*2 RICKHOFF, Before GREEN JOHN HILL,1 JJ. G.
OPINION HILL, (Assigned).
JOHN G. Justice appeals from a Jose Saucedo nothing in his claims that he take Company Manufacturing against Rheem Loera, appellees. His cause Jaime contract, promissory action was for breach defamation, fraud, and intentional estoppel, He contends infliction of emotional distress. single point of error that the trial in a summary judgment. by granting erred and remand part affirm in and reverse the trial court part we hold that because by granting part erred respect to breach Rheem with Saueedo’s granting claim did not err of contract take noth- summary judgment that Saucedo respect to ing as to Rheem and other claims. Saucedo’s Supreme Court of Texas. Assigned Justice of the this case the Chief H9 resume fraud estoppel are barred because of Background Procedural Factual and (2) are limit- damages part; working as a alleged mitigation, for one-year less period, to a ed when manager company for a maintenance (3) contract; and Sau- any alleged breach of position by Rheem for he was hired elements two essential cedo fails establish plant in superintendent of its maintenance *3 estop- promissory and his claims for fraud He that he worked Nuevo Laredo. stated (b) (a) kept, any promise not was or pel, that terminat- Rheem from 1991 until Rheem for any to his detriment Saucedo relied that All action him in of the causes of ed 1994. promise. such alleged relate to that termination. joint for in a third motion sum- summary Finally, motion for Loera asserts his (1) urge that mary and Rheem against judgment, Loera that: Saucedo’s claim necessary to all the him for of contract must fail because fails establish breach Saucedo Sau- his for intentional infliction contract between him and elements of claim there was no (2) cedo; against any him for in that behavior on Saucedo’s claim of emotional distress promissory estoppel any employee of part must fail because Sauce- or of Loera do, response interrogatories, that outrageous to states con- Rheem not extreme and promises establish, for his claim made the basis were fails as a duct and that Saucedo law, to him someone else before he was hired matter that he suffered severe dis- Rheem, for was not to work whereas Loera tress. year employed by Rheem until a after Sauce- response In for his to Rheem’s first motion (3) Rheem; working do had been for Sauce- his summary judgment, asserts that Saucedo against claim him for must fail do’s fraud employment agreement provided for written promises upon because which the fraud salary that he continued an annual and when else; claim are based were made someone year, end the first employed to be at the (4) against claim Saueedo’s for defama- year, for an additional contract extended making for tion statement to Ms. Jo expire so that his contract did not until employed Staneland that had been Saucedo 15,1995; met and the facts show that he that by Rheem a “chief than mechanic” rather promissory estop- the elements of claim for superintendent” a “maintenance fail be- must respect pel and fraud. to the defama- With publication, cause there was no because there claim, replied “subsequent tion Saucedo that special damages plead provable, are no checks, has learned reference Plaintiff alleged and because the statement is not Rodriguez, receptionist at from Ms. Juliana capable defamatory meaning of a as a matter Laredo, Mr. plant in Nuevo that of law. all gave Loera her strict orders to refer original summary judg- In its motion for requests for references on Saucedo Jose (1) ment, asserts that: Rheem Saucedo’s him.” contract, promissory claims breach es- response Defendant mo- his Loera’s toppel, and fraud fail must because summary judgment, tion for Saucedo notes upon relied for em- Saucedo was petition so that he has amended ployment greater than one and was and inten- only assert claims for defamation writing, reduced to in violation of not against tional infliction of emotional distress Frauds, Texas Statute Tex. Bus. Comm. & Loera. that the defamation was He asserts (2) § 26.01 and Saucedo’s claim for Code Staneland, also made not to Ms. Jo (a) fail must there defamation because Personnel, Mitchell, Box, RM Margie Aero (b) publication; special there are no dam- anyone request else in to who called (c) ages plead provable; the state- information about him. upon ment which Saucedo bases his claim is defamatory capable meaning of a as a motion for response Rheem’s second matter of law. alleges judgment, that summary judgment, that terminated In a Rheem has admitted he was second (1) justify that: it cannot later contends Saucedo’s claims without cause and that Rheem contract, fraud, grounds that were not promissory breach of his termination on made the basis of termination at the time Defamation discharge. He also that Rheem indicates will first