Santos v. HolderSantos v. Holder
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Gregory K. Frizzell, Lucero, Ebel
ORDER AND JUDGMENT***
GREGORY K. FRIZZELL, District Judge.
Petitioners Hector Agustin Santos, Gloria Corina Mazariegos Alvarado, and Joselin Jesenia Santos Mazariegos seek review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA“) denying their motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction, and we deny the petition for review.
I. Background
Hector Agustin Santos and Gloria Corina Mazariegos Alvarado (“the Santoses“) are natives and citizens of Guatemala. Hector Santos entered the United States without inspection in 1988; in 1992, he left the country, returned to Guatemala to marry, and re-entered the United States. Hector‘s wife, Gloria, and their daughter, Joselin, entered the country in 1994.1 The
In 2005, the Santoses were issued a Notice to Appear before an Immigration Judge (“IJ“). The Santoses retained an accredited representative to assist them in the proceedings before the IJ. The representative filed applications for cancellation of removal on the Santoses’ behalf.2 After a hearing held on November 16, 2005, the IJ concluded that the Santoses had failed to establish that their two United States citizen children would suffer exceptional or extremely unusual hardship as a result of the Santoses’ removal from the United States. Accordingly, the IJ denied the
Prior to the expiration of the voluntary departure period, petitioners obtained new counsel and filed a motion to reopen their case with the BIA. Petitioners claimed their case should be reopened because their previous representative had failed to call witnesses and present evidence that would have established the level of hardship necessary to support a grant of cancellation of removal.3 They further claimed their case should be reopened on the basis of new evidence that, since the deportation order was entered, Carina had experienced psychological distress and anxiety attacks. Petitioners also filed a motion for stay of deportation and extension of voluntary departure, as well as a motion to expedite either of the two motions before the BIA.
The BIA denied petitioners’ motion to reopen. It concluded that petitioners had failed to demonstrate they had suffered any prejudice as a result of their representative‘s actions. Specifically, the BIA determined that the evidence the representative allegedly failed to introduce would not have had an effect on the outcome of the proceedings. The BIA held that “the respondents would have been unable to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to ... qualifying relatives irrespective of whether their former representative had presented the additional evidence that [was] submitted with their motion to reopen.” A.R. at 3. The BIA further concluded that petitioners had failed to demonstrate that their case should be reopened in light of newly discovered evidence. The BIA did not rule on petitioners’ motion for stay of deportation and extension of voluntary departure. Petitioners timely filed this appeal, and this court subsequently granted petitioners’ unopposed emergency motion for stay of removal pending consideration of their petition for review.
II. Discussion
A. Jurisdictional Analysis
We first address the Government‘s jurisdictional argument. The Government asserts we have no jurisdiction to determine whether the omissions of petitioners’ former representative could have altered the outcome of the case because the ultimate hardship determination is a “discretionary determination” and “purely a judgment call on the part of the Board.” See Respondent‘s Br. 18-20 (citing
As we previously have recognized,
B. The Santoses’ Claims
The Santoses raise three issues on appeal: First, they assert that the BIA ap
1. The Ineffective-Assistance Claim
We turn first to the Santoses’ claim that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review when it denied their motion to reopen proceedings based on alleged ineffective assistance. “We review the BIA‘s decision on a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. The BIA abuses its discretion when its decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements.” Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th Cir.2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see Mickeviciute v. INS, 327 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir.2003).
Although there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in civil deportation proceedings, “the Fifth Amendment guarantees aliens subject to deportation the right to a fundamentally fair deportation proceeding.” Osei, 305 F.3d at 1208; see Akinwunmi v. INS, 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 n. 2 (10th Cir.1999) (per curiam). Thus, a petitioner‘s claim that his counsel was ineffective may implicate the Fifth Amendment if the petitioner can show that “his counsel‘s ineffective assistance so prejudiced him that the proceeding was fundamentally unfair.” Akinwunmi, 194 F.3d at 1341 n. 2 (citation omitted).
The Santoses claim the BIA abused its discretion by applying an improper standard when assessing the impact of their representative‘s conduct. According to the Santoses, the BIA‘s ruling was based on its determination that “the [additional] evidence did not establish that any hardship the qualifying relative may face upon their parents’ removal to Guatemala would rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual.” Petitioners’ Br. 21. The Santoses assert that, by basing its ruling on that determination, the BIA impermissibly required them to establish that a qualified relative would suffer from exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if they were deported. The Santoses maintain that they were not required to meet this strict standard in order to prevail on their motion to reopen; instead, they submit, they were required to demonstrate only that their representative‘s deficient performance may have impacted the outcome of the proceedings. See Petitioners’ Br. 18 (quoting Godinez v. Keisler, 249 Fed.Appx. 555, 557 (9th Cir.2007) (unpublished)). The Santoses submit that their motion to reopen would have been granted under this more lenient standard, as the outcome of the proceedings may have differed had their representative introduced the medical reports pertaining to the Santos children‘s health issues, the letters discussing the educational hardship that the Santos children would face if they were to leave the United States, and the Country Conditions Report on Guatemala.
