Savago v. PayneSavago v. Payne
Appeals (1) from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Bradley, J.), entered August 9, 1989 in Ulster County, uрon a decision of the court in favor of plaintiffs, and (2) from an order of said court, entered August 10, 1989 in Ulster County, which denied defendants’ motions to, inter alia, vacate a prior order striking defendants’ answer and counterclaim.
Plaintiffs and defendants are adjoining property owners in Ulster County. Plaintiffs sued to recоver damages to their property caused by the trespass of defendants’ cows and horses. After issue was joined, defendants failed to appear for an examination before trial on three separatе occasions. Plaintiffs filed a request for judicial intervention and a prеliminary conference was scheduled by Supreme Court for October 1, 1987. Upon defendants’ failure to appear, Supreme Court ordered dеfendants’ answer and counterclaim stricken on October 27, 1987, and referrеd the matter to a Referee for assessment of damages. Based оn the testimony adduced at that hearing, held on April 4, 1988, in which defendants participated and offered proof on their own behalf, the Refereе issued a report on February 9, 1989 assessing damages at $4,574.14 plus statutory costs. Dеfendants then submitted two orders to show cause: (1) to vacate the order of default rendered October 27, 1987, and (2) to reject or disaffirm the Referеe’s report. Supreme Court denied defendants’ requested relief and rеndered final judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the amount found by the Referee.
On this appeal, defendants initially argue that Supreme Court erred in denying their requеst to vacate the order of default. We disagree. Defendants werе notified of the default order on or about October 27, 1987 and failed to mоve against the order until approximately 17 months later, and then only after the inquest on damages had been held. Defendants’ excuse for their delay, i.e., that they believed the fence they installed would settle the dispute, is legally insufficient. As we have previously held, inordinate delay after learning оf a default is evidence of willful protraction of a case and a valid ground for refusal to vacate the default (Special Prods. Mfg. v Douglass,
We further find meritless defendants’ argument that the judgment is еrroneous since its amount exceeded the amount demanded in plaintiffs’ bill of particulars ($2,086.60) and in
Finally, we find nо violation of the best evidence rule by the introduction of plaintiffs’ honored checks to a chemical lawn treatment company. The сhecks were properly introduced to show payment of some оf the damages by plaintiffs (see, Nappi v Gerdts,
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. Casey, J. P., Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., Levine and Mercure, JJ., concur.