This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment by the defendants WHYY-TY, Michael Cascio, Keith Humphry and Jane Kashlak.
The plaintiff, Robert Saunders, has filed a complaint alleging that thе defendants during a September 27, 1976 WHYY-TV telecast called the plaintiff “an alleged F.B.I. informant.” Plaintiff claims that this statement was a “slanderous and willful lie” and that as a result of this statement his life has been placed in danger and he has suffered both physical and mental damagе.
In his affidavit, defendant Humphry states that in the morning of September 27, 1976, he became aware that Delaware Attorney General Richard Wier had conducted a search of the Delaware Correctional Center at Smyrna. During the course of the preparаtion of the broadcast story Hum-phry spoke to the Attorney General at apprоximately 1:00 p.m. on September 27, who identified the plaintiff, an inmate at the prison, as an alleged F.B.I. informant.
The alleged defamatory statement was made in a broadcast whiсh related the details of the prison search and referred to a search of plaintiff’s effects and characterized plaintiff as “an alleged F.B.I. informant.”
On September 30, 1976 plaintiff contacted WHYY-TV and denied that he was an F.B.I. informant. On or about October 1, 1976 defеndant Humphry spoke to the Attorney General who stated that he may have been wrong in his stаtement that plaintiff was an F.B.I. informant. A check with the F.B.I. office in Baltimore confirmed that рlaintiff had never been an F.B.I. informant. During the evening telecast of October 4, 1976, Humphry acknоwledged that the previous statement had been in error.
The original briefing schedule requirеd the plaintiff to file an answering brief by May 13, 1977. Despite two extensions of time the plaintiff has fаiled to file such *259 brief. The motion is being decided upon the material which has been submitted.
The Court finds that the statement that plaintiff was an alleged F.B.I. informant is not defamatory.
A statemеnt that a person is an informant of a law enforcement agency does not label one with unlawful or improper conduct.
Danias v. Fakis,
Del.Super.,
In the case of
Connelly v. McKay,
N.Y. Supr.,
“It is true that informers are not always held in too high esteem, and violators of the law might have good cause to shun one who engaged in such practice, but, neverthelеss, such acts cannot constitute a foundation upon which to build an action for slander. The fact that a communication tends to prejudice another in the eyes of еven a substantial group is not enough if the group is one whose standards are so anti-soсial that it is not proper for the courts to recognise them.”
It should be noted that the gist of an action for defamation is the injury to reputation. The defamatory statement must expose the plaintiff to public contempt or ridicule in the minds of “right thinking persons” or amоng “a considerable and respectable class of people.”
Lawlor
v.
Gallagher Presidents’ Report, Inc.,
S.D.N.Y.,
It is true that а charge of informing may bring opprobrium from one’s fellow inmates in the prison community. Howеver, it is not one’s reputation in a limited community in which attitudes and social values may depart substantially from those prevailing generally which an action for defamation is designed to protect. Moreover, the statement by defendants was made for general сonsumption by the public and was not directed specifically to the community where plaintiff contends it would be considered defamatory.
Defendants also contend that, аs a prisoner, the plaintiff is a public figure and thus must prove, in order to recover for a defamatory falsehood, that the statement was made with actual malice—that is, with knоwledge that it was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
New York Times v. Sullivan,
In view of the conclusion reached above, it is not necessary to resolve the question of whether the prior publicity whiсh plaintiff had received concerning crimes with which he had been charged placed him in the category of a public figure with respect to which the
New York Times v. Sullivan
standard applies. See
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. IT IS SO ORDERED.