This court has not adopted the rule that, to establish prejudice, the petitioner “need only demonstrate that the deficient performance by counsel may have affected the outcome of proceedings,” Godinez, 249 Fed.Appx. at 557 (emphasis added), and we decline to do so now. Contrary to the Santoses’ assertions, a petitioner claiming
We conclude that the BIA applied the appropriate standard of review in analyzing whether the Santoses were prejudiced by their representative‘s deficient performance. Although the BIA did not discuss the “reasonable likelihood” standard in its opinion, it nevertheless evaluated the evidence that the Santoses’ representative failed to introduce and concluded that, even if the representative had introduced that evidence, the Santoses would have been unable to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. A.R. at 3. In short, the BIA found that there was no reasonable likelihood that the representative‘s deficient performance affected the outcome of the proceedings. Accordingly, it concluded that the Santoses were not prejudiced by their counsel‘s failure to introduce the additional evidence. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in reaching this conclusion. Cf. Lopez, 313 Fed.Appx. at 101-02 (holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the petitioner “failed to show prejudice ... because even if [his] representative had raised crosschargeability, it would not have altered the outcome of his case as [the petitioner] was ineligible for crosschargeability“).
2. Whether the Motion to Reopen Automatically Tolled the Voluntary Departure Period
We now turn to the Santoses’ assertion that the voluntary departure period should have been tolled automatically when they filed their motion to reopen proceedings.6 The Santoses point out that, if an alien who has been granted voluntary departure remains in the country after his departure date, he will be subject to civil penalties. See
At the time this case was argued, the circuits were divided over the appropriate means of dealing with an alien who had filed a motion to reopen prior to his voluntary departure date, but whose case had not been, or could not be, decided by the expiration of the voluntary departure period.7 The Supreme Court has since resolved the circuit split, finding no statutory authority for the proposition that the voluntary departure period should be tolled automatically during the pendency of a motion to reopen. Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 128 S.Ct. 2307, 2318-19, 171 L.Ed.2d 178 (2008). In light of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Dada, we must reject the Santoses’ argument that their departure date should have been tolled automatically. As the Supreme Court has indicated, the appropriate means of remedying the dilemma faced by an alien who has been granted voluntary departure but who seeks to reopen his case is to permit that alien to file a motion to withdraw his voluntary departure request. Id. at 2319-20.
3. The Motion for Stay of Removal and Extension of Voluntary Departure
We turn next to the Santoses’ claim that the BIA erred by failing to rule on the Santoses’ motion for stay of deportation and extension of voluntary departure. The Santoses ask this court to remand this case to the BIA so that it may rule on that motion.
We conclude that it is unnecessary to remand this case to the BIA. To the extent the Santoses claim the BIA erred by failing to rule on their motion for a stay of removal, that claim became moot when this court granted petitioners’ unopposed motion for stay of removal. To the extent the Santoses claim the BIA erred in failing to rule on their motion for an extension of voluntary departure, we conclude that it would be futile to remand this case to the BIA because the BIA lacks authority to grant such an extension. According to the Code of Federal Regulations, the authority to extend time for voluntary departure rests exclusively with the district director for the Department of Homeland Security, the Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal, and the Director of the Office of Juvenile Affairs.
III. Conclusion
In sum, we hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Santoses’ motion to reopen the proceedings. Furthermore, we reject the Santoses’ claim that their voluntary departure period should have been tolled automatically during the pendency of their motion to reopen. We conclude that it is unnecessary to remand this case to the BIA, as the BIA is without authority to grant the Santoses’ motion for extension of voluntary departure. Accordingly, we DENY the petition for review and lift the stay of removal previously entered.
Notes
- [the alien] has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application;
- [the alien] has been a person of good moral character during such period;
- [the alien] has not been convicted of an offense under
section 1182(a)(2) ,1227(a)(2) , or1227(a)(3) of this title (except in a case described insection 1227(a)(7) of this title where the Attorney General exercises discretion to grant a waiver); and - [the alien] establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien‘s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.