consider whether Loera alleged rely misrepresenta- did and Rheem have established them claim tions, material, that it were evidence establishes any complaints alleged misrep- to the waived has no claim for defamation. resentations. alleged petition in his allegations respect to the With breach gave strict orders to Rheem em contract, alleges in response ployees inquiries regarding him that all were damages motion that Rheem’s second Loera, to be referred to who was to inform salary the breach are his and benefits for the prospective employees Saucedo was year, earnings. less his He remainder “chief instead of “maintenance su mechanic” *4 that reiterates his assertion he has estab- pervisor,” they give any could and that lished of the elements of claims for all Saucedo, regarding leading information promissory estoppel. fraud and something listener to believe there that they unwilling were to discuss or to unable appellees’ response joint to the third tell the about that the lis listener judgment, summary con- tener had to know. tends that certain conduct Loera did con- conduct, outrageous or raises stitute at least noted, previously As we have both Rheem question a fact as to whether it constituted and that no claim Loera contend Saucedo has outrageous He also to cer- conduct. refers publica- for defamation because there was no testimony establishing tain that he suffers tion, special damages there are no because decompensating schizophrenic from a disor- plead alleged because provable, and personality der or disorder as a borderline capable defamatory of a statement is not problems result of his with Rheem and Lo- meaning of law. also as a matter We have era. responds had noted that Saucedo that he receptionist Mr. learned from Rheem’s that noted, previously grant- As the trial court Loera orders re- given had strict that all summary appellees’ judgment ed the with quests were to be to for references referred respect all of to Saucedo’s claims. construing responses
him. In as a whole, all construe this mean that Discussion requests references were to be referred for summary judgment The movant for has response also asserts Loera. He showing genu the burden of there is no only defamation was made to ine fact and enti issue of material that it is Staneland, to Margie Ms. Jo but also Mitch- judgment a matter tled to as of law. Nixon ell, Personnel, Box, anyone RM Aero and Co., Management Property v. Mr. request else in to information who called deciding concerning him. disputed fact there is a material whether summary judgment summary judgment, evi The evidence reflects precluding issue Mitchell, a recruiter for Aero Margie dence to the will be favorable non-movant Garcia, true; deposi- every infer Box Tom testified her taken as reasonable indulged in non- tion she called and talked ence favor of the that when must manager in Nuevo Lare- personnel doubts resolved in its favor. Rheem’s movant and do, he had been told not to Id. at Inasmuch this motion told her 548-49. Sep give any He did prior was filed information about Saucedo. policy job 1, 1997, say company to all governed by it is Rule 166a not that was tember inquiries. that if there lawsuit prior She said is no of the Texas Rules Civil Procedure 1, pending calls for a reference and is September to its effective and she amendment Court, calling Supreme Approv party told that the she has been 1997. Texas Final say anything person, about that Texas told not to al to the Rules Civil Revisions (Au Procedure, 97-9139, question in her mind probably No. would leave a Docket Misc. qualifications 15,1997). person’s as to that or back- gust later, at hour called about an appli- hurt the Loera back ground would therefore about complimentary most time he was cant. Saucedo, outstanding he saying that of Jo presented the affidavit candidate, him all the that he wished opposition motions Staneland best. summary judgment. Attached Stane- shows The concerning her land’s affidavit is statement any publication one that there was Loera, had conversation she defamatory, publica and that thing possibly had plant manager. says She that Saucedo Staneland, Lo- contacted who tion was Jo her a reference asked to conduct check request of Saucedo. This era at point- himself because of circumstances that publication of held that if the previously being given out ed towards a bad reference plaintiff complains was consented which the she at Rheem. She indicates that when invited, authorized, to, procured by Loera, called Rheem her call was directed to injuries plaintiff, sus cannot recover informed her he would be able who publication. Smith tained reason Ac- give her reference check on Saucedo. Holley, —San Staneland, cording to when she asked denied). publi Since this Antonio title, he “chief for Saucedo’s said mechanic.” Saucedo, procured by cation was invited