*294 the door to the cylinder of the machine upon which he was working had no fastening device upon it to keep it closed, and might have been thrown open by a thick place in the lap which he was-putting through the machine when the accident occurred, and that-he did not know of this alleged danger and was nоt instructed or warned in respect to it.
In answer to this claim, the defendants were permitted to show by their witness Gould that he had made experiments on the same-machine since the accident, by putting through it the kind of lap that was being carded when the accident occurred, and that it did not throw the door - open. His method was to use a perfect lap, and to put pieces of lap in spots on top of the lap that was being run through the machine and in front of the feed-rolls, to produce a similar condition, with like effect upon the feed-rolls and the door, to that existing at the time of the accident. The only evidence of the condition of the lap in use when the accident took place was that it was an ordinary lap ; but whether it had thick places in it, or differed from the lap used in the experiment, dоes not appear. The trial judge, when he permitted the testimony in regard to the experiment to be introduced, must have considered that the conditions then made use of were as nearly like those in еxistence at the time of the accident as could be ascertained from the evidence, and we are of the opinion that he was justified in this conclusion. Colburn v. Groton, 66 N. H. 151. Where the conditions are similar, it has uniformly been held that proof of this character is legally competent. Whitcher v. Railroad, 70 N. H. 242, 248; Cook v. New Durham, 64 N. H. 419; Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401.
The defendants were entitled to rely upon the plaintiff’s representation that he was a skilled and experienced workman upon revolving-top flat cards, and to understand that he knew and appreciated the dangers liable to arise from the operation of cards
*295
that were in common use. If the door to the cylinder of the machine upon which he was set to work was not equipped as cards in common and ordinary use were, he should show that fact by the testimony of witnesses who knew how cards in common use were equipped, but not by proof that he knew of or bad worked upon two machines with equipment differing from that used on the defendants’ machines and not shown to be in common use. When such evidence is thus presented it is not competent, and when admitted is prejudicial because it erects a false standard for the jury to judge the defendants’ conduct by.
Hill
v. Railroad,
This evidence was offered at a time when no testimony had been introduсed showing how doors to cards in common use were equipped. But notwithstanding this, if the plaintiff had then stated to the court that he would afterward make the evidence competent by showing how machines in common use were equipped, and that the two machines upon which he had worked were eq nipped like them, as bearing upon his knowledge derived from operating such machines, it might have been recеived de bene. But as this purpose was not made known to the court, and the apparent purpose of the evidence was to show that the defendants were negligent, by proving that the doors on the two machines on which the plaintiff had worked had fastening devices while the defendants’ had none, it was properly excluded. Tabor v. Judd, 62 N. H. 288, 292. If the plaintiff had desired to avail himself of this evidence for the purpose for which he now claims, he should have renewed his offer after testimony had been submitted showing how doors to machines of this character in common use were equipped ; but as he did not do so, he cannot now complаin.
After the plaintiff had rested his case, the defendants were permitted to show that in various mills in New Englаnd, including those specially referred to by the plaintiff’s experts, machines of the make used by the defendants were operated, and that they had no device for fastening the doors. This evidence was competent, as it tended to contradict the testimony of the plaintiff’s experts, *296 and was properly admitted. Green v. Bedell, 48 N. H. 546, 549; Martin v. Towle, 59 N. H. 31; Quimby v. Blackey, 63 N. H. 77; Spalding v. Merrimack, 67 N. H. 382; Perkins v. Roberge, 69 N. H. 171.
The instructions given to the jury as to this matter are as follows : “ The plaintiff must have shown by the evidence what the cause of the dоor being open was. It is not to be left to guess or conjecture. You must weigh the evidence and from it find what made the door come open, and further find that such cause was one the defendants should have provided against; otherwise, the defendants are not liable. . . . If you find upon all the evidence that a reasonably prudent person might use these Hetherington cards of the model 1900, then the defendants arе without legal fault and are entitled to your verdict. But if, on the other hand, it seems to you that the exercise of a reasonable degree of care would forbid the use of these cards so equippеd, and that because of such negligence the door became opened from some cause which the defendants ought to have anticipated and provided against,-— if this is your view of the facts, — then you will come to the second of the three questions. Unless you find (1) that the door was not left open by Chenette, (2) that it was forced open by causes which the defendants ought to have provided against, (3) that the likelihood of such a happening would be unknown to an experienced card-stripper, and was in fact unknown to the plaintiff, and (4) that he did not carelessly get his hand into the place of danger,- — ■ unlеss the plaintiff has satisfied you by a fair balance of the probabilities upon each of these questions that he is right, — your verdict will be for the defendants. But if upon all these questions *297 you are convinced of tliе truth, of the plaintiff’s claim, then your verdict will be for him and you will assess his damages.”
From the foregoing it appears that the court told the jury at the very close of his charge, and when he was summing up the questions which they wеre to consider, that they might find the defendants liable, if the door came open from any cause which they ought reasonably to have anticipated and provided against, but not if it was left open through thе negligence of Chenette, or if the plaintiff was injured through his own negligence; and taking the charge as a whole, we do not think the jury could have been misled in the way the plaintiff claims.
Exceptions overruled.