MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs pleading captioned “Plaintiff, Elham Sataki’s Motion and Memorandum to Chief Judge and Judge Kollar-Kotelly to Reassign and Remand Case, by Consent or Otherwise, to Prior Trial Judge Richard W. Roberts, or in the Alternative, to Assign Sataki Cases to Another Trial Judge Through Random Assignment System,” (hereinafter, “PL’s Mot. to Reassign”). See Docket No. [42], As set forth therein, Plaintiff requests that this Court, or alternatively, Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth, reassign this case, as well as a related civil action, Sataki v. Falahati, 10cv466 (CKK), to a different trial judge. Defendants have filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Reassign. See Docket No. [53]. Plaintiff declined to file a Reply. The Cоurt has thoroughly considered Plaintiffs Motion, Defendants’ Opposition, the relevant case law and legal authority, and the record of this case as a whole. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to identify any legitimate grounds warranting reassignment of this case or the related civil aсtion. Similarly, to the extent Plaintiffs Motion to Reassign may be construed as seeking recusal of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a) & (b), the Court finds that recusal is neither warranted nor required. Accordingly, the Court shall DENY Plaintiff’s [42] Motion to Reassign.
*18 BACKGROUND
Plaintiff seeks reassignment of the above-captioned case and the related civil actiоn, Sataki v. Falahati, 10ev466 (CKK). Both actions stem from allegations that Plaintiff was sexually harassed and assaulted by a co-worker at the Persian News Network and that her employer, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (“BBG”), as well as several members and employees of the BBG, unlawfully facilitated the alleged sexual harassment, actively attempted to cover up the incidents of harassment, interfered with the investigation of her administrative complaint, and retaliated against her for complaining about her coworker’s harassing conduct as well as for criticizing BBG’s management and mission.
Plaintiff initially filed suit against her alleged harasser, Mehdi Falahati, on March 1, 2010, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. That case was subsequently removed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on March 19, 2010, upon the certification of Rudolph Contreras, Chief of the Civil Division, United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2), that Mr. Falahаti was acting within the scope of his employment when he allegedly engaged in the conduct complained of by Plaintiff. See Sataki v. Falahati, Civ. Act. No. 10-466(CKK), Notice of Removal, Docket No. [1]. The action was then randomly assigned to the undersigned by the Calendar and Case Management Committee (“Calendar Committee”). Plaintiff did not file any objection to the Notice of Removal, and the case remains pending at this time. See Sataki v. Falahati, Civ. Act. No. 10-466(CKK).
On April 2, 2010, Plaintiff filed the above-captioned lawsuit against BBG and several members and employees of the BBG, both in their official as well as their individual capacities. From the Court’s review of the docket in this case, Plаintiff initially filed a Notice of Related case, indicating her belief that this action was related to Safavi v. BBG, Civil Action No. 08-1225, then pending before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. See Pl.’s Notice of Related Case, Docket No. [2]. However, it appears that the case was deemed not to be a related action and was thеrefore reassigned, at random and at the direction of the Calendar Committee, to Judge Richard W. Roberts. See Reassignment of Civil Case, Docket No. [3]. On May 20, 2010, while the case remained pending before Judge Roberts and before counsel for Defendants had yet entered an appearance, Plaintiff filеd a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. Counsel for Defendants thereafter entered an appearance on May 21, 2010, and on May 24, 2010, prior to resolution of Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, filed a [10] Notice of Related Case, advising Judge Roberts that this action was related to Sataki v. Falahati, Civ. Act. No. 10-466(CKK). Plaintiff did not file an objection to the Notice of Related Case. Accordingly, the above-captioned case was reassigned to this judge by the Calendar Committee on May 25, 2010. See Docket No. [29] (Reassignment of Civil Case).
By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated June 1, 2010, this Court denied Plaintiffs request for a temporary restraining order.
See Sataki v. BBG,
LEGAL STANDARDS AND DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiffs Civil Actions were Properly Assigned to this Court, and Plaintiff has not Demonstrated that Reassignment Pursuant to LCvR 40.6(a) is Appropriate
Both the above-captioned action and the related civil action, Sataki v. Falahati, were properly assigned to this Court by the Calendar Committee. First, with respect to Plaintiffs initial lawsuit filed against Mr. Falahati, the case was randomly assigned to this Court by the Calendar Committee in compliance with the procedures set forth in the Local Civil Rules of this Court. Second, with respect to the above-captioned case, it was appropriately reassigned to this Court as a related civil action pursuant to LCvR 40.5(a)(3) (providing that civil actions аre deemed related “when the earliest [action] is still pending on the merits in the District Court” and, inter alia, the cases “involve common issues of fact” or “grow out of the same event or transaction”). Plaintiff did not object to the designation of this case as a related case, as permitted by LCvR 40.5(c)(3). Nor does she now argue that the case was improperly designated as a related case, see generally Pl.’s Mot., and with good reason, as the civil actions clearly involve common issues of fact relating to Plaintiffs allegations of sexual harassment and arise out of the same event, namely, Mr. Falahati’s alleged harassmеnt of Plaintiff and the Defendants’ response thereto.
