 is rendered superfluous. See Amaral, 598 N.W.2d at 384. The majority makes no attempt to explain how its interpretation of paragraph 1 gives effect to the other paragraphs in the statute.
Moreover, if the majority is right that the meaning of “determine” includes “change,” then we should be able to substitute the word “change” for the word “determine” in paragraph 1. But when we do so, the result is absurd: The commissioner of natural resources shall: (1) change the correct and most appropriate names of the lakes.9 Simply
The majority‘s reading also effectively nullifies the Legislature‘s decision in section 83A.05 to give voters the power to initiate name changes and counties the power to change lake names. If the majority‘s interpretation is correct, there is no reason to go through the detailed, step-by-step process set out in the statute or seek input from local residents that sections 83A.05-.07 require. The majority‘s grant of total discretion to the DNR makes this process, and consequently, the desires of the local residents, completely irrelevant.10 Reading sections 83A.05-.07 out of the statute is not within the judicial power.
Based on this analysis, it is clear that paragraph 1 does not give the DNR the authority to change the name of this lake or any other lake in Minnesota.
B.
Paragraph 3 does not give the DNR authority to do what it did here either. This paragraph reads: “in cooperation with the county boards and with their approval, [the DNR shall] change the names of lakes . . . with the end in view of eliminating, as far as possible, duplication of names within the state.”
From the plain language, the DNR can only change the name of a lake “in cooperation with the county boards and with their approval” and “with the end in view of eliminating, as far as possible, duplication of names within the state.”
There is a passing reference in the DNR Order to the fact that there is at least one other lake in Minnesota named “Lake Calhoun.” Giving the DNR the benefit of the doubt as to its motive and ignoring the factual record as to what really happened here, paragraph 3 could be relevant. But the DNR‘s authority under this paragraph is limited only to those name changes that can be done “with the[] approval” of the relevant county board.
The majority defines “approval” to mean “[t]o give formal sanction to; to confirm authoritatively.” Approval, Black‘s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). Without analysis, the majority then concludes: “Here, there is no question that the county board formally approved the change in name from Lake Calhoun to Bde Maka Ska; indeed, it specifically requested and recommended it.”
The majority‘s conclusion is flawed. It is a legal impossibility for this county board to formally or authoritatively approve of this name change; it cannot approve of the name change because the Legislature has explicitly withheld from the county board the legal authority to approve of a change to a lake name that has existed for 40 or more years.
Based on this plain-language interpretation of paragraph 3, the DNR had no power to change the name of Lake Calhoun.
2.
But the DNR argues that paragraph 3 can be interpreted as not incorporating the process outlined in sections 83A.05-.07. Even if there is an alternate reading that is reasonable and so paragraph 3 is ambiguous, the relevant canons of construction confirm that my interpretation is the interpretation that is most consistent with the legislative intent. See
After the Civil War, there was a surge in exploration and settlement in the western territories. U.S. Bd. on Geographic Names, Principles, Policies, and Procedures: Domestic Geographic Names 1 (2016) (“U.S. Bd. Principles“). As a result, “[i]nconsistencies and contradictions among many names, spellings, and applications became a serious problem to surveyors, map makers, and scientists.” U.S. Bd. on Geographic Names, U.S. Geological Survey, https://www.usgs.gov/core-science-systems/ngp/board-on-geographic-names (last visited on Apr. 16, 2020). To standardize geographic names, President Benjamin Harrison, in 1890 and by executive order, created the United States Board on Geographic Names to adjudicate unsettled conflicts about the names of geographic features, including lake names. See U.S. Bd. Principles 1. In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt, again by executive order, granted the U.S. Geographic Board authority to standardize (a) new names given to lakes and (b) any changes to lake names. See id. Prior to 1925, Minnesota did not have a process for resolving these disputes on its own, so the federal government was in charge of resolving disputes and standardizing (not regulating) proposed names and name changes to Minnesota geographic features. See id.; see also Act of Apr. 8, 1925, ch. 157, 1925 Minn. Laws 146.
But, in 1925, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the first statute “providing for a method for changing the name of, or giving a name to, any lake . . . wholly within the boundaries of this state.” Act of Apr. 8, 1925, ch. 157, 1925 Minn. Laws 146. And the
That whenever it is desired to change the name of, or give a name to any unnamed lake, river, stream or body of water located within the boundaries of this state, any 15 or more legal voters, residing within the county where all or any part of such body of water is located, may petition the County Board of the County wherein said petitioners reside, to change the name of, or to give a name to any previously unnamed lake, river, stream or other body of water, however designated.
