SARAH LYNN NORTLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v DENNIS HURST, DENNIS HURST & ASSOCIATES, and MICHAEL ROSENTHAL, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 333240
STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
October 10, 2017
FOR PUBLICATION; Jackson Circuit Court; LC No. 16-000110-NM
O‘CONNELL, J.
Plaintiff, Sarah Lynn Nortley, appeals as of right the trial court‘s grant of defendants’ motion for summary disposition pursuant to
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Nortley retained Dennis Hurst, of the law firm Dennis Hurst & Associates, in August 2008 to represent her in a divorce proceeding. The judgment of divorce, entered on June 12, 2009, contained a provision terminating representation 21 days after the date of entry of the judgment.
The divorce became final 11 days before the tenth anniversаry of the marriage. A person can claim social security benefits through a former spouse if the marriage lasted ten years or more.1 Nortley alleged thаt she learned about this rule on September 5, 2015, during a conversation with her mother.
Nortley brought a legal malpractice claim against defendants on January 15, 2016. Nоrtley contended that defendants failed to advise her that social security benefits were only available to a former spouse if the marriage lasted tеn years or more.
Defendants Hurst and the law firm denied the allegations of malpractice, maintaining that they fully advised Nortley about all aspects of the divorce. Defendant Michael Rosenthal answered separately to deny the allegations because he only attended one court hearing on behalf of Hurst and did not participate in advising Nortley about the divorce.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a trial court‘s decision to grant summary disposition. Nuculovic v Hill, 287 Mich App 58, 61; 783 NW2d 124 (2010). This Court also reviews de novo the trial court‘s aрplication of a statute of limitations, Stephens v Worden Ins Agency, LLC, 307 Mich App 220, 227; 859 NW2d 723 (2014), and the constitutionality of a statute, Stevenson v Reese, 239 Mich App 513, 516; 609 NW2d 195 (2000).
Summary disposition under
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the Legislature‘s intent by applying the plain language of the statute. Klooster v City of Charlevoix, 488 Mich 289, 296; 795 NW2d 578 (2011). If the statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written. USAA Ins Co v Houston Gen Ins Co, 220 Mich App 386; 389; 559 NW2d 98 (1996). Otherwise, if the statute is ambiguоus, “judicial construction is appropriate.” Id. at 389-390. This Court construes statutes of limitations and repose to promote the policy of protecting defendants from stale claims. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998).
III. ANALYSIS
A professional malpractice claim accrues when the professional stops serving the plaintiff in a professional caрacity on the matter giving rise to the claim.
In this case, the claim accrued on July 3, 2009, when defendants’ representation ceased 21 days after entry of the judgment of divorce. Nortley filed her complaint on January 15, 2016, beyond both the two-year period of limitations and the six-year period of repose. Nortley argues that the statute of repose does not apply retroactively to bar her claim because the Legislature enacted it after the claim accrued and did not provide for retroactive application. Accordingly, Nortley contends, the complaint was timely because she filed it within six months of discovering thе existence of the claim. We disagree.
Legislative intent governs whether a statute applies retroactively or prospectively only. Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich 578, 583; 624 NW2d 180 (2001). Generally, a new or amended statute applies prospectively unless the Legislature clearly and unequivocally intends for the statute to have retroactive effect. Davis v State Employees’ Retirement Bd, 272 Mich App 151, 155-156; 725 NW2d 56 (2006). Reference to events that have already occurred does not require retroactive application. Id. at 156. An exception to the gеneral rule presuming prospective application only is a statute that is remedial or procedural in nature and whose prospective application will not deny vested rights. Id. at 158.
The enactment of the statute of repose did not deny a vested right. Nortley‘s legal malpractice claim accrued in July 2009. Whеn the statute of repose went into effect on January 2, 2013, Nortley still had more than two years to bring a timely claim within the six-year period of repose. Thus, the amended legislation did not prevent Nortley from filing a timely claim. This circumstance distinguishes this case from cases examining the immediately preclusive effect of a nеwly-enacted statute of limitations. See, e.g., Davis, 272 Mich App at 166 (noting that a new one-year deadline immediately precluded the plaintiff‘s claim). Accordingly, we apply the statute of repose as written to Nortley‘s then-viable claim to conclude that her complaint was untimely.
Nortley‘s discovery of the claim after the six-year stаtute of repose does not alter this conclusion. Unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose bars a claim after a fixed period of time frоm the defendant‘s act or omission and may prevent accrual of a claim even if the injury happens after the statutory period has expired. Frank v Linkner, 500 Mich 133, 142; 894 NW2d 574 (2017). The statute setting the deadlines for bringing a legal malpractice claim makes clear that the six-year period of repose caps the time for bringing a claim within six mоnths of discovery. See
We also reject Nortley‘s argument that retroactive application of the statute of repose to bar her claim violates due process. A statute comports with due process if it “bears a reasоnable relation to a permissible legislative objective.” Trentadue v Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co, 479 Mich 378, 404; 738 NW2d 664 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Nortley relies on Price v Hopkin, 13 Mich 318 (1865), and O‘Brien v Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich 1; 299 NW2d 336 (1980), to support her argument. In Price, 13 Mich at 322-323, 326,
Likewise, in this case, the statute of repose reflects the reasonable legislative purpose of protecting professionals from stale claims. See Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co, 456 Mich at 515. Moreover, unlike Price, 13 Mich at 326, enactment of the six-year period of repose did not immediately extinguish Nortley‘s claim. Thus, application of the statute of rеpose to Nortley‘s claim did not violate due process.
We affirm.
/s/ Peter D. O‘Connell
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Colleen A. O‘Brien