[¶ 1] Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews appealed from a judgment determining the ownership and control of certain property in Sargent County. We reverse, conсluding the plain language of the 1917 and 1918 right-of-way deeds at issue conveyed easements.
I
[¶ 2] In November 2012, the Sargent County Water Resource District (“District”) commenced аn action seeking declaratory relief regarding the ownership
[¶ 3] The District sought declaratory relief because Paul Mathews sought to exert control over the property, claiming a property interest through his rental agreement with Phyllis Delahoyde and Nancy Mathews, the purported owners of the property. Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews answered the complaint and raised a number of defenses and a counterclaim against the District. Delahoydе did not claim an interest in the disputed property, nor did she join the codefendants in the appeal.
[¶ 4] In January 2014, the district court held a bench trial. After trial, the cоurt found the 1917 deed and 1918 deed were ambiguous on their face and considered extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties to the deeds. The court subsequently entered judgment declaring that the 1917 and 1918 deeds granted fee title in the property to the District’s predecessor.
II
[¶ 5] Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews argue the plain language of the right-of-way deeds from 1917 and 1918 unambiguously show an intent to convey easements for a right of way and not fee simple. They further contend that if this Cоurt decides the deeds are ambiguous, the district court’s interpretation of the parol evidence is clearly erroneous.
A
[¶ 6] We interpret deeds in the same manner as contracts. N.D.C.C. § 47-09-11. In construing a deed, the primary purpose is to ascertain and effectuate the grantor’s intent. EOG Res., Inc. v. Soo Line R.R. Co.,
[¶7] When a deed is ambiguous, the district court may consider extrinsic evidence to decide the parties’ intent. EOG Res.,
B
[¶ 8] The Mathеws assert that numerous courts have held right-of-way deeds similar to the two deeds in this case conveyed easements. See, e.g., Midland Valley R. Co. v. Jarvis,
[¶ 9]. The Mathews contend the deeds are intеgrated documents and missing plats do not inject ambiguity into the type of interest conveyed by the deeds. They argue the parties’ intent is further shown by the eminent domain statute available to the Water District in 1918, whiсh would have only allowed for an easement. N.D. Comp. Laws § 8204 (1913). They argue, in the alternative, that if the deeds are ambiguous, the district court’s interpretation of parol evidence is clearly erroneous because the record does not support the court’s factual finding that Sargent County only removes acres deeded in fee from the tax rolls and the court did not account for high inflation that occurred from 1914 to 1918 when it compared sales of nearby land in fee.
[¶ 10] In the cоntext of railroad rights of way, this Court addressed the issue of whether purported right-of-way deeds conveyed an easement or an estate in fee in EOG Res.,
“[T]he specific language of the granting clause of the deed controls the interests the grantor purported to give the grantee.” Waldock v. Amber Harvest Corp.,2012 ND 180 , ¶ 10,820 N.W.2d 755 . A deed that conveys a strip, pieсe, parcel, or tract of land' generally indi- = cates an intent to convey a fee simple title. See, e.g., Bockelman v. MCI Worldcom, Inc.,403 F.3d 528 , 532 (8th Cir.2005); Elton Schmidt & Sons Farm, Co. v. Kneib [2 Neb.App. 12 ],507 N.W.2d 305 , 307 (Neb.Ct.App.1993); see also 65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads § 45 (2015). A deed that conveys a “right” or “right of way” generally indicates an ’ intent' to convey an easement. See Bockelman, at 531—32; Haggart v. United States,108 Fed.Cl. 70 , 87 (2012) (applying Washington law); see also Riverwood Commercial Park, LLC v. Standard Oil Co., Inc.,2005 ND 118 , ¶¶ 10-11,698 N.W.2d 478 (easements grant a right or permission to use or control lаnd for a specific, limited purpose); 65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads § 45 (2015). A deed that limits the use of the parcel to railroad purposes also indicates an intent to convey an easement. Bockelman, at 531-32; Schmitt v. United States,203 F.R.D. 387 , 399 (S.D.Ind.2001). “As a general rule, conveyances to railroads that purport to grant and convey a strip, piece, parcel, or tract of ‘land,’ and dо not contain additional language relating to the use or purpose to which the land is to be put, or in other ways cut down or limit, directly or indirectly, the estate сonveyed, are usually construed as passing an estate in fee.” 65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads § 45 (2015).
EOG Res., at ¶ 24. Regarding use of the phrase “right of way,” the Court further explained:
*612 When the phrase [right of way] is inсluded in the granting clause limiting the estate conveyed or specifying the purpose of the grant, courts have often held the use of the language supports finding an easement was conveyed. However, when the phrase is included only in the title or caption of the deed, courts have generally held it is not a significant fаctor in determining whether the deed conveys an easement or a fee simple interest. Moreover, this Court has said when there is a conflict between prоvisions of a deed, the specific provision qualifies the general provision, and a caption on a deed is of no effect where the conveyаnce is clear.
EOG Res., at ¶ 29 (citations and quotation marks omitted). See also N.D.C.C. § 47-10-13 (“A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a grant of real property unless it appears from the grant that a lesser estatе was intended.” (emphasis added)); N.D. Comp. Laws § 5527 (1913).
[¶ 11] In this case, the 1917 and 1918 deeds are captioned “right of way” deeds and state, in relevant part, that the property оwners:
grant, sell and convey, and forever release to the people of the County of Sargent, in the State of North Dakota, right of way for the laying out, construction and maintenance of a public drain, as the same may be located by the Board of Drain Commissioners, through said above described lands, being a strip of land ... [described]. And we hereby release all claims to damages by reason of the laying out, construction and maintenance thereof through our said lands.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶ 12] Although the District argues that the deeds are ambiguous and the district court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous when it found parol evidence showed the intent was to convey a fee simple interest, based on the Court’s deсision in EOG Res.,
[¶ 13] We conclude as a matter of law that the district сourt erred in holding an ambiguity existed in the right-of-way deeds and conclude the deeds plainly establish the intent to convey only an easement “through” the described property.
Ill
[¶ 14] The district court judgment is reversed.