she whether he could com- When asked injuries sustained as he cannot recover *5 ability, he ment on Saucedo’s work hesitated of it. result he saying before that could not. She states was evi- that there no suggests he indicated that could also not com- that he Saucedo knew that Rheem good as to dence that he ment whether Saucedo a asked, any him if so that de- employee. would defame She indicates that Loera stated famatory made to Jo Staneland give statement company policy that it was not to refer- publication. constitute a Attached employees. would ences on former opposition in the mo- Saucedo’s affidavit says in her that she Staneland statement a is memoran- tions and told him her called Saucedo conversa- prepared Jo Staneland. In that dum that speculates tion with Loera. She Sauce- states, memorandum, “I she was asked manager the Human Resources do contacted on to conduct a reference check Jose Saucedo him of and informed the conversation that of circumstances which himself because had with Loera. She states that Loera she being given a ‘bad pointed towards reference’ day her called the next and asked her she that hold that this shows out at Rheem.” We wording taken a refer- had to be “bad any that did consent defamation Saucedo him ence.” She said that she told that she might have been made Jo Staneland. a had and that since she had been recruiter suggests year, checking is that evidence for a and since reference Saucedo duties, Margie job her at Rheem told Mitchell part of that she knew that someone give they out good a refer- had been told not difference between and bad that prided told that Saucedo is evidence of ence. She also him she information about defamatory being judge publication statement herself an astute character job than Jo Staneland. He relies and that is her to determine on someone other Buck, B. Co. v. very person short if the the case of Frank Hall & phone order handing person genuine. her a line or — Houston n.r.e.), cert. de says Dist.] she informed Loera that she writ ref'd [14th She that nied, think that she was mistaken about U.S. S.Ct. did not (1985). to be apolo- L.Ed.2d 720 We find case indicates that Loera Saucedo. She distinguishable. someone with getting he case gized and said that was used to them, employer agreed to about the em giving talk people, references on give pressed for more informa company policy ployee, but when that it was indeed stated, “I can’t to comment and He title tion declined them. said it,” very then manager” go into said that would “maintenance and he was employee. Id. at 618. The Court Finally, says that rehire the good employee. Staneland (4) University; never Saucedo zona State defamatory statement. that could be a held Paso; University Texas at El attended the the Rheem Id. at 619. this ease (5) degree did not earn an associates agree to dis Saucedo Mitchell did not who talked to any Community College or of the any El giving out Paso and was not cuss Saucedo to which he colleges or universities imposes no other about him. “The law information (6) resume; colleges or of the em refers duty anyone to talk about a former resume, Int’l, in his Sauce- v. universities mentioned Medical Inc. ployee.” American Col- Giurintano, only Community attended El Paso (Tex.App.— do (7) hours; writ). 75 credit lege, where he earned [14th Dist.] Houston point aver- grade a 3.0 did not have agree that the mere refusal Saucedo with Rheem (8) Community College; and age at El Paso matter of law does talk about as a in mechanical completed no courses not constitute a defamation. Community College. El engineering at Paso suggests that the defamation was Box, Personnel, opposi- presented his affidavit RM published also to Aero summary judgment. request person that called to to the motions tion he attended appears him. It he states that information about In that affidavit are colleges of such a defamation is universities that each companies may of those that he does mere fact that some in his resume. He states listed did saying reference check and then do why have made a some are not understand him, believe that do not that he is not hire Saucedo. We not have a record publication says is sufficient to show explanation. this He attempting to find an defamatory guided statement. Betty advised and Stockdale employ- resume and preparation in the of his upon which Rheem of the bases One and that she is application, ment grant upon which the trial moved some agent. He described employment summary judgment is Rheem’s motion for ed *6 where he took buildings at each school action for breach of causes of classes. contract, fraud, estoppel are promissory accepted are Even if Saucedo’s statements part of by resume fraud on the Sauce- barred true, by undis- appellees established the summary judgment evidence There is do. that Sau- summary judgment evidence puted