139 Wash. App. 175 | Wash. Ct. App. | 2007
Lead Opinion
f 1 — The chief question here is whether the Washington statute providing for judicial enforcement of statutory condominium warranties must yield to the federal arbitration statute solely because some construction materials came from outside Washington State. We hold that under the circumstances here, the commerce clause does not reach so far and the state statute controls.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Satomi, LLC (Company) developed the Satomi Condominium, an 85-unit complex located in Bellevue. In 2005, the Satomi Owners Association (Association) filed suit against the Company, alleging numerous construction defects and other deficiencies throughout the complex, and claiming breach of contractual warranties, breach of implied and express warranties under the Washington Condominium Act (WCA), chapter 64.34 RCW, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, and violations of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW.
¶3 The Company denied the allegations and demanded arbitration based on the arbitration clause in the warranty addendum, which was an attachment to the original purchase and sale agreements. The Company asserted that most of the building materials used to construct the condominium were manufactured and shipped in interstate commerce, and the Association’s claims were therefore subject
¶4 The Association moved to quash the demand for arbitration, contending it is not bound by the agreement and that in any event, the agreement violates the judicial enforcement provision of the WCA, which is not preempted by the FAA because the contract does not involve interstate commerce.
¶5 The trial court quashed the demand for arbitration motion on three grounds:
(1) The Company did not prove that all of the individual owners agreed to arbitrate.
(2) Even if the individual owners agreed to arbitrate, the Association “is a legally separate corporate entity which is neither a ‘successor or transferee’ to [the Association], Thus, the arbitration clause is simply inapplicable.”
(3) The FAA does not apply because Marina Cove Condominium Owners Ass’n v. Isabella Estates
¶6 The Company appeals. Our review is de novo.
DISCUSSION
¶7 The Company argues the court erred and that all unit owners agreed to arbitrate their claims, the Association is bound to arbitrate these issues in the same manner as the unit owners, and the FAA applies and mandates arbitration. We agree with the first two arguments, but not the third.
I. Applicability of Arbitration Agreement to Association
¶8 The Association acknowledges that all original owners signed the warranty addendum but contends that later purchasers are not bound by it. This argument has no
¶9 The Association next contends the agreement has no application here because the Association is a separate legal entity.
¶10 The WCA requires condominiums to have a homeowners’ association whose membership consists solely of the unit owners, all of whom must belong.
¶11 Such is the case here. The claims asserted belong to the individual unit owners. In addition to violations of the CPA, the Association alleges breaches of warranties under the WCA, the purchase contract, and the implied warranty
¶12 The Association stands in the shoes of the individual unit owners. The trial court erred when it concluded the arbitration clause does not apply to the Association. If the claims are subject to arbitration, the Association must arbitrate.
¶13 The remaining question is whether statutory warranty claims are subject to arbitration because the FAA preempts state law.
II. Applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act
¶14 The Association contends that we decided this issue in Marina Cove, wherein we held that condominium purchase and sale agreements between Washington companies and Washington residents do not implicate the FAA.
¶16 Congress also favors arbitration of disputes and to that end enacted the FAA. The FAA’s basic purpose is to overcome courts’ unwillingness to enforce arbitration agreements.
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.[18]
¶17 The United States Supreme Court most recently considered the scope of the FAA in Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,
¶18 The Court emphasized that the commerce clause power “ ‘may be exercised in individual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate commerce’ if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent ‘a general practice . . . subject to federal control.’ ”
¶19 The Citizens Bank debt restructuring agreements, although executed in Alabama by Alabama residents, easily met the “involving commerce” test for at least three reasons: (1) Alafabco used funds from loans that were the subject of the debt restructuring agreements to finance large projects throughout the southeastern United States; (2) the restructured debt was secured in part by Alafabco’s inventory of goods assembled from out-of-state parts and raw materials; and (3) the general practice represented by the transactions at issue, commercial lending, has a broad impact on the national economy and is clearly within Congress’ regulatory power.
