This is an appeal from a conviction for transporting cattle from within the brand area to a point outside without first having a brand inspection.
The plaintiff in error, Everett Satterfield, hereinafter referred to as defendant, lists 24 assignments of error, nearly all of which are either not discussed or are improperly presented. Rule 8a2(4), Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1960, provides: “Assignments of error relied upon for reversal and intended to be urged in the brief shall be separately numbered and paraghaphed, bearing in mind that consideration of the cause will be limited to errors assigned and discussed. However, the court may, at its option, notice a plain error not assigned.” This rule disposes of most of defendant’s assignments. However, we will hereinafter discuss all of the principal ones.
The defendant, on December 1, 1959, hired a trucking firm to transport branded сattle from Loup County, Nebraska, inside the brand area, to a ranch 17 miles east of St. Paul in Merrick County, which is outside the brand area. No brand inspection was made of the cattle. A brand inspector learned of this viоlation and caused a brand inspection to be conducted. On January 29, 1960, a complaint was filed against defendant in the county court of Loup County. A jury found the defendant guilty as charged, and he was fined $50 and ordered tо pay the costs.
He appealed to the district court for Loup County, and *277 was found guilty by a jury. He was sentenced to pay a fine of $200 and costs, and to serve a term of 30 days in the county jail, which jail sentence was suspended. He appealed to this court.
The comрlaint on which defendant was tried in the district court did not bear a filing stamp until after the trial. There is no question it was in the court before and during the trial, but that the clerk of the district court neglected to place a filing stamp on it. Before the trial, defendant waived arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty to- the complaint. After the trial the court entered a nunc pro tunc order to the effect that the complaint and original papers in the county court were admittedly filed October 24, 1960, before the defendant’s plea, but that the clerk, through inadvertence and oversight, did not place the filing stamp upon them, and directed her to do so showing their filing as of October 24, 1960.
In Fisher v. Minor,
As early as Garrison v. People,
Defendant at several stages attempted to raise the constitutionality of sections 54-141 and 54-143, R. R. S. 1943. Section 54-143, R. R. S. 1943, prоvides as follows: “No owner, shipper, person, persons, firm, motor car *278 rier, railroad company or other carrier or corporation or his, her, its or their agent or agents or servant or servants, shall movе, drive, ship or transport, in any manner, any cattle from any point within the brand area to any point outside the brand area, unless such cattle shall first have a brand inspection by the Nebraska Brand Committee; Provided, if the line designating the brand area divides any ranch or farm, written permission may be given, at the discretion of the Nebraska Brand Committee, to the owner or owners of cattle on such ranch or farm to move the cattle in аnd out of the brand area without inspection. In cases of prosecution for violation of this section, venue may be established in the county of origin or any other county through which the cattle may pass in leaving thе brand area.”
Section 54-141, R. R. S. 1943, provides as follows: “The committee shall have the power and authority to pass rules and regulations relating to the administration of, but not inconsistent with the provisions of sections 54-134 to 54-156.”
Defеndant has restricted the issue of constitutionality to the above two sections. Consequently, we are restricting our discussion to them.
Defendant contends that section 54-143, R. R. S. 1943, provides a different right for people in different рarts of the state and is discriminatory between citizens of the state. There is no question but that the act sought to remedy an evil existing in a certain area and operates equally upon all persons located within that area. The area included in the act represents the cattle and range area of Nebraska. As such, it can be readily distinguished from the rest of the state.
In McFadden v. Denter,
Without the inspection provided by section 54-143, R. R. S. 1943, of cattle leaving the brand area, the brand law would be ineffective. It is an essential part of the enforcement of the act.
The act affects all persons and not merely those who maintain residence in the area, and cannot be considered to be special legislation. In Bauer v. State Game, Forestation & Parks Commission,
Dеfendant argues that the provision of section 54-143, R. R. S. 1943, providing for trials in various counties, deprives defendant “of personal privilege and personal liberty, in having to be tried in some county not his residence.” The defendаnt also argues that this provision is an unreasonable delegation of legislative authority to bring an action in any county. Defendant misconstrues the section. It is the Legislature which has established the venue “in the county of оrigin or any other county through which the cattle may pass in leaving the brand area.” The act of transporting cattle is a continuing one. The violation is as improper in any county through which the cattle pass as it is in thе county of origin.
Defendant contends further that no crime was committed in Loup County. The moving, shipping, and transporting of cattle from one point within the brand area without inspection brings the act into operation. The point of origin was Loup County. The action was properly brought in Loup County, the county of defendant’s residence.
*280
The defendant also argues that: “Sec. 54-143 describes the location of the brand area but leaves entirely to the Nebraska Brand Committee the inspection regulations and thus delegates and grants to an administrative agency legislative power.” This statement from defendant’s brief is not argued further or supported in any way by a reference to regulations alleged to be an exercise of legislative power by an administrative agency. Certainly defendant’s mere statement of a conclusion is not sufficient to overcоme a presumption of constitutionality. In any event, we believe the following from Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan,
The defendant contends that instruction No. 5 of the trial court’s instructions is improper because it tells the jury that the defendant is presumed by law to know that Loup County was in the brand area and that Merrick County was outside such area. This is not further discussed in the defendant’s brief. We refer to it in passing, although we have ignored other like assignments, because of defendant’s attempt at the trial to offer ignorance of the law as a defense. Suffice it to say that a person charged with the commission of a crime who has reached the age of accountability is conclusively presumed to know the law of the land, including both common law and statutory law. 22 C. J. S., Criminal Lаw, § 586, p. 901.
In City of Plattsmouth v. Murphy,
Defendant filed a supplemental motion for new trial, attacking a jury panel which was drawn from the primary poll books rather than those of a general election. It has frequently been held by this court that provisions of statute relating to the selection of grand and petit jurors are mandatory and must be strictly followed. Hоwever, here the objection came too late.
In Brown v. State,
In Davis v. State,
There can be no question on the record presented but that the defendant received a fair trial. The trial court fully protected his rights at all stages of the proceedings, and all rulings made during the trial are strictly in accord with the law. The statute for the offense involved provides a penalty of a fine of not less than $50 and not more than $500, imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed 6 months, or both, in the discretion of the trial court.
The trial court, after passing sentence, attempted to suspend the jail term. Under thе circumstances of this case, we find the imposition of a jail sentence is excessive. Under the authority of section 29-2308, R. R. S. 1943, the sentence is reduced to the payment of a fine of $200 and the costs of the action, and the judgment of the trial court is in all other respects affirmed.
Affirmed as modified.