20 Ga. App. 8 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1917
The plaintiff’s petition makes substantially the following case: The Savannah Lighting Company owns, operates, maintains, and controls, in the City of Savannah, an electric lighting and power system, and, in various places in the city and in the county of Chatham, owns, maintains, and controls electric wires, carrying high voltage of electricity, strung upon poles. One of such lines is situated west of the city of Savannah, running in an easterly and westerly direction, and parallel with the Augusta road, about three hundred yards to the rear of the home in which the petitioner lives. Standing almost directly in the rear of his home is a pole belonging to the defendant, which, with a series of other poles, carries electric wires and cables as aforesaid. The said line of poles carries four current-carrying wires, two on each side of the pole, at the.end of the cross-arms, and another wire or cable directly over the top of said line of poles, and from this top wire another wire or cable extended down the pole, and had been attached to it by means of porcelain knobs, and entered a lead pipe, about four feet above the ground. For a period of several months the said ground wire,—that is, the wire extending from the topmost wire down the side of the pole to the lead pipe,—had been broken off at the top of the lead pipe, and was loose from some of the porcelain knobs. It had also been broken and detached from the topmost wire, and was extending up the said pole, leaning first to one side and then to the other, in the direction of the two current-carrying wires on each side of the pole. A slight wind was sufficient to sway "the wire at its top end to the wires on either the north or the south side of the pole. The ground wire had been detached as aforesaid from the lead pipe for a period of several months, and had been blown by the wind and whipped against the pole to such an extent that the insulation had been worn and broken, leaving the copper wire without insulation in several places. Petitioner is a boy thirteen years of age, entirely ignorant of electricity or its effects, and knowing nothing of the danger connected with such line of wire. On the afternoon of March 4, 1916, he had been playing with a companion in the field back of his .father’s house, and, following his boyish impulses, he started southward, and in passing the said pole he caught the broken wire extending toward the ground, and received a severe electric shock, which ■ knocked him unconscious for a considerable period of time. As a
This case is easily distinguished from the following cases: In Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Howell, 124 Ga. 1050 (53 S. E. 577, 4 Ann. Cas. 707), a wire charged with electricity was permitted to sag so that a pedestrian came in contact with it while on the street. In Eining v. Ga. Railway & Electric Co., 133 Ga. 458 (66 S. E. 237), a wire was broken and lying on the street, charged with electricity, and a pedestrian came in contact with it. In Atlanta Consolidated Street Ry. Co. v. Owings, 97 Ga. 663 (25 S. E. 377, 33 S. E. 798), a heavily charged wire fell across another wire, on which the deceased was working and had a right to work. In Mayor &c. of Madison v. Thomas, 130 Ga. 153 (60 S. E. 461), the city had notice that a wire on the street was charged with elec
It seems to be settled that children are only required to exercise such care for their own safety as may reasonably be expected in view of their age and condition. Whether such care has been exercised is usually a question for the jury to determine. The jury usually havé the opportunity of seeing the minor and hearing him testify, and unless the child is so young that the court ihay say that he is incapable of contributory negligence, the jury have the right to determine that he is of such age and is possesesd of such intelligence that he may be guilty of contributory negligence or lacking in care to such an extent as to defeat his right to recover. The jury have the right to say for themselves whether the negligence, if any, of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff, or whether the voluntary act of the plaintiff is such that no recovery for the injuries should be had. Eor the purposes of the demurrer, the allegations of the petition must be taken by the court as true. This being the law, this court can not as a matter of law hold that the petition in this case shows that the injury alleged to háve been sustained by the plaintiff was not the result of negligence upon the part of the defendant; nor can we, as matter of law, say that the petition shows that the plaintiff,
Judgment affirmed.