¶20 Citizens Bank confirmed the broad reach of the FAA announced in 1995 in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson ,
¶21 In another 1995 decision, United States v. Lopez,
¶22 In Marina Cove, we adopted an interpretation of Lopez enunciated in L&L Kempwood Associates, LP v. Omega Builders, Inc.,
Similarly here, Marina Cove Condominiums were constructed, marketed, and sold solely within the state of Washington. The contract at issue is a limited warranty offered by a Washington corporation on condominium units located within the state, whose owners all reside in Washington. The only connection to other states involves one buyer, who moved to Washington from another state, and another buyer, who trans*185 ferred funds from an out-of-state bank account for use as a down payment on one emit purchased. That negligible contact with other states does not constitute a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The FAA does not apply.[31]
¶23 But in Citizens Bank, the Court rejected the “substantially affecting” interpretation as an “improperly cramped view” of the commerce clause power
¶24 We know of only one other case similar to this one: Basura v. U.S. Home Corp.
¶25 With these authorities in mind, we turn to the claims and facts of this case. The Association’s complaint alleges a “variety of construction defects and other deficiencies in building components and/or installation”
*187 1. Limited Warranty. The Unit in the Condominium identified above and the Common Elements are suitable for the ordinary uses of real estate of their type and, except as provided below, all parts of the Unit and Common Elements constructed by or for the Declarant are free from defective materials and have been constructed in accordance with applicable law, in accordance with sound engineering and construction standards, and in a workmanlike manner.[41]
¶26 The warranty addendum purports to require arbitration of all warranty disputes:
7. Seller’s Right to Arbitration. At the option of the Seller, Seller may require that any claim asserted by Purchaser or by the Association under this Warranty or any other claimed warranty relating to the Unit or Common Elements must be decided by arbitration, in King County, Washington, under the Construction Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in effect on the date hereof, as modified by this Warranty.[42]
¶27 Contractual and common law warranties are subject to arbitration. WCA warranties, however, are not: “[A]ny right or obligation declared by this chapter is enforceable by judicial proceeding.”
¶29 Second, real property law has historically been the law of each state.
¶30 Third, the warranties in question arise entirely from state law. Unlike Citizens Bank and Allied-Bruce, where the very subject matter of the contracts involved interstate commerce, here the issues are confined to claims founded in warranties created by the Washington Legislature.
¶31 Fourth, these transactions have none of the earmarks of an economic activity that in the aggregate would represent a general practice subject to federal control. The Company offers no authority holding that local real estate transactions represent such a practice, or that warranties required by state law for state condominium projects represent such a practice, or that local regulation of real estate transactions can constitute an economic activity that in the aggregate would represent a general practice subject to federal control. The Company relies upon a single fact: that construction materials came from outside Washington State. In some cases, this is adequate for FAA preemption. Here, it is not.
¶32 Where the issue is federal regulation of the business itself — for example, enforcement of the rights of employees to nondiscriminatory and healthy workplaces — the “transaction” involves the internal operation of the business, and its use of materials shipped in interstate commerce is
¶33 Where the issue is a private dispute, however, the analysis must identify the transaction involving commerce. In Citizens Bank, the Court reasoned that because the commerce clause gives Congress “the power to regulate local business establishments purchasing substantial quantities of goods that have moved in interstate commerce,” it followed that it also permits regulation of “substantial commercial loan transactions secured by such goods.”
¶34 Here, the only connection to interstate commerce is that materials from elsewhere were used in construction, and some of those were allegedly unsound or unsuitable, thereby violating the warranty required by RCW 64.34.445 that the condominium be free from defective materials and constructed in accordance with applicable state law. This warranty amounts to a guarantee that the builder has examined the materials used and ensures they are of sound quality and suitable for the use to which they are put, on site, in Washington State. The origin of the materials is irrelevant to the warranty, and the giving of the warranty is not a transaction involving commerce because, in the aggregate or otherwise, it does not represent a general prac
¶35 It has been often observed that the “affects commerce” test is easily met.
¶36 Here, a significant right created by state law is at issue. The legislature of Washington State retains sovereignty over local real estate transactions. Despite its strong policy favoring arbitration, the legislature created warranty rights in condominium purchasers and provided an exclusively judicial remedy. We do not think this legislative determination as to the appropriate forum for adjudicating legislatively created rights is preempted solely because construction materials may have crossed state lines.
¶37 The reach of the commerce clause is broad, but it is not unlimited. We hold that WCA statutory warranty claims are not arbitrable and that contract and common law claims are, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appelwick, C.J., concurs.
Clerk’s Papers at 144.
