Saunders v. SteversSaunders v. Stevers
This is аn appeal from a judgment and from an order denying a motion for a new trial. The judgment was in favor of Becky Jane Stevers and against Barney R. P. Saunders in an interpleader action brought by the Union Central Life Insurance Company to determine the beneficiaries entitled to the proceeds of two life insurance policies issued by the company on the life of Nanсy Saunders. Since the order denying appellant’s motion for a new trial is not appealable
(Rodriguez
v.
Barnett,
The case was submitted tо the trial court on an agreed statement of facts. The facts were that Union Central Life Insurance Company issued two policies of insurance on the life of Nancy Bardosy, formerly Nancy Saunders. Each policy was in the amount of $5,000. At the time the policies were issued Nancy was married to Cecil Saunders, but he is not a party to this action and has in fact disclaimed аny interest in the policies. Nancy first designated respondent Becky Jane Stevers, her daughter by a prior marriage, and aрpellant Barney Saunders, her son by her marriage to Cecil Saunders, as beneficiaries of each policy. Nancy аnd Cecil Saunders were divorced and Nancy thereafter married AI Bardosy. After Nancy’s marriage to Bardosy she wrote the insurance company a letter stating: “I have remarried and wish to have my policies mailed to the above address. Also, I wish to have both my policies to read Becky Jane Stevers as beneficiary—Sincerely Nancy J. Bardosy P.S. I am removing my son Barney Robert Pearson Saunders he having been well provided for by his father. ’ ’ The insurance company returned its forms for change оf beneficiary to Nancy and these were at least partially executed when they
Nancy died on December 1, 1959. At the time of her death she had not returned the second set of change of beneficiary forms to the company.
Nancy’s policies of insurance contained the following provision relating to change of beneficiary: “Al. CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY. The insured shall have the right at any time, and from time to time, to change the beneficiary, by written notice in form acceptable to the Company, which will be furnished on request. ’ ’
The sole question presented on appeal is whether the аcts of Nancy effected a change of beneficiary under California law. We are of the opinion that Nancy’s acts were sufficient to effect such a change and that the judgment must be affirmed.
As a general rule an insured has no absolute right to change the beneficiary of his life insurance policy.
(Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.
v.
Clark,
We do not deal here with any objection by the insurer to payment. It has interpleaded the claimants and paid the policy proceeds into court. We are concerned solely with the confliсting claims of the asserted beneficiaries against each other. The provisions in Nancy’s insurance policies relаting to change of beneficiary are obviously ambiguous, but they appear to confer upon the policyholder the broad right to change beneficiary by notice in writing given to the company. The requirement of written notice was fully observed by Nancy in her letter in which she clearly stated that she was removing her son Barney as a beneficiary and was making her daughter Becky the sole beneficiary of both poli
It may not successfully be contended that Nancy may have altered her intentions between the dаte upon which she received the second set of forms and the time of her death. On November 4, 1959, Nancy executed her will, in whiсh she left Barney one dollar only, and in which she again expressed the view, previously stated in her written notice to the company, that Barney would be well provided for by his father. Nothing appears in the record to suggest that Nancy’s intentions relating tо her son Barney were in any manner changed between the date of the execution of her will and the time of her death, or that she had any intention other than that expressed in her letter to the company, namely that her daughter Becky Jane be the sole beneficiary of her insurance policies.
The appeal from the order denying motion for a new trial is dismissed; the judgment is affirmed.
Draper, P. J., and Devine, J., concurred.