Act of Apr. 8, 1925, ch. 157, § 1, 1925 Minn. Laws 146 (codified as amended at
That in choosing and fixing the name of any . . . lake . . . the County Board or Boards shall, as far as possible not duplicate names of existing lakes . . . . [T]he State Commissioner of Drainage and Waters . . . shall compare the names suggested in said petition with the names of other lakes, rivers, streams and bodies of water within the state . . . .
Act of Apr. 8, 1925, ch. 157, § 5, 1925 Minn. Laws 146, 147-48 (codified as amended at
In 1937, the Minnesota Legislature created the State Geographic Board and amended the 1925 law. The law creating the State Geographic Board contains the same language as sections 83A.015 to 83A.04 except for a few minor differences. Compare Act of Mar. 8, 1937, ch. 63, §§ 1-4, 1937 Minn. Laws 108, with
The 1937 legislation also amended the 1925 petition process, making the State Geographic Board subject to the petition process. Act of Feb. 24, 1937, ch. 35, 1937 Minn. Laws 68, 68-69 (codified as
That whenever it is desired to change the name of, or give a name to any unnamed lake . . . the State Geographic Board or any 15 or more legal voters, residing within the county where all or any part of such body of water is located, may petition the County Board of the County . . . .
Including the State Geographic Board as a party that could petition to change a lake name strongly suggests that the State Geographic Board was not created with stand-alone authority to change the names of lakes (other than in the situation where multiple lakes had the same name). If the Legislature intended to endow the State Geographic Board with broad authority to name and change the names of lakes in section 354.02 (now, section 83A.02), it would make no sense to subject the State Geographic Board to the petition process.
The final amendments occurred in 1990. The 1990 amendments governed the “recodifying, clarifying, and relocating provisions relating to water law,” totaling 400 pages. Act of Apr. 6, 1990, ch. 391, art. 1, 1990 Minn. Laws 354. Relevant here, the 1990 amendments relocated
There is one relevant change that occurred in the 1990 amendments. Section 83A.05, subdivision 2, removed “the commissioner of natural resources” as a person who can petition the county boards to change or give a name to a water body. Act of Apr. 6, 1990, ch. 391, art. 8, § 7, 1990 Minn. Laws 354, 693 (codified as
Subd. 2. Petition for name. (a) Fifteen or more legal voters residing in a county where all or a part of a body of water is located may petition the county board of the county where the petitioners reside or the body of water
is located to change the name of or give a name to a previously unnamed lake, river, stream, or other body of water located within the state.
But importantly, the 1990 bill concluded with article 10, which stated:
The legislature intends this act to be a clarification and reorganization of provisions of laws affecting water. The changes that have been made are not intended to alter the laws affecting water and shall not be construed by a court or other authority, to alter the meaning of the law. It is intended that decisions construing laws that are recodified by articles 1 to 10 are not affected by the recodification.
Act of Apr. 6, 1990, ch. 391, art. 10, § 1, 1990 Minn. Laws 354, 750. Consistent with this direction, the Legislature‘s decision to remove the Commissioner from the petition process cannot be read as giving the DNR substantive authority he did not previously have. Just as before the 1990 amendments, so too after them: the DNR is effectively bound by the petition process under section 83A.02, paragraph 3, because the DNR has to act “in cooperation with the county boards and with their approval.” And county boards cannot approve a name change without going through the petition process.
In sum, the legislative history and former laws on the subject confirm that the better interpretation of the phrase, “in cooperation with the county boards and with their approval,” in paragraph 3 means the county board petition process in sections 83A.05-.07.11
The consequences of each interpretation confirm this as well. Under the DNR‘s interpretation, it can effectively change the name of any lake in Minnesota at any time with essentially no role for those most impacted by the change—the people who live on or near the lake. The majority concedes that its interpretation elevates the DNR‘s naming decision above “the permanent, best interests of the affected county.” The Legislature made its intent clear, however, that those most directly impacted by the name change should be the ones with the power to initiate the change.12 See
My interpretation is consistent with this intent and preserves the right of local residents and communities to play a meaningful role in lake-name changes. My interpretation also gives effect to the stability the Legislature sought through the 40 year
For all of these reasons, the most reasonable interpretation of the approval provision in paragraph 3 is that it incorporates the approval process set out in sections 83A.05-.07. Following this analysis, I would affirm the court of appeals.
III.
The majority declares: “the body of water that was Lake Calhoun is now Bde Maka Ska.” This court has no more authority to change the name of the lake than the DNR. Because the majority‘s opinion is contrary to legislative intent and settled precedent, I dissent.
ANDERSON, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Chief Justice Gildea.