109 Wn. App. 230, 34 P.3d 870 (2001).
Walters v. A.A.A. Waterproofing, Inc., 120 Wn. App. 354, 357, 85 P.3d 389 (2004).
RCW 64.34.300.
RCW 64.34.304(l)(d).
18 William B. Stoebuck & John W. Weaver, Washington Practice: Real Estate: Transactions § 12.5, at 40 (2d ed. 2004) (citing RCW 64.34.304(l)(d)).
Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc., 109 Wn.2d 406, 413-14, 745 P.2d 1284 (1987) (under previous version of WCA, homeowners’ association was not separate juristic entity and claims were brought in representative capacity for individual homeowners whose rights were at issue); see also Klay v. Pacificare Health Sys., Inc., 389 F.3d 1191, 1202-03 (11th Cir. 2004) (“associations suing in a representative capacity are bound by the same limitations and obligations as their members”); Meadowbrook Condo. Ass’n v. S. Burlington Realty Corp., 152 Vt. 16, 565 A.2d 238, 241 (1989).
Meadowbrook Condo. Ass’n, 565 A.2d at 241 (quoting trial court).
Common elements are all of the portions of a condominium other than the units. RCW 64.34.020(6). Limited common elements are portions of the common elements reserved for the exclusive use of one or more but fewer than all of the units. RCW 64.34.020(22). The individual unit owners own the common elements and the limited common elements. See RCW 64.34.204(2), (4), .224(1), .228(1).
See RCW 64.34.443(1) (“Express warranties made by any seller to a purchaser of a unit, if relied upon by the purchaser, are created as follows----”); RCW 64.34.445(6) (“Any conveyance of a emit transfers to the purchaser all of the declarant’s implied warranties of quality.”).
Stuart, 109 Wn.2d at 416.
Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 792-93, 719 P.2d 531 (1986) (only a person injuréd in his business or property may bring a private action under the CPA).
Marina Cove, 109 Wn. App. at 244.
Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 153 Wn.2d 293, 301 n.2, 103 P.3d 753 (2004).
Kamaya Co. v. Am. Prop. Consultants, Ltd., 91 Wn. App. 703, 714, 959 P.2d 1140 (1998) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S. Ct. 927, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1983)).
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270, 115 S. Ct. 834, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995).
Id. at 272.
18 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
539 U.S. 52, 123 S. Ct. 2037, 156 L. Ed. 2d 46 (2003).
Id. at 56.
Id. at 56-57 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236, 68 S. Ct. 996, 92 L. Ed. 1328 (1948)).
Id. at 57.
Id. at 57-58.
513 U.S. 265, 115 S. Ct. 834, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995).
Id. at 282.
Id. at 279-80.
Id.
514 U.S. 549, 559, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995).
972 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. App. 1998). The Texas Supreme Court reversed, using the same rationale later applied in Citizens Bank. In re L&L Kempwood Assocs., LP, 9 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 1999).
Marina Cove, 109 Wn. App. at 244.
31 Id.
Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 58.
Id. at 57.
98 Cal. App. 4th 1205, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328 (2002).
Id. at 1214.
Clerk’s Papers at 4.
Brickler v. Myers Constr., Inc., 92 Wn. App. 269, 275, 966 P.2d 335 (1998).
RCW 64.34.443(1) specifies that the formal words “warranty” or “guarantee” are not needed to create an express warranty, which arise from any one of the following:
“(a) Any written affirmation of fact or promise which relates to the unit, its use, or rights appurtenant thereto, area improvements to the condominium that would directly benefit the unit, or the right to use or have the benefit of facilities not located in the condominium creates an express warranty that the unit and related rights and uses will conform to the affirmation or promise;
“(b) Any model or written description of the physical characteristics of the condominium at the time the purchase agreement is executed, including plans and specifications of or for improvements, creates an express warranty that the condominium will conform to the model or description except pursuant to RCW 64.34.410(l)(v);
“(c) Any written description of the quantity or extent of the real property comprising the condominium, including plats or surveys, creates an express warranty that the condominium will conform to the description, subject to customary tolerances; and
“(d) A written provision that a buyer may put a unit only to a specified use is an express warranty that the specified use is lawful.”
RCW 64.34.445 provides in pertinent part:
“(1) A declarant and any dealer warrants that a unit will be in at least as good condition at the earlier of the time of the conveyance or delivery of possession as it was at the time of contracting, reasonable wear and tear and damage by casualty or condemnation excepted.