in his resume that: represented that Saucedo respect to (1) resume fraud with percent of his cedo committed graduated top in the ten he average, (2) grade point class; standing and Diego his class he attended San high school earned, degrees number of credit hours earning 12 hours in the College, credit State obtained, (3) classes taken. administration; the nature of Ari he attended business University, earning 12 credit zona State resume fraud is Rheem describes as What (4) administration; he at in hours business as the cases that it cites in the described Paso, University at El the of Texas tended Texas, In after-acquired evidence doctrine. engi in hours mechanical earning 60 credit in defense of employed the doctrine has been (5) degree an associates neering; he earned wrongful retaliation brought for claims (6) completed he four mid-management; in compensation claims. filing of workers’ the (7) average earned a 3.0 years college; he Fifth approved the has been The doctrine (8) in 76 credit hours college; he took v. Appeals, see Jordan District Court engineering at El Paso Communi mechanical Inc., Controls, 881 S.W.2d Johnson (9) diploma from College; and he has ty denied), re —Dallas University of Texas at El Paso. the Ninth and Thirteenth Courts jected Wiesner, Inc., Mitchell v. John summary Appeals, see presented appellees have The (Tex.App consisting of evidence of 923 judgment evidence . —Beaumont (1) 1996, writ); Technologies v. Trico no Montiel showing that: Saucedo records school (Tex.App Corp., ranked 319th high from school graduated . —Cor (Tex. 1996),aff’d, (2) students; pus Christi never attended Saucedo 1997). judgment of affirming Diego College or State Diego San State San Court, Supreme Court the Texas (3) Ari- Thirteenth attended University; never “Saucedo, you;” once fucking fire not serve recently held that the doctrine does fucking boat.” again you serve missed such claims but that it does to bar bar the recov under certain circumstances to deposition, Saucedo testified his ery damages period after of actual for the working with employee who was had an em employer discovers of the evidence had plant in Mexico who at the chemicals Technologies ployee’s misconduct. Trico that he problems. said respiratory Montiel, Corp. S.W.2d 308 Security, a go employee to to Social told the However, applica may the doctrine have that provided services hospital Mexico employer tion at all is aware plant. He in the employees Mexican termination, not ter prior fraud but does out, he told found that when Loera indicated Regard employee minate the that basis. if he he would went there less of whether Rheem knew of Saucedo’s him, treat- and that he needed medical fire termination, prior to fraud resume pay private physi- would for a ment Rheem doctrine, case, does under the facts of this testified that Loera told cian. Saucedo total bar claims. not serve to his trying guy know privately, “You what this money trying get be- to do? He’s more Intentional Emotional Infliction of working dangerous chemi- cause he’s Distress said, also Loera cals.” Saucedo indicated stupid. you’re too You’re not even “And next consider of wheth the issue manager recognize fucking this.” er estab any a matter of law lishes as conduct recounted another incident part of Loera or Rheem em stayed after employees he and other ployee outrageous was not extreme or con that the repair a machine. He said hours give duct that would rise a cause of action at his morning, dozing while next he was for the intentional infliction of emotional dis desk, picture a week later Loera took tress. him, “I can him with it confronted and told your fired for He did not get ass this.” The elements of a claim the intentional up (1) he had been mention whether knew infliction of emotional distress are: night. all recklessly; intentionally defendant acted (2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and deposition to an referred (8)
outrageous; and actions defendant’s official incident in which environmental *7 plaintiff caused the severe distress. emotional the stacks. had wanted some testers for 619, Twyman, Twyman v. 621 855 S.W.2d that he had ordered Saucedo indicated (Tex.1993). yet necessary materials but that had not said that at a conference may arrived. Saucedo
