Aрpellant Warren Schulthess seeks review of an order requiring him to pay damages to Respondents Peter Santoro and Mary Santoro for trespass and for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations. Schulthess also appeals the requirements that he lower the level of his pond and remove a motor home from his property. We reverse.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2002, Schulthess, a Columbia resident, purchased a pond (North Lake) and an adjoining triangular, unimproved parcel in Orangeburg County. At that time, the level of the pond was very low because its spillway had been leaking. Whenever he visited the pond to perform maintenance or make repairs to the spillway, Schulthess took his motor home and parked it on his adjoining triangular lot.
North Lake is surrounded by several residential lots in the Country Oaks subdivision, including three lots owned by the Santoros since 1993 (lots 1 through 3 in block “K” of the
In June 2002, the Santoros placed their home and the three lots on the market so they could move to Arizona. The Santoros’ realtor, Century 21/The Moore Group (Century 21), listed their house and three lots for $319,000. When Schulthess discovered the realtor’s sign on the Santoros’ property, he visited a formеr colleague who worked for Century 21 to inquire about the Santoros’ asking price. When he saw a copy of the real estate listing, he noticed that it represented the Santoros’ property as extending ten feet into North Lake. In late June 2002, Schulthess wrote a letter to the Santoros’ agent at Century 21 and copied the Santoros with the letter.
Schulthess’s letter expressed disagreement with the representation that the Santoros’ property extended ten feet into his pond and stated that the property line between the pond and many of the abutting properties was determined by the pond’s high water level. The letter also stated that Schulthess had given permission to abutting owners to use the pond, but expressed concern about any prospective purchasers of the Santoros’ property being given the wrong impression that the Santoros could convey any formal littoral rights to them. 2 Schulthess requested the agent to revise the listing so that the Santoros’ property was not being advertised as “waterfront.” Schulthess also stated that there was a structure on one of the Santoros’ lots that encroached upon the pond.
The Santoros later engaged the Tatum Company to list their property for $298,500. On July 15, 2003, Schulthess wrote a letter to the Santoros’ agent at the Tatum Company advising her that he owned the pond, that the Santoros’ property only extended to the pond’s edge, and that he had a five-foot easement around the pond’s edge. Schulthess further stated that he understood that littoral rights applied only to natural waterways and not to private impoundments such as his pond. He suggested that the agent “legally qualify this matter” before offering fishing rights or access to the pond. He stated that he believed that those rights could only be conveyed by him. According to Mary Santoro, when the real estate agent showed the property to prospective buyers, “[W]e had to tell them that we could not pass thе water rights on, [and] that they would have to get permission from [Schulthess].”
Sometime during the latter half of 2003, Schulthess placed a temporary stopper in the pond’s leaking spillway. On November 24, 2003, South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) sent a letter to Schulthess after receiving complaints from the Santoros about the pond flooding their land. DHEC instructed Schulthess to return the spillway to normal operation within thirty days. DHEC also indicated that it was unsafe to rely on the emergency spillway to be the only spillway on the North Lake dam. The letter also stated that replacing the flashboards on the spillway would not require a permit from DHEC. Schulthess noted that in a telephone call about the letter, a DHEC representative instructed him to remove the temporary stopper in its entirety, which Schulthess removed thrеe days after receiving DHEC’s letter.
In Spring 2004, Schulthess repaired the spillway. According to Mary Santoro, she saw Schulthess adding concrete to the spillway and she believed that the concrete addition raised the spillway’s height. However, according to another abutting owner and Schulthess, the spillway was never raised and the concrete addition merely closed up а hole in the spillway.
Mary Santoro telephoned some contractors to obtain verbal estimates on the cost of supplies for filling in eroded land, building a retaining wall to prevent further erosion, and adding new topsoil and sod. Based on those phone calls, she understood the cost to be approximately $25,000.