“(2) A declarant and any dealer impliedly warrants that a unit and the common elements in the condominium are suitable for the ordinary uses of real estate of its type and that any improvements made or contracted for by such declarant or dealer will be:
“(a) Free from defective materials;
“(b) Constructed in accordance with sound engineering and construction standards;
“(c) Constructed in a workmanlike manner; and
“(d) Constructed in compliance with all laws then applicable to such improvements.”
The Association’s complaint alleges the creation of express warranties by public offering statement, advertising materials, advertising statements, and
41 Id. at 193.
42 Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
RCW 64.34.100(2).
Marina Cove, 109 Wn. App. at 236-37 (RCW 64.34.100(2) creates a right to judicial enforcement of the WCA that may not be waived).
In addition to an ages-old common law, the State thoroughly regulates real estate law in areas including broker licensing, chapters 18.85-.86 RCW; real estate sale financing, chapters 61.12 and 61.30 RCW; sale and transfer procedures, chapters 64.04 and 64.06 RCW; taxation, Title 84 RCW; and eminent domain, Title 8 RCW.
See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S. Ct. 377, 13 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1964) (Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964) (Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 89 S. Ct. 1697, 23 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1969) (Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Ratliff, 906 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1990) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a); Usery v. Lacy, 628 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1980) (Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678).
Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 57.
See, e.g., Ratliff, 906 F.2d at 1316.
The parties recently advised the court that the Association and the Company have settled. The Association seeks to terminate review, which the Company
Dissenting Opinion
¶39 There are two major problems with the majority’s approach. First, it relies on authority it admits is of questionable continuing validity for one of its major premises: that ££[t]he right to a judicial forum for resolution of
¶40 The FAA provides that
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of*193 such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.[61]
The party moving to compel arbitration must make a threshold showing that there is a written agreement to arbitrate and that the contract at issue involves interstate commerce.
¶41 Satomi, LLC Company argues the transactions evidenced by the warranty addendum involve interstate commerce because over 70 percent of the building materials used to construct the condominium complex were manufactured in and shipped from outside Washington. The Satomi Owners Association (Association) asserts the origin of the building materials is too remote an interstate connection for the FAA to apply. It contends this court in Marina Cove established that condominium purchase and sale agreements between Washington companies and Washington residents do not implicate the FAA.
¶42 The FAA’s basic purpose is to overcome courts’ refusals to enforce arbitration agreements.
functional equivalent of the more familiar term “affecting commerce” — words of art that ordinarily signal the broadest*194 permissible exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power. Because the statute provides for “the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause,” it is perfectly clear that the FAA encompasses a wider range of transactions than those actually “in commerce” — that is, “within the flow of interstate commerce.”[66]
¶43 In Allied-Bruce, the Gwins entered into a termite protection contract for their home with Allied-Bruce and Terminix.
¶44 After holding that the words “involving commerce” invoked the full extent of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, the Court disapproved of the “ ‘contemplation of the parties’ ” test and held the transaction evidenced by the contract need only “in fact” involve interstate commerce.
¶45 In Basura v. U.S. Home Corp., homeowners brought suit against a developer for alleged design and construction defects, and the developer moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause in the sale agreements.
¶46 In Citizens Bank
¶48 If there was any question about whether the far-reaching “involving interstate commerce” test in Allied-Bruce remained valid, Citizens Bank answered that ques
¶49 Here, the warranty addendum containing the arbitration clause evidences a transaction “involving interstate commerce” within the United States Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of the FAA. The addendum states in part:
The Unit in the Condominium identified above and the Common Elements are suitable for the ordinary uses of real estate of their type and, except as provided below, all parts of the Unit and Common Elements constructed by or for the Declarant are free from defective materials and have been constructed in accordance with applicable law, in accordance with sound engineering and construction standards, and in a workmanlike manner.[80]
As the Association points out, the warranty addendum evidences an agreement between a Washington company and primarily Washington-resident purchasers about warranties on condominiums located within Washington. But the addendum also specifically addresses the materials used to construct the condominium complex, most of which were manufactured and shipped from outside Washington. Basura and Citizens Bank give this interstate materials connection significant weight in determining whether the FAA applies. Most importantly, the general practice represented by the transactions at issue, condominium warranties and sales, has an undeniably broad impact on the national economy.