Whether the defendant’s conduct rea official, and the sonably regarded as out with Loera environmental be so extreme and verbally him in front of had insulted rageous permit recovery initially as to a Loera official, saying, “I care. I don’t question don’t for the court. v. Ca Wornick Co. get sas, (Tex.1993); supposed You to excuses. were Re want 856 S.W.2d 734 you get it accom- § done and did not 46 cmt. h. this (SECOND) statement TORTS (1965). Loera plished.” Saucedo also indicated that Outrageous conduct is that him, always looking fucking “You’re goes possible decency, all told beyond bounds of always atrocious, got You’ve an excuse regarded utterly excuses. to and be everything. your I don’t hear fuck- society. want to in a civilized Wornick intolerable 734; anymore. supposed to Co., ing excuses You were at (SEC Restatement thing get it done. get § this done. You didn’t 46 cmt. d. OND) of Torts assign somebody else.” going I’m to it to There is kick in frequently used “fuck” testified that Loera would the word Saucedo, requisitions parts including phras- his for critical with back or lose conversations him machine broke you’re know insult when a “You don’t what the fuck and then es like fucking going by saying, your “It’s all fault.” up;” are all am doing;” “You fucked “I down Industries, Findlay deposition said in his that Loera he was recruited references, gave gave specific position superintendent bad no out of maintenance Laredo, example. in He for Rheem Nuevo Mexico. Vanderveldt, Vice said that John Finally, in deposition Saucedo indicated Operations, of- for Maintenance President night. gave call He that Loera would him position super- fered him the maintenance example calling one him at of Loera 11:30 intendent, to required him that was telling he p.m. already midnight asleep or when he was establishing personal make commitment beeper to check to if he had his on. He see deep Rheem that Rheem roots with beeped to night said that Loera him permanent turn would in offer a stable and give times for reason. He did not times position says until retirement. Saucedo respect with other occasions. promised per- him stable Vanderveldt even rude “Insensitive or behavior does position manent until retirement but did outrageous amount behavior.” Mat many of tell him that Rheem had terminated (Tex. Reck, tix-Hill v. January employees period its in the from Alexsis, Inc., 1996); Natividad v. 31,1991. May copy He attaches a conduct, Loera’s While offer and of the written confirmation of the rude, true, might or be insensitive acceptance The written affidavit. not, agree trial that it with the does length confirmation makes no mention law, surpass possible a matter of all bounds employment. of Saucedo’s It does indicate decency utterly in and is not intolerable “$36,000 salary of paid is to be a base society. civilized Saucedo refers us to sever begin annually.” employ- was to examples outrageous al eases that discuss 15,1991. says ment Rheem on He with conduct, one from federal court in Texas very performed until that he his duties well and the others from the courts of other September Rheem terminated states, all of which are referenced Co., Supreme Texas Court in Wornick at 735-36. We find those eases be 26.01 of the Texas Business Section distinguishable. Most have to do with em Code, commonly called the stat- Commerce employees ployers charging with criminal frauds, provides, things, among ute of vile, conduct and another has to do with capable being per- agreement that an agree racial slurs. do not with offensive within one from date formed Saucedo’s conclusion that Loera’s conduct agreement writing making the must be equaled or exceeded the conduct discussed signed by person charged did, eases. Even we note that the those agreement, someone Court, Supreme referring Texas while sign for him. Tex. lawfully authorized eases, controlling adopt those did not them as 26.01(b)(6). § If & Com.Code Bus. Ann. Id. at 736. Texas. employment until promised retirement, writing it was not and there- *8 Contract, Promissory Estop- 3. Breach of fore not enforceable under the terms is pel, and Fraud this section. consider the issue of wheth We next Texas, the exceptions, follows some er causes of action for breach of Saucedo’s doctrine, employment at under which will contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud may term be employment for an indefinite against by the Texas Rheem are barred Stat and without cause. terminated will Frauds, Tex. ute of Ann. Bus. Com.Code & Works, Inc., 813 v. Iron Schroeder Texas (Vernon 1987), § it for 26.01 because was 483, agree- 489 A verbal S.W.2d year and employment greater than one was un- employment ment until retirement writing. not reduced to Id. enforceable. op- presented an affidavit Jose Saucedo noted, previously the memoran As position to Rheem’s employment agreement between dum of the judgment. In that affidavit he states that provides that is to be manager Rheem and Saucedo employed the maintenance while
125
arbitrarily
$36,000 annually.
paid
hiring
upon
based
Rheem
that Rheem could not
A
period.
agreement
salary
the annual
an
of an
limits in a
terminate him within
annual
way
employer’s
meaningful
special
Rios,
upon by
the memorandum relied
discharge
prerogative
employee during
was
satisfy
Rios to
the statute of frauds
period
employment.
dictated
Wino
not
employment
offer
that Rios was
an
(Tex.