After a trial on the Santoros’ claims, the master issued an order concluding that a deed in Schulthess’s chain of title made his triangular lot subject to a provision of the subdivision’s restrictive covenants prohibiting house trailers and other temporary structures. 3 The master also concluded that Schulthess was liable to the Santoros on all of their claims. The master ordered Schulthess to pay damages to the Santoros in the amount of $108,000, 4 to lower the level of the pond, and to remove his motor home frоm his triangular lot. This appeal followed.
1. Did the evidence support the Santoros’ cause of action for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations?
2. Did the evidence support the Santoros’ cause of action for trespass?
3. Did the master err in concluding that Schulthess’s triangular lot was subject to the restrictive covenants of the Country Oaks subdivision?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On direct appeal from a final judgment of a master-inequity, the scope of review is the same as that for review of a case heard by a circuit court without a jury.
Tiger, Inc. v. Fisher Agro, Inc.,
When legal and equitable causes of action are maintained in one suit, the court is presented with a divided scope of review. On appeal from an action at law that was tried without a jury, the appellate court can correct errors of law, but the findings of fact will not be disturbed unless found to be without evidence which reasonably supports the judge’s findings. In an equitable action tried without a jury, the appellate court can correct errors of law and may find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence.
Blackmon v. Weaver,
A tort action for damages is an action at law.
Longshore v. Saber Sec. Servs., Inc.,
The pleadings and evidence indicate that the Santoros’ primary purpose in asserting their trespass claim was to require Schulthess to remove the pond’s waters from the disputed location to enable them to fill in the eroded land and tо add a retaining wall, topsoil, and sod. Because their primary purpose in asserting the trespass claim was to obtain injunctive relief, the claim is equitable in nature.
5
Therefore,
The Santoros’ remaining claim seeks an injunction to enforce their subdivision’s restrictive covenants. Thus, this claim also sounds in equity.
See S.C. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Town of McClellanville,
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Intentional Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations
Schulthess argues that the Santoros failed to present sufficient evidence to establish their cause of action for intentional 'interference with prospective contractual relations and that the master erred in concluding otherwise. We agree.
To recover on a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, the plaintiff
1. Interference
First, Schulthess is not a stranger to any relationship that the Santoros would have with a prospective buyer because any littoral rights or privileges that the prospective buyer could expect would depend on Schulthess’s rights as the pond owner.
6
Schulthess would play an essential role in the designation of any rights or privileges that future abutting owners have in the pond. Therefore, it is doubtful that the actions of Schulthess could conceptually fall within the scope of the term “interference.”
Cf. Renden, Inc. v. Liberty Real Estate Ltd. P’ship III,
Schulthess argues that the Santoros failed to establish any prospective contractual relations because they did not present evidence of any specific prospective buyer who was “chilled” by Schulthess’s letters or who would have purchased the Santoros’ property but for Schulthess’s claims. We agree.
This Court explained the phrase “prospective contractual relations” in
United Educ. Distrib., LLC v. Educ. Testing Serv.,
This Court stated that a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations “generally stands following the loss of an identifiable contract or expectation.”
Id.
at 14,
Here, Mary Santoro testified that a few people looked at their property. However, she did not testify as to any specific prospective purchaser who would have made an offer on the property but for the existence of the claims that Schulthess asserted in his letters to the realtors. Rather, she spoke in generalities:
Q. Did you ever have to reveal to anyone the contentions made by Mr. Schulthess?
A. Yes. When Tatum showed the house on the second contract that I had a year later, they showed the property to a person who was interested in the property. When they look at our house, they always ask questions about the water, if they have water rights, аll that type of thing, how much — what kind of fish are in it, what kind of boat they can put on it, and that kind of thing. So at that point, we had to tell them that we could not pass the water rights on, that they would have to get permission from the new owner.
Q. Did you ever have any buyer come forward and sign a contract and say they want to buy the property?
A. No. Because when they asked the question about the lake and I can’t give them water rights, people who want the lake are not going to make the contract. It discourages them because they want — they come to look at the house because it’s on the lake, generally.
