Lоrraine SATACK, Relator, v. STATE of Minnesota, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY (self-insured), Respondent, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota, Intervenor.
No. 48453
Supreme Court of Minnesota
Nov. 9, 1978
3. Defendant‘s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a pretrial protective order does not merit detailed discussion. Defendant cites no authorities in support of his argument.
4. Defendant‘s final contention is that the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to introduce evidence that in 1971 a social wоrker conducting a custody evaluation had talked with complainant, but she had not informed him that defendant was sexually abusing her. While the trial court properly could have admitted this evidence, we do not see how the court‘s ruling could have prejudiced defendant, since complainant had made it clear in her testimony that even though she had the opportunity, she did not tell anyоne other than her mother about defendant‘s conduct until 1976.
Affirmed.
Cochrane & Bresnahan, St. Paul, for relator.
Jeffrey Nelson, St. Paul, for respondent.
PETERSON, Justice.
The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals denied compensation to relator, a
The so-called “premises requirement” is set forth in
“‘Personal injury’ means injury arising out of and in the course of employment * * * but does not cover an employeе except while engaged in, on, or about the premises where his services require his presence as part of such services at the time of the injury and during the hours of said service.”1
Because of the premises requirement, it is generally held that an employee injured in going to or away from his place of employment is not entitled to benefits unless he is engaged in a service for his employer. 1 Larson, Workmen‘s Compensation Law, § 15.00. There are, however, exceptions permitting recovery in certain circumstances when the employee was not literally оn the employment premises when injured. The issue in this case is whether relator comes within any of these exceptions.
The facts upon which the issue turns are undisputed. Employee was a reсeptionist for the Drivers License Division of the Department of Public Safety and worked in the Transportation Building (formerly Highway Building). This building, one in the Capitol complex, is located in the block bounded on the south by Columbus Avenue and on the west by John Ireland Boulevard.
Although employee was not required to begin work until 8 a. m., she usually arrived 45 minute earlier, so that she could receive a ride from her husband. On Fеbruary 28, 1978, she got out of his automobile at the northeast corner of the intersection of Columbus Avenue and John Ireland Boulevard, crossed the street and the boulevard between the street аnd the public sidewalk paralleling the west side of John Ireland Boulevard, and began walking north on that sidewalk to enter the Transportation Building. The east side of the building has two entrances, a main еntrance with several doors near the north end of the building and a smaller one with one door near the south end. This entrance is approximately 100 feet from the main public sidewalk, and a smаll sidewalk runs from the entrance to the main sidewalk. Employee intended to enter the building at the smaller entrance, as was her custom. While walking on the public sidewalk, she slipped on ice approximately 10 or 15 feet south of the walk leading to the smaller entrance and fractured her left ankle. Apparently, the sidewalk on which she fell is owned jointly by the state and the city of St. Paul, but the state removes snow and salts or sands it in the wintertime.
Relator relies upon the exceptional expansion of the employer‘s premises found in such recent cases as Goff v. Farmers Union Accounting Services, Inc., 308 Minn. 440, 241 N.W.2d 315 (1975), and Faust v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 312 Minn. 438, 252 N.W.2d 855 (1977), in both оf which an employee injured on a public street was held within the protection of the act. In Goff the employees used a parking lot directly across the street from their place of work, which was made available to them through agreement by the employer and the lot owner. The employees, with the employer‘s knowledge, usually crossed the street directly on leaving the entrance to the employer‘s building rather than at an intersection some distance away or through an underground tunnel. We held that the route represented a special hazard causally related to employment and that in those circumstances the parking lot constituted
We agree with the court of appeals that these cases are distinguishable, both because there was no showing that the employer had knowledge of the employee‘s routе to work and because there was no special hazard annexed to relator‘s employment in the use of that route. It was a route used by the employee in common with members of thе general public and the hazard faced by her of falling on winter ice or snow was not unlike the hazard faced by the general public.
The fact that the worksite was part of what is called the Capitol complex is not itself enough to constitute the entire area as the premises of the employer. The employer‘s duty of maintenance, to be sure, has been viewed by some courts as a reason to hold that a public sidewalk is a part of the employment premises,2 although in some of those cases the sidewalks were used almost exclusively by the emрloyees. This is not true of the sidewalks in the Capitol complex, and the state‘s duty to its employees to maintain the sidewalks is no different from its duty to the public to do so.
The exclusion of public sidewalks from the employer‘s working premises has been found in several of our cases. In Sommers v. Schuler Chocolates, 239 Minn. 180, 58 N.W.2d 194 (1953), a factually similar case, we said (239 Minn. 183, 58 N.W.2d 196):
“* * * [E]mployee fell only after she had passed through what could be considered a route of ingress or egress incident to the employment [a 15-foot private sidewalk]. After she reached the public sidewalk in front of the building, she was in no way bound to follow a route incident or peculiar to her еmployment. * * * Any public street or sidewalk used by an employee in leaving or arriving at his employment would as well be a part of the working premises as was the site of this accident, and manifestly suсh a construction is not possible under the statute.”
In Simonson v. Knight, 174 Minn. 491, 219 N.W. 869 (1928), where a restaurant employee who customarily entered and departed from the back door of the restaurant and across the rear of the lot on which it was located fell into an excavation on that part of the lot while coming to work, we held her route of ingress and egress an incident of her employment аnd a part of the “working premises” on which the hazards she encountered were referrable to her employment. But we restricted the working premises to the rear of the lot, saying (174 Minn. 493, 219 N.W. 870):
“* * * Relator would not have reached her ‘working premises’ if she had been on the street in front of the building or in the alley or street in the rear of it.”
And in Johannsen v. Acton Const. Co. Inc., 264 Minn. 540, 549, 119 N.W.2d 826, 831 (1963), we said:
“* * * It is only reasonable to conclude that an employee is within the protection of the act as long as he is exposed to a hazard causally connected with the employment and peculiar to it. This does not mean that the protеction will continue when he has entered the avenues of
travel where he is exposed to no work-connected hazard or any hazard greater than that to which all others not so еmployed are exposed.” (Italics supplied.)
We conclude that the controlling principles stated in these cases fully support the determination of the court of appеals.
Affirmed.
YETKA, Justice (dissenting).
Because I find this case, in my opinion, cannot be distinguished from Goff and Faust cited in the majority opinion, I would reverse.
SCOTT, Justice (dissenting).
I agree with my brother Justice Yetka. This sidewalk area where the employee fell is no less a part of the Capitol Grounds Cоmplex than the grassy mall area in Faust, supra.