Willis,
307,
grad
v.
S.W.2d
sign.
providing
asked to return and
While
1990,
App.
wilt de
[14th Dist.]
$28,000,
— Houston
salary
the offer did
for a base
nied);
Inc.,
Engels,
v.
Molnar
specific
upon which
state a
duration time
224,
1985,
(Tex.App.
Antonio
writ
Rios,
— San
at 815. Con-
was based.
n.r.e.). Where,
here,
employ
ref'd
did
sequently,
court held that the offer
salary, by
ment is for an annual
its terms it
limit
agreement or
employment
not create an
performed
year
could
in one
have been
right to
him at
Texas
terminate
Commerce’s
therefore excused from
statute of
case, there
no contention
will. Id. In this
If,
Winograd, 789
frauds.
S.W.2d at 311.
does
that the memorandum
not constitute
year
employee
the expiration of a
contin
Saucedo, and
agreement
Rheem
between
services,
perform
ues to
the contract
dura-
specific
does state a
memorandum
impliedly
period
renews itself for a
of one
salary
time
upon
tion
which Saucedo’s
year.
Consequently,
Id. at 310.
Rheem based,
annually.
being
We sustain Sau-
could
good
not terminate Saucedo without
point
relates
cedo’s
of error number one as it
cause
period
July
within the one
from
to his breach of contract claim.
15,1994,
14,1995.
prom
claims
fraud and
principally
on the
relies
case of
promises
issory estoppel
upon
are based
oral
Corp.,
Dobson v. Metro Label
until
employees
employment
writ).
(Tex.App.
65-66
promises
— Dallas
unenforcea
retirement. Such
are
find
distinguishable.
that case to be
In Dob-
ble
are barred
the statute
because
son,
memorandum,
provid
the written
while
frauds.
a defendant’s motion
“[W]here
ing
salary, provided
for an annual
neither an
appli
...
establishes
position.
contrast,
employee name nor
cability
a matter
of Frauds as
Statute
provided
the memorandum this case
law, the
burden
movant does
have the
Saucedo was the
hired and stated
promissory
negate
plaintiffs
claim of
position
in which
employed.
he would be
Conoco,Inc.,
estoppel.”
v.
Leach
(Tex.App.
[1st Dist.]
— Houston
Massey
Rheem also relies on the
cases
Instead,
w.o.j.).
the nonmovant
writ dism’d
Univ.,
Baptist
v. Houston
in a
is
fraud
seeking
promise
the
of a
the oral
nor
as
of
breach
not
enforce
what he has lost
a result
bargain,
under the stat
of the
what he
that is unenforceable
recover
benefit
contract
frauds,
gained thereby,
is
action is also barred
have
but instead
ute of
fraud
would
by
fraudulently
v.
seeking
being
frauds.
by the statute
Collins
what he lost
(Tex.Civ.
745,
McCombs,
Findlay
resign
747
leave
Indus-
511
induced to
S.W.2d
n.r.e.).
1974,
However,
specifical-
App.
damages
Antonio
writ ref'd
tries.
— San
ly
response
that one could
opinion
In that
inferred
referenced
Saucedo’s
re-
summary judgment
damages
of action
motion
under a fraud cause
were
recover
rather
plaintiff sought
sulting
he had lost as a result
from Saucedo’s termination
what
opposed
leaving
prior employer.
He did
entering
into the contract
than
damages as
gain
result of the con
on
what he would
as a
assert
limitations
not
may
for sum-
argues
granting
that Saucedo
for not
the motion
tract.
Id. Rheem
basis
pre-
promise
judgment.
expressly
that is
mary
not base a fraud claim on
Issues
motion,
by
statute
frauds.
the trial court
written
unenforceable due to the
sented to
Quinn
answer,
con-
response
v.
other
shall not be
It relies on the cases of
or
Workforce
2000,
(E.D.Tex.