This testimony points to no identifiable prospective buyer who considered the perceived lack of water rights to be the sole deal-breaker, and, therefore, the Santoros presented insufficient evidence that an identifiable third party was influenced by Schulthess’s communications with the Santoros’ realtors.
See Walker v. Sloan,
Furthermore, the master concluded that it was “more likely than not” that the Santoros’ property would have been sold within six months at the listing price had they not been required to disclose the claims in Schulthess’s letters. The
3. Improper Purpose or Method
Schulthess argues that he cоuld not be found liable for intentional interference because he was merely asserting his property rights. We agree.
We find no evidence in the record to suggest any purpose or motive by Schulthess other than the pursuit of his own legal rights. “Generally, there can be no finding of intentional interference with prospective contractual relations if there is no evidence to suggest any purpose or motive by the defendant other than the proper pursuit of [his or her] own contractual rights with a third party.”
Eldeco, Inc. v. Charleston County Sch. Dist.,
Here, Schulthess had a bona fide right to express concern about the statements in the realtor listings. There is insufficient evidence in the record that the abutting owners had any legal rights in the pond as opposed to revocable permission informally given by Schulthess and previous owners of the pond.
8
The Santoros intrоduced only a 1976 letter authored by the son of the developer’s principal that described abutting
Moreover, even if some of the legal claims in Schulthess’s letters were inaccurate, there is no evidence to support the master’s implicit finding that Schulthess knew that the claims were inaccurate when he made them. 9 Additionally, the master made no conclusion that Schulthess should have known of any inaccuracies or should have consulted with legal counsel before sending the letters.
There is no evidence in the record to suggest any purpose or motive by Schulthess other than the pursuit of his own legal rights. Additionally, nothing in the record supports the master’s conclusion that Schulthess used an improper method to pursue his rights. 10 The fact that the Santoros’ realtor was obligated to reveal to prospective buyers the claims in Schulthess’s letters did not make it improper for Schulthess to send the letters to the realtors.
Based on the foregoing, the master erred in concluding that Schulthess intentionally interfered with any potential contractual relations of the Santoros for an improper purpose or by an improper method.
See Eldeco, Inc.,
4. Damages
Schulthess argues that there was insufficient evidence of damages resulting from his letters to the Santoros’ realtors to sustain a claim for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations. We agree.
“The trial judge has considerable discretion regarding the amount of damages, both actual or punitive.”
Austin v. Specialty Transp. Servs., Inc.,
Here, the master found that Mary Santoro’s testimony on the increase in mortgage rates sufficiently supported the Santoros’ claim for damages:
I find that the mortgage rate increase and damages flowing from that increase are not speculative. ' The Plaintiff testified that the mortgage interest rate was up [two percent] and that over the life of a loan for thirty (30) years the additional costs will be $78,000. Both of these are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See 5.C.R. Evid. 201 C. [sic] I find that the damages from the intentional interference which [sic] prospective contracted [sic] relations are $78,000.00.
II. Trespass
Schulthess argues that the evidence does not support the Santoros’ trespass cause of action and that the master erred in awarding damages and ordering an injunction for this claim. We agree.
For a trespass action to lie, the act must be affirmative, the invasion of the land must be intentional, and the claimed harm must be the direct result of that invasion.
Hawkins v. City of Greenville,
Here, the Santoros claim that Schulthess’s actions of temporarily stopping up the pond’s spillway and subsequently permanently repairing the spillway rеsulted in an invasion of their land causing permanent damage. We find insufficient evidence in the record to support this claim. The Santoros presented no reliable evidence of permanent damage directly resulting from the three days of flooding caused by the placement of the temporary stopper in the spillway. As to Schulthess’s permanent repair of the spillway, there was insufficient evidence of a resulting invasion of the Santoros’ land as is required to grant relief for trespass.
