Theodore Sarantis appeals from the grant of summary judgment to The Kroger Company and Jim Strong & Associates, Inc. (“Strong”) on his claims against them for injuries he allegedly received after a floor cleaning machine, owned and operated by Strong, backfired while Sarantis was shopping in a Kroger store. Sarantis alleges that he was so scared by the loud noise that it affected his heart permanently.
Kroger’s motion for summary judgment contended it was not liable because Strong was an independent contractor and because Kroger was not negligent since it had no knowledge the machine would backfire. Strong’s motion contended it also was not negligent because the machine was maintained and operated properly and the machine had never backfired before and it had no reason to know the machine would backfire.
Sarantis’ response to the motions for summary judgment asserted that the defendants were liable on grounds that Kroger was aware this machine would backfire because Kroger employees told him they would pay for his medical expenses and another employee told him the machine had backfired before. Held:
Pretermitting Kroger’s independent contractor argument, it is clear that the trial court did not err by granting the motion for summary judgment because neither defendant is liable to Sarantis as a matter of law. Neither Kroger nor Strong was an insurer of Sarantis’ safety, and they did not become so merely because a piece of equipment backfired while he was shopping. See
Kenny v. M & M Supermarket,
Although Sarantis attempted to rebut the defendants’ defenses by stating in his affidavit that weeks after the incident a Kroger em
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ployee told him the machine had backfired before and that another employee stated Kroger would pay for his expenses; no affidavits from those employees were attached and these statements are mere hearsay which has no probative value and cannot be considered in summary judgment proceedings
(Strickland v. DeKalb Hosp. Auth.,
Accordingly, Sarantis did not respond adequately to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and even affording him the benefits granted in our law as the respondent to a motion for summary judgment (see OCGA § 9-11-56 (c);
Moore v. Goldome Credit Corp.,
Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting the motion for summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