¶51 The majority characterizes this as a “private dispute” to which the FAA does not apply and the warranty as the “general practice” to which we must look under Citizens Bank. Majority at 189. The first characterization begs the question and the second is an attempt to miniaturize the transactions at issue to shield them from interstate significance. All the disputes discussed in Allied-Bruce, Basura, and Citzens Bank were “private.” Yet the courts held the FAA applied to them all because, when viewed through the lens of interstate commerce and the purpose of the FAA, all were a part of broader “aggregate economic activity,” i.e., pest control using out-of-state products, home
¶52 Finally, the majority seeks to downplay the significance of the out-of-state materials at issue in this dispute. Majority at 190. If anything, the connection this condominium project has to interstate commerce is far greater than in Allied-Bruce. If any contract would seem to be remote from the reach of the Commerce Clause, it is one between a homeowner and his local Terminix outlet to spray for bugs. Yet the Supreme Court found FAA preemption based solely on Allied-Bruce’s multistate operations and the fact that a single commodity — the bug spray — was manufactured in another state. Here, virtually all the materials at issue come from another state. This, too, is a contract that “in fact” involved interstate commerce.
I agree with the majority that “a significant right created by state law is at issue.” Majority at 190. But so were the similar laws invalidated in Allied-Bruce, Basura, and Citizens Bank. I simply do not think we can ignore the very clear mandate of the United States Supreme Court that, where a contract involves a general practice that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, state laws limiting or prohibiting arbitration must yield to the FAA.
Review granted at 163 Wn.2d 1017 (2008).
109 Wn. App. 230, 34 P.3d 870 (2001).
RCW 64.34.100(2) (right of action), .030 (nonwaiver provision).
As the majority recognizes (majority at 190), even if the FAA did not preempt the WCA remedy here, the arbitration clause still applies to the Satomi Owners Association’s implied warranty of habitability and Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW, claims. It would clearly promote judicial economy to resolve these claims, which arise from identical facts, in one arbitration hearing.
Majority at 187 (citing Marina Cove, 109 Wn. App. at 236-37).
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 134 L. Ed. 2d 902 (1996).
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 269, 115 S. Ct. 834, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995).
Basura v. U.S. Home Corp., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1205, 1212, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328, review denied, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 6245.
513 U.S. 265, 115 S. Ct. 834, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995).
Id. at 57.
61 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
Walters v. A.A.A Waterproofing, Inc., 120 Wn. App. 354, 358, 85 P.3d 389 (2004) (citing Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 978 n.4 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 270.
Id. at 272 (citing Southland Corp. v Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16, 104 S. Ct. 852, 79 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984)).
66 Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 56 (citations omitted) (quoting Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273-74; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 96 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1987)).
Id. at 269.
Id. at 279-80.
Id. at 282.
Id.
98 Cal. App. 4th 1205, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328, review denied, 2002 Cal. LEXIS 6245.
514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995). This is the case we erroneously relied on in Marina Cove to narrow the test for applying the FAA. 109 Wn. App. at 243.
Basura, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 1214.
Id. at 56-57 (alteration in original) (quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236, 68 S. Ct. 996, 92 L. Ed. 1328 (1948)).
Id. (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27, 88 S. Ct. 2017, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (1968), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1976); Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37-38, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937)).
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 58. Notably, the Texas Supreme Court had earlier used the same reasoning, that Lopez did not affect Allied-Bruce, in granting mandamus relief and essentially overruling the Texas Court of Appeals’ decision in Kempwood Associates, which we had relied on in Marina Cove. See In re L&L Kempwood Assocs., LP, 9 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 1999). Although the only interstate feature of that contract was that the parties lived in different states, the court ruled the contract still involved interstate commerce, so the FAA applied. Id. at 127.
80 (Emphasis added.)
“[E]ven when a transaction is entered into between residents of the same state and consummated in that state, the tramsaction implicates the FAA when ‘in the aggregate the economic activity in question’ represents a ‘general practice
The Association’s complaint alleged causes of action based on a “variety of construction defects and other deficiencies in building components and/or installation including, but not limited to, siding and trim, sealant joints, building paper, flashing, penetration wraps, concrete entry patios and walkways, parapet guardrails on walkways, columns, shear walls, windows and concrete slabs on grade.”
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 279-80.