Inc.,
181, 135-36
appeal
grounds for reversal.
F.Supp.
887
sidered
166a(c).
1995);
East,
755,
hold
Weakly v.
900 S.W.2d
758
P.
We therefore
Tex.R. Civ.
1995,
granting
(Tex.App. Corpus
writ de
trial
did not err
Christi
that the
—
Inc.,
954,
nied);
Conoco,
respect to
v.
892
with
Leach
S.W.2d
1995,
(Tex.App.
[1st Dist.]
960-61
fraud claim.
— Houston
w.o.j.);
v. Allied Phar
writ dism’d
Collins
Inc.,
929,
macy Management,
871 S.W.2d
Conclusion
1994,
(Tex.App
[14th Dist.]
935-36
.—Houston
error
point
sole
sustain Saucedo’s
Coast, Inc.,
writ);
Polysar
Benoit v.
Gulf
claim,
respect
his breach
contract
403,
408
S.W.2d
— Beaumont
him as a
by
damages
limited to
suffered
n.r.e.);
v.
Kel
ref'd
Webber M.W.
writ
from the date
of his termination
result
Co.,
(Tex.App.—
logg
720 S.W.2d
14, 1995,
earlier
until
termination
n.r.e.);
1986, writ ref'd
[14th Dist.]
Houston
by
after-ac-
limited
determined
Bank,
andWade v. State Nat’l
Sau-
quired
We overrule
evidence doctrine.
(Tex.Civ.App.
Paso
— El
to all
claims.
point of error as
cedo’s
n.r.e.).
ref'd
arguing
J.,
Rheem
GREEN,
dissenting.
It
unclear whether
is
concurring
is
maintain a claim
one could
ever
Justice,
GREEN,
dissenting.
arising
unenforceable
fraud
out
majority’s holding that
is,
disagree
If it
I
with the
of Frauds.
its view
under the Statute
Wade,
employment contract
one
at
supported
is
Collins,
through
at
One
established
S.W.2d
East,
salary of
cites,
pay
a “base
agreed
Weakly v.
holds that
eases it
$36,000
I therefore dissent
arising
annually.”
fraud claims
statute of frauds bars
judg-
opinion
and to the
portion
promise unless
out of the unenforceable
necessary writing.
is
it.
900 ment that
affected
prevents
fraud
Some of the cases that
S.W.2d at 758.
my
am, however,
uneasy in
I
somewhat
holding in
our
inconsistent with
cites are not
majority opinion
disagreement because
Webber, 720
These include
S.W.2d
Collins.
legal precedent.
grounded
long-standing
Leach,
960-61;
129;
at
English Rule
I
aware
the so-called
am
Benoit,
The
Winograd supports Saucedo’s
English
pre
is
of the
Rule
the existence
agreement
hiring
“a
based on an
It held that
State,
sumption
employment
of at-will
in this
‘meaningful
salary limits in a
of an annual
presumption
only
by ex
overcome
prerogative
way’
employer’s
special
press agreement
parties.
Federal
of the
See
during the dictat
discharge
employee
Dutschmann,
Express Corp. v.
846 S.W.2d
Id.;
employment.”
see Molnar
period of
ed
(Tex.1993) (“The
long-standing rule
(Tex.App.—
Engels, 705
v.
will,
provides
employment
at
Texas
n.r.e.).
Signifi
writ ref'd
Antonio
San
any
by
party,
terminable
time
either
however,
Winograd nor Mol
cantly,
neither
cause,
agreement
express
without
absent an
by sim
question of whether
naraddress
added);
contrary.”) (emphasis
Ameri
to the
salary
intended
ply stating
parties
a
rate the
Hamilton,
04-95-
can Lantern Co. v.
No.
employment
be created.
a term of
-
-,
00517-CV,
slip op. at
directly ad-
supreme
The
court has not
-,
(Tex.App.—San
firm the of the trial court. parte Philip Ex SHERIDAN.
No. 04-97-00531-CR. Texas, Appeals of Court of Antonio. San March 1998. May Rehearing Overruled Discretionary Review Refused 30,1998.
Sept.