However, the master’s award of injunctive relief as well as $25,000 in damages for this fleeting trespass is not supported by the evidence. The Santoros failed to present reliable evidence that any permanent damage directly resulted from the three days of flooding. Although counsel for Schulthess questioned Mary Santoro about the allegation in her complaint that the value of her land had diminished, she did not give any opinion as to any amount of diminution in the property’s value. In fact, she indicated that there was no significant change in the value of her land from 2002 to the date of trial. Further, the evidence shows that the Santoros contributed to the erosion of which they complained by neglecting to control the effect of rainfall on the downward slope of their land and by cutting down several trees and burning vegetation. Therefore, we find no evidence of permanent damage directly resulting from Schulthess’s temporary trespass.
As to Schulthess’s permanent repair of the spillway, we find no resulting invasion of the Santoros’ land, which is required to grant relief for trespass.
See Hawkins,
In any event, the evidеnce of damages that the Santoros claim resulted from the spillway’s repair was not reliable because the contractors from whom Mary Santoro obtained supply cost estimates did not view the property in question, and they were not available at trial for questioning.
See Whisenant,
Based on the foregoing, the master erred in awarding injunctive relief and damages to the Santoros on their trespass claim.
III. Restrictive Covenants
As to the Santoros’ cause of action to enforce their subdivision’s restrictive covenants, Schulthess argues that his triangular lot is not subject to the restrictive covenants, which prohibits house trailers and other temporary structures. We agree.
The master conceded that the subdivision’s restrictive covenants as originally filed did not apply to Schulthess’s triangular lot because it was not one of the specifically enumerated lots listed as being covered by the covenants. However, the master concluded that the language in a deed in
In construing a deed, “the intention of the grantor must be ascertained and effectuated, unless that intention contravenеs some well settled rule of law or public policy.” “In determining the grantor’s intent, the deed must be construed as a whole and effect given to every part if it can be done consistently with the law.” “The intention of the grantor must be found within the four corners of the deed.”
Windham v. Riddle,
The court may not limit a restriction in a deed, nor, on the other hand, will a restriction be enlarged or extended by construction or implication beyond the clear meaning of its terms even to accomplish what it may be thought the parties would have desired had a situation which later developed been foreseen by them at the time when the restriction was written. It is still the settled rule in this jurisdiсtion that restrictions as to the use of real estate should be strictly construed and all doubts resolved in favor of free use of the property, subject, however, to the provision that this rule of strict construction should not be applied so as to defeat the plain and obvious purpose of the instrument. It follows, of course, that where the language of the restrictions is equally capable of two or more different constructions that construction will be adopted which least restricts the use of the property. A restriction on the use of property must be created in express terms or by plain and unmistakable implication, and all such restrictions are to be strictly construed, with all doubts resolved in favor of the free use of property.
Id.
(emphasis in original) (quoting
Taylor v. Lindsey,
If this Court decides that the language in a deed is ambiguous, the determination of the grantor’s intent then becomes a question of fact.
See McClellanville,
The deed in question evidences four separate conveyances of property to W.M. Harvey, IV. A clause immediately following the third listed property description (for Lot 23 in Block “S” in the subdivision) states,
This conveyance is made subject to restrictive covenants and conditions as are contained in an Agreement datedApril 22, 1974 of record in the office of the REM for Orangeburg County in Deed Book 395, at Page 573.
TMS# 0137-00-10-016
(emphasis added). In stark contrast, the other three property descriptions in the deed, including the description of Schulthess’s triangular lot, did not have any similar language following them; each description was merely followed by a tax map number.
Contrary to the master’s implicit interpretation of the deed, the plain meaning of the term “conveyance” — the way it is most commonly used and understood — is the actual transfer of the property itself rather than the deed evidencing the transfer. See Black’s Law Dictionary 357-58 (8th ed.2004) (defining “conveyance” in the following descending order: “1. The voluntary transfer of a right or of property ... 2. The transfer of a property right that does not pass by delivery of a thing or merely by agreement. 3. The transfer of an interest in real property from one living person to another, by means of an instrument such as a deed. 4. The document ([usually] a deed) by which such a transfer occurs.”). Hence, a deed evidencing the transfer of multiple parcels does not constitute a single “conveyance” as that term is commonly used and understood.
