114 P.2d 938 | Okla. | 1939
The plaintiff in error, hereafter referred to as plaintiff, sustained an accidental personal injury on January 23, 1936, and attempted to recover compensation therefor under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law from the defendant in error Moran-Buckner Company, a corporation, hereafter referred to as the corporation. Due to the inability of the plaintiff to show the existence of the relationship of master and servant, a first prerequisite to an award under such act *179
(Mastin v. Black,
The plaintiff contends that the proceeding before the State Industrial Commission was an action, which entitled him upon a failure thereof, otherwise than upon the merits, to commence a new action within the time limited by section 106, O. S. 1931, 12 Okla. St. Ann. § 100, which provides as follows:
"If any action be commenced within due time, and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff be reversed, or if the plaintiff fail in such action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or, if he die, and the cause of action survive, his representatives may commence a new action within one year after the reversal or failure."
An "action" is defined by statute (section 9, O. S. 1931, 12 Okla. St. Ann. § 4), as follows:
"An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by which a party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense."
And by section 10, O. S. 1931, 12 Okla. St. Ann. § 5, it is provided:
"Every other remedy is a special proceeding."
The plaintiff urges that since by section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution it is provided judicial power shall be vested in commissions and boards, as well as courts, that the State Industrial Commission must be held to be vested with judicial power, and consequently to be a court. This contention cannot be entertained, since it is no longer an open question in this jurisdiction that the State Industrial Commission is not a court, but is merely an administrative body clothed with quasi-judicial power for the purpose of administering relief under the Workmen's Compensation Law. See Union Indemnity Co. v. Saling,
"By the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, an employee may receive compensation for accidental injuries arising out of his employment, *180 although there was no actionable fault by his employer, that it, the employee is granted rights that did not exist at common law, and, under the uniform construction of such acts, the rights of an injured employee are the same without regard to whether or not there was actionable fault on the part of the employer. The employee is given the right to compensation in cases where he would have had no cause of action at law, and he is required to accept the compensation provided by the act, although he would have a cause of action at law in the absence of such an act."
In other words, it is to be observed that the purpose of a proceeding before the State Industrial Commission is to obtain relief under the Workmen's Compensation Law and nothing else, and while one who erroneously claims compensation under said act is not thereby estopped to maintain any other action which he may have in a proper forum if he does so within the time limited by law (Dixon v. Gaso Pump Burner Manufacturing Co.,
"Dismissal of compensation claim by compensation board for lack of jurisdiction held, not to extend time for filing action for personal injuries within the statute providing that new action could be started within three months after court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, since board was not 'court' within meaning of Constitution."
The plaintiff had no claim under the Workmen's Compensation Law; his sole action was one for personal injuries against the Moran-Buckner Company, a corporation, and he failed to bring this action within the time limited by law, and the allegations of his petition failed to state a cause of action against the copartnership, the trial court committed no error in sustaining the demurrers and in dismissing the petition. It will be unnecessary to discuss any of the other matters urged by the respective parties.
Judgment affirmed.
BAYLESS, C. J., WELCH, V. C. J., and RILEY, OSBORN, and HURST, JJ., concur.