26 Fla. 148 | Fla. | 1890
The action is by appellee against appellant for damages occasioned by the loss of goods and in* jury to goods while being transported from Charlotte, New York, to Buffalo Bluff, Florida. The bill of lading, given by the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad, was for one car of household goods and building material received from Geo. L. Harris with destination to him at “ Buffalo Bluff, Fla., via Palatka, without transfer.” It is unnecessary to consider the matters connected with the first count of the declaration and the first, second and third pleas, intended as defences to that count. These relate to the claim of plaintiff that defendant became responsible for the loss and damage because it did not deliver the car to the next succeeding road running to Palatka, as the bill of lading required ; and it is apparent from the record that the verdict of the jury in favor of plaintiff could not have been founded on that count, as this would have been di
The second count, resting somewhat on the bill of lading, we also pass by, as we think the real merits of the case are to be determined on the issues made under the third count, which is, substantially, as follows: That defendant received the car load of goods undertaking to safely keep, transport and deliver the same, but not regarding its duty as a common carrier, acted so carelessly and negligently that by reason thereof the said goods and property of plaintiff were as to part wholly lost, and as to other part greatly damaged. One plea is that defendant safely carried the goods over its line and delivered the same to the next carrier in the same condition as they were received; and another plea is that whatever injury and damage there was to said goods was caused by the careless and negligent packing of the same by the plaintiff. Issue was joined on these pleas; and the questions now to be considered are those which arose during the trial on the evidence and the charges of the court connected with this part of the controversy. The evidence shows that the goods were delivered to the initial carrier in apparent good order, and that the car in which
In the absence of evidence to show where all other loss and damage occurred, we must resort to the rules which govern in such cases. The contract with the initial road, as shown by the bill of lading, was that it was “ not to transport the * * * goods beyond the limit of terminus of its own road.” Hence its liability would be discharged upon delivering the car to the next connecting road with the contents in as good condition as when received, and
The rule as to the loss of goods is correctly stated by Rorer, we think, as follows : “ In an action against a railroad company for goods lost by it as a common carrier, the burden of proof, first, is on the plaintiff to prove the delivery and acceptance of the goods to be carried; and secondly, the loss, and the value thereof. This makes a prima facie case for the plaintiff. To absolve the defendant from such prima facie liability, the burden of proof is then changed to the
It is shown by the evidence that the car was delivered to defendant’s road at Jesup, (Ga.), and was transported thereon to Jacksonville. The loss of a portion of the goods and the value of the same is also shown, but where the loss occurred, whether on defendant’s line or some other, is not shown. In such case, there being several carriers, and no contract except with the initial one, the law is, if the last carrier be sued, that it will be held liable, on the presumption that when the car was delivered to it the contents were the same .as when started by the first carrier. And this presumption applies, also, to the condition of the goods the car contained. See Smith vs. New York Central R. R. Co., 43 Barb., 225; Dixon vs. Richmond & Danville R. R. Co., 74 N. C., 538, Laughlin vs. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 28 Wis., 204; Shriver vs. Sioux City & St. Paul R. R. Co., 24 Minn., 506; Lin vs. Terre Haute & Indianapolis R. R. Co., 10 Mo., App. 125; Leo vs. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba R’y Co., 30 Minn., 438.; (12 Am. and Eng. R. R. Cases, 35); Montgomery & Eufaula R’y Co. vs. Culver, 75 Ala., 587; (22 Am. and Eng. R. R. Cases, 411). The reason of the rule of evidence is founded upon the better
The cases cited, except one, relate to the last carrier. Strictly speaking, the defendant in this case was not the last carrier, but in the case of Montgomery & Eufaula R’y Co. vs. Culver, supra, it is held that the same presumption which applies against the last also applies to an intermediate carrier. And it would seem that so far as the contents of a box or car are concerned, or the condition of those
The sum of the situation, then, is this: The contents of the car were delivered to' the first carrier in “ apparent good order,” and the jury, in the absence of proof to the contrary, were authorized to presume that when delivered to defendant the contents were all still in the car, and uninjured. It was then the duty of defendant to show delivery in the same condition to the next carrier. It has not done this; and having discharged the car, and being thereby in position to know what it did deliver, and having failed to show that in making delivery to the People’s Line, it delivered the goods that were lost, and that such as were delivered were in the condition in which it received them, the jury were further authorized to presume that the loss and injury occurred on its line, except as to that part of the injury shown to have been done on the People’s Line. In
It is unnecessary to consider the several errors assigned in detail, as in the view we have taken of the case they are all covered, and in our opinion are either without good foundation or immaterial. The judgment in the case will be affirmed.