Therefore, the plain meaning of the deed’s language regarding restrictive covenants is that the transfer of the property described in the immediately preceding paragraph (i.e., “Lot #23”, Block “S, on a plat of Oakmont Subdivision”), rather than all four parcels described in the deed, was subject to the restrictive covenants. If the grantor had intended to make the remaining parcels subject to the restrictive covenants, the plural form of the term “conveyance” would have been used and either the restrictive language would have followed the deed’s final property description or similar restrictive language would have immediately followed the property description of each parcel so that the application of the restrictive covenants to all four parcels would have been unmistakable.
See McClellanville,
Our conclusion that the grantor did not intend to subject Schulthess’s triangular lot to the restrictive covenants is consistent with the geography of the various parcels described in the deed. Only one of the four property descriptions was for a typical residential subdivision lоt (Lot # 23, Block “S”), and that description logically preceded the deed’s language regarding restrictive covenants. In contrast, two of the deed’s four property descriptions were for parcels that were not part of the subdivision — a parcel on Wannamaker Street in the City of Orangeburg and Schulthess’s triangular parcel. Moreover, another property description was for North Lake itself. Clearly, the geography of the North Lake parcel and the parcels located outside the subdivision make it highly improbable that the grantor intended to subject them to the subdivision’s restrictive covenants.
In sum, the language of the deed in question makes only one of its four conveyances subject to the subdivision’s restrictive covenants — that conveyance immediately preceding the language conсerning the restrictive covenants (Lot 23 of Block “S” in Oakmont). Therefore, the master erred in concluding that the restrictive covenants applied to Schulthess’s triangular parcel and in requiring him to remove his motor home from the property.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the master’s order is
REVERSED.
Notes
. The subdivision’s original name was ’’Oakmont Subdivision” but later changed to “Country Oaks.”
. Littoral rights are special rights allowing owners of land abutting oceans, seas, or lakes to make "reasonable use” of the body of water for any lawful purpose.
White’s Mill Colony, Inc. v. Williams,
. The original restrictive covenants were created in 1974. In 1990, the document was amended to allow for an increase in the allowable square footage of homes in the subdivision. In his order, the master conceded that the restrictive covenants as originally filed did not apply to Schulthess’s triangular lot because it was not one of the spеcifically enumerated lots listed as being covered by the covenants. Nevertheless, the master found that certain language in a deed conveying the triangular lot to Schulthess's predecessor-in-title subjected the lot to the subdivision's restrictive covenants.
. The master awarded $25,000 to the Santoros for the alleged trespass and $78,000 for the Santoros' claim for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations.
. We recognize that the ownership of the land on which the claimed trespass occurred was in dispute and that prior appellate opinions characterize actions involving trespass claims as legal when the defendant challenges the plaintiffs ownership of the land.
See Mountain Lake Colony v. McJunkin,
.
See White's Mill Colony, Inc.,
. In Renden, the Georgia Court of Appeals explained that under appropriate circumstances, a party can be a nonsigner of a particular contract and yet not be a stranger to the contract itself or to the underlying business relationship. Id. The court concluded that the defendant in that case was not a stranger to the business relationship at issue, but rather, as a lessor, was an essential entity in a prospective lessor/lessee/sublessee relationship. Id. Here, Schulthess would be an essential player in the designation of any rights or privileges that abutting owners would have in the pond.
.
See White's Mill Colony, Inc.,
. The master found that Schulthess "intentionally sent false claims to the realtor, knowing that the claim [sic] would have to be revealed.”
.
See Love v. Gamble,
. The Santoros' deed to lot 2 .corroborates Schulthess’s assertion that the northeast boundary for lot 2 is North Lake itself. Lot 2 does not have a ten-foot buffer separating it from the pond as do lots 1 and 3.
. As there is no evidence in the record to the contrary, we presume that the original subdivision plat was prepared when the pond's spillway was functioning properly and the water level was at "full pool.”
. "A contract is ambiguous when the terms of the contract are reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation.”
McClellanville,