Receiving no objection from Plaintiff, Judge Roberts subsequently transferred the case to the Calendar Committee for reassignment to this Court, which had been previously assigned the earlier-filed case. See LCvR 40.5(c)(2) (“Where the existence of related cases in this court is revealed after the cases are assigned, the judge having the later-numbered case may transfer that case to the Calendar and Case Management Committee for reassignment to the judge having the earlier case.”). Finding that “good cause exists for the transfer,” the Calendar Committee then assigned the case to this Court pursuant to Local Civil Rule 40.5(c)(2). Plaintiff did not object to reassignment of this case nor does she now argue that reassignment of this case was not done in compliance with the Local Rules. It is therefore undisputed that both civil actions were properly assigned to this Court by the Calеndar Committee. As such, the Court finds no reason to reassign this case, by consent or otherwise, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 40.6(a).
B. To the Extent Plaintiffs Motion May be Construed as a Motion for Recusal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), the Court Finds that Recusal is Neither Required nor Warranted
As noted above, Plaintiffs Motion to Reassign is explicitly framed as a motion for reassignment of this case pursuant to Local Civil Rule 40.6.
See
PL’s Mot. at 5-6. As Defendants note, however, Plaintiffs Motion may also be construed as seeking recusal of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. Specifically, Plaintiffs Motion appears to suggest that recusal is appropriate under section 455(a), which provides that a federal judge shall disqualify herself “in any proceeding in which h[er] impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” and/or section 455(b), which provides that a federal judge shall also
*20
disqualify herself where,
inter alia,
she “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” Because section 455 “imposes a duty directly uрon the judge to evaluate [her] own conduct,”
United States v. Heldt,
The standard for recusal under 455(a) is an “objective” one: “Recusal is required when ‘a reasonable and informed observer would question the judge’s impartiality.’ ”
S.E.C. v. Loving Spirit Found. Inc.,
First, Plaintiff appears to indicate that recusal is necessary based upon this Court’s judicial decisions — both in the above-captioned case as well as in two unrelated civil actions in which Plaintiffs counsel was or is involved, specifically,
Tooley v. Bush,
Civ. Act. No. 06-306(CKK) and
Klayman v. Judicial Watch,
Civ. Act. No. 06-670(CKK).
See
Pl.’s Mot. at 2-5. It is well established, however, that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”
Liteky v. United States,
Review of the decisions identified by Plaintiff confirms that any claims of bias, actual or otherwise, based on these decisions is wholly without merit. Plaintiff complains that this Court previously dismissed the complaint in
Tooley v. Bush,
in which Plaintiffs present counsel also served as counsel of record for the plaintiff. PL’s Mot. at 2. Plaintiff contends that this Court improperly “dismissed a color-able lawsuit ... based, obviously in part, on extrajudicial reports not in the court record.”
Id.
Plaintiff, however, does not specifically identify what purported “extrajudicial reports” the Court allegedly relied on in that case nor does review of the Court’s opinion in
Tooley
support Plaintiffs claim that the decision was based, in part, on alleged extrajudicial reports. Indeed, the Court’s decision dismissing the complaint in
Tooley
was ultimately affirmed by the D.C. Circuit, which held that “the allegations of Tooley’s complaint constitute the sort of patently insubstantiаl
*21
claims” warranting dismissal.
Tooley v. Napolitano,
Similarly, Plaintiff complains about this Court’s decisions in the civil action,
Klayman v. Judicial Watch,
to which Plaintiffs present counsel is a party.
See
Pl.’s Mot. at 3-4. The Court has previously addressed counsel’s complaints regarding the Court’s judicial decisions in that case and has found them to be wholly without merit and insufficient to either warrant оr require recusal.
See Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc.,
Plaintiff also appears to complain that the Court’s decisions in the above-captioned case support a finding of bias because the decisions have been unfavorable to her.
See
Pl.’s Mot. at 4-5. This argument is also without merit. While Plaintiff may displeased with the Court’s rulings, that alone does not provide a proper ground for recusal.
Liteky,
Second, Plaintiff suggests that recusal is necessary because the undersigned was nominated to the Federal Bench by a Democratic administration. PL’s Mot. at 3. However, the ease law is clear that recusal is not warranted in this circumstance.
See Karim-Panahi v. U.S. Congress,
Judges generally have political backgrounds to one degree or another but must be presumed, absent more, to be impartial. At least in the federal system, judges separate themselves from politics when going on the bench, and their life tenure reduces аny felt reliance on political patrons. Indeed, a suggestion of partiality based on the appointing administration may often be a double-edged sword. If a Democratic appointee’s impartiality toward lawyers publicly identified as active Republicans may be questioned, a Republican appointee’s impartiality toward lawyers’ adversaries might similarly be questioned on the ground that a Republican judge might favor the Republican lawyers.
MacDraw,
The Court therefore concludes that recusal is neither warranted nor required, whether Plaintiffs claims of bias are examined singly or as a whole. Plaintiffs allegation that recusal is warranted or that an appearance of bias against her has been created completely lack merit. Moreover, the Court is satisfied, upon its own independent review of the record, that no reasonable and informed observer would question this Court’s impartiality. To the extent Plaintiffs Motion to Reassign may therefore be construed as seeking recusal of the undersigned judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) & (b), the motion is therefore denied.
Finally, as noted above, Plaintiffs Motion to Reassign, as drafted by counsel, is directed not only to this Court, but as well to Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth in his capacity as Chief Judge for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The undersigned has alerted Chief Judge Lamberth to Plaintiffs Motiоn to Reassign and has been advised that Chief Judge Lamberth shall address Plaintiffs Motion, to the extent it is directed at him in his capacity as Chief Judge, by separate response.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court shall DENY Plaintiffs [42] Motion to Reassign. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Notes
. The Court notes that Plaintiffs counsel was also counfeel of record for the plaintiff in the
MacDraw
litigation.
See MacDraw,