135 N.W. 797 | N.D. | 1912
While there are the customary minor disputes, a fair preponderance of the evidence shows the following facts: Plaintiff was an unmarried man, thirty-six years of age, in good health, weighed
The case at bar is a civil action against the father and the two sons for damages alleged to have been inflicted upon plaintiff. In the complaint it is alleged that the defendants, “Jointly, wrongfully, and unlawfully conspired together ... to assault, beat, bruise, and injure plaintiff,” and that as a result of the conspiracy the two sons did assault and batter said plaintiff, and that the father did counsel, advise, incite, and encourage the said sons in their said assault, wherefore the plaintiff prays judgment against all of the defendants in the sum of $2,515.00, for actual and punitive damages. The answer filed by the father is a general denial. The sons add the further defense of justification, alleging that what they did was in defense of their father’s person. They also add to their answer the following statement: “That thereafter and on or about the 20th day of May, 1909, the plaintiff made a complaint before W. W. Bradley, Esq., a justice of the peace in and for Sargent county, in which these two defendants were charged with the commission of assault and battery upon the person of the plaintiff, such charge being based upon the acts aforesaid;, that being advised thereto by friends and relatives who were not lawyers, and being entirely unadvised as to their legal rights in the premises, these defendants, mistakenly believing themselves technically guilty of assault and battery upon the person of the plaintiff, went before said justice of the peace and entered a plea of guilty to said charge . . .; that in truth and in fact these defendants were not guilty of said offense, and made and entered said plea under a mistaken apprehension both of the factsf' and of the law.”
(1) At the trial below, plaintiff offered in evidence the record of the justice of the peace to show the plea of guilty entered by the two younger Muffles, as an admission against their interests in the present case. Appellant concedes that this procedure is proper as a general rule of law, but insists that in this praticular case the record offered was in-, sufficient in several particulars; for instance, that the complain t in the justice court did not in fact charge any offense. Also that the record
(2) We now come to a more serious question. After the trial court had admitted the record of the justice of the peace showing the plea of guilty, the defendants made the following order: “Defendants offer to prove by this witness and the witness Louis Muffle and by the witness Knute Knipstrap and George Sullivan, that this witness and the other defendant, Louis Muffle, were on the morning of the 20th of May, 1909, advised by Knipstad and Sullivan to come to Forman and enter a plea of guilty to assault and battery, for the reason that it would be better and cheaper than to employ an attorney and let their breaking rig stand idle during the time of the trial, and whether guilty or innocent made no difference.” This offer was rejected by the court, and error is assigned upon the ruling. The appellant cites to us cases holding that a plea of guilty entered in a criminal case is not conclusive against the defendant in case the same facts are made the basis of a civil suit, and that the defendant may show why he comes to make the plea of guilty. There is no attempt upon the part of the plaintiff to dispute this doctrine, either here or below. In fact the defendants were allowed to go all over the details of the combat and give their version of the facts. They were not held to their plea of guilty. They* were allowed to show fully just how the fight started, progressed, and ended. They were álso allowed to show that they were running a breaking outfit the next day when arrested, and that they advised with friends. When, however, they attempted to show what those friends had advised them, the evidence was excluded. The statements made to defendants by other persons would at most be material if they were relied upon and acted upon by defendants; and the offer .made does not .include this fact. Dozens of their friends may have advised them to plead guilty, but unless they were influenced thereby to make such a plea the advice of their friends would be immaterial in this suit. After all the matter in issue was not what they were advised, or what they did
(3) During the course of the trial, plaintiff offered Evidence to the effect that plaintiff and the elder Muffle had an altercation some time before the assault in issue. This evidence was admitted over the objection of the defendants. We think the evidence proper. It showed the condition of the elder Muffle’s mind toward plaintiff, and went to the question of punitive damages at least.
(4) Another error alleged by appellant is the admission of evidence as to the elder Muffle carrying a knife, and threats made by him to use it. As the evidence showed that plaintiff had armed himself with an iron bolt after the first meeting with the elder Muffle, we think it proper to show the above facts as a reason why plaintiff so armed himself.
(5) At the close of the taking of evidence, the defendants moved for a directed verdict upon the grounds of failure of proof. It is especially urged that the elder Muffle was entitled to the same as he had not touched plaintiff and no conspiracy was proven. The ruling of the trial court was right. The elder Muffle had stood by and encouraged the boys in the assault; he had related to them the facts of the bolt in plaintiff’s hands. He had done everything he could to incite the anger of his sons. Such conduct made him an active participant in the assault, and equally liable with his sons for any damage done. Little v. Tingle, 26 Ind. 168; Baldwin v. Biersdorfer, Wilson, Super. Ct. (Ind.) 1; Brink v. Purnell, 162 Mich. 147, 127 N. W. 322, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 829. In the last-named case the language was very similar to that used by Muffle, Sr. We think the motions were properly denied.
(6) Certain errors are predicated upon the instructions to the jury. Most of them relating to the matters already covered by this opinion, and are in harmony therewith. They will therefore not be further noticed.
Many other exceptions are taken to the charge of the jury and have been carefully considered by us. Many of the extracts quoted by appellants, taken alone, áre subject to criticism, and emphasize the neces
Finding no prejudicial error, the judgment is affirmed.