Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
GIULIO A. SANTORIO,
Plaintiff, v. 1:24-cv-359 (AMN/ML) CARE.COM, INC. & IAC/INTERACTIVECORP,
Defendants. APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL: GIULIO A. SANTORIO
1248 Lowell Rd.
Schenectady, New York 12308
Plaintiff, pro se
MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, JOHN C. CARTER, ESQ.
GLOVSKY & POPEO, P.C.
919 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Attorneys for Defendants
Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 15, 2024, pro se Plaintiff Giulio Santorio commenced this action against Care.com, Inc. (“Care.com”) and IAC/InteractiveCorp [1] (“IAC” and collectively with Care.com, “Defendants”) pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) alleging various employment discrimination claims. See Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). On April 30, 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), see Dkt. No. 14, and on May 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint as a matter of course pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, which bolstered certain factual allegations and added a claim pursuant to the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). See Dkt. No. 19 (“Amended Complaint”). On June 20, 2024, Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss, tailored to the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint. See Dkt. No. 23 (“Motion”). On July 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Motion, see Dkt. No. 26, and on August 8, 2024, Defendants filed a reply in further support of the Motion, see Dkt. No. 29. [2] The Motion is now ripe for adjudication.
For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
II. BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint, its
attachments, or materials it incorporates by reference, and Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’
motion to dismiss.
See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.
,
A. The Parties
Plaintiff is a 57-year-old veteran and resident of Schenectady, New York who suffers from “severe hearing loss in both ears[] and diabetes.” Dkt. No. 19 at 3. [3] On January 18, 2022, Plaintiff was hired as the Senior Director of Global Talent Management in Defendant Care.com’s Human Resources department but was terminated on July 7, 2022. See id. ¶¶ 7, 14(a), 15(f)-(g), 25; see also Dkt. No. 26-1 at 14.
Defendant Care.com is a private company that operates an online marketplace for individuals to find and manage family care with a headquarters in Austin, Texas. See Dkt. No. 19 at ¶ 2. Care.com is a subsidiary of Defendant IAC. Id.
Defendant IAC is a public holding company that owns various businesses across the world with a headquarters in New York, New York. Id. at ¶ 3. IAC is the parent company of Defendant Care.com and is Care.com’s sole shareholder. ; see also Dkt. No. 26-1 at 12.
B. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff is a 57-year-old “decorated and esteemed disabled veteran,” having previously served in the United States Army as an officer and aviator. Dkt. No. 19 at ¶ 10. Prior to beginning with Defendant Care.com, Plaintiff was employed by Amazon Web Services in a human resources role. See id. at ¶ 10 (Plaintiff is “renowned for executing over 7000 hires annually at Amazon”).
In December 2021, Plaintiff was solicited by Defendant Care.com to fill the role of Care.com’s Senior Director of Global Talent Management. id. at ¶ 10. Following this solicitation, Plaintiff submitted hiring documents and gave verbal notifications to Care.com regarding his hearing loss and diabetes, which Care.com’s Senior Director of Human Resources “acknowledged.” Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff ultimately accepted and began working in Care.com’s “New York-based remote office” on January 18, 2022. See id. at ¶ 14(a)-(b).
The Amended Complaint alleges that, as soon as he started with Care.com, Plaintiff was “met with a culture of blatant disrespect and rampant unprofessionalism, epitomized by the Defendant’s executives’ habitual use of profanity and discriminatory remarks.” Id. at ¶ 14(b).
Specifically, in March 2022, Plaintiff alleges that he conducted “an exhaustive investigation” into Care.com’s decision to discharge a newly hired 54-year-old African American colleague, wherein Plaintiff was confronted with obstruction and “outright rejection from senior HR officials.” Id. at ¶ 15(b); see also Dkt. No. 26-1 at 13. Also in March 2022, Plaintiff claims that he was on a call with Care.com executives wherein certain employees used profane language and yelled at Plaintiff, and during that discussion, Care.com’s Chief Executive Officer Tim Allen asked Plaintiff, “Are you going to fight back?” ; see also Dkt. No. 26-1 at 15.
Additionally, on May 3, 2022, Plaintiff reported an incident of discrimination based on alleged verbal abuse of a Hispanic female employee by a younger white male colleague. See id. at ¶ 15(a); see also Dkt. No. 26-1 at 14. The report was escalated to Care.com’s Senior Director of Human Resources and Plaintiff’s manager, and Plaintiff alleges that it was “met with a disheartening and persistent disregard” in violation of Care.com’s antidiscrimination policies. Id.
On May 6, 2022, Plaintiff states that he took issue with certain racially insensitive remarks that were made during a company-sponsored Cinco de Mayo event, and his concerns were similarly “met with indifference.” Id. at ¶ 15(c); see also Dkt. No. 26-1 at 14. While Plaintiff does not detail the nature of those remarks, he does claim that this incident “mark[ed] the beginning of documented retaliation.” Dkt. No. 26-1 at 14. [4]
On June 15, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a report via email to his manager regarding the behavior of Care.com’s Chief Financial Officer, who allegedly joined a video interview wearing a bath robe, asked one question to the candidate, and promptly ended the call. See id. at ¶ 15(e); see also Dkt. No. 19 Ex. D. The CFO’s behavior apparently led the candidate to file a complaint with his recruiter. See id. According to Plaintiff, the CFO declined to hire the candidate despite unanimous support from other interviewers. See id.
On July 7, 2022, Plaintiff alleges that he was “abrupt[ly]” terminated from Care.com, along with other senior employees who allegedly reported discrimination, which IAC apparently told Plaintiff was due to a “necessity of a reduction in force.” Id. at ¶ 15(f)-(g). Plaintiff claims that the close timing between the reports of discrimination and the terminations “constitute[] more than mere coincidence” and “raise[] serious concerns about the true motive behind the[] layoffs.” Id. Plaintiff also contends that the close timing between his reports and the layoffs, as well as IAC’s public filings detailing significant revenue increases, establish that Care.com’s financial justification for the layoffs was pretextual. See id. at ¶ 15(g); see also Dkt. No. 26-1 at 8.
On July 11, 2022, Plaintiff purportedly “attempted to resolve this matter with Care.com management” but received “no response.” Dkt. No. 19 at ¶ 9. Plaintiff subsequently filed a charge with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“E.E.O.C.”) and received a Right to Sue Letter on January 21, 2023. See id. , Ex. A.
Based on the above allegations, the Amended Complaint brings the following causes of action: (1) disability discrimination under the ADA and NYSHRL; (2) age discrimination under the ADEA and NYSHRL; (3) retaliation under Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and NYSHRL; as well as (4) discrimination and retaliation under New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, a permanent injunction requiring Defendants to adopt policies that ensure equal employment opportunities, back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages, as well as associated fees and costs. at 8-9.
C. The Motion
Defendants’ Motion is brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), asserting various arguments as to why the claims set forth in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed. See generally Dkt. No. 23. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims against IAC should be dismissed because IAC was never Plaintiff’s employer. Dkt. No. 23-3 at 13-15. Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant Care.com bore no connection to New York City, and therefore his claim pursuant to NYCHRL should be dismissed. See id. at 15- 17. Finally, Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint does not set forth plausible claims for discrimination, hostile work environment, or retaliation against either Care.com or IAC. See id. at 17-31.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a party’s claim for relief.
See Patane v. Clark
,
To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead “a short and plain statement of the
claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual “heft to sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to
relief,”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
,
“[I]n a
pro se
case . . . the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than
that accorded to ‘formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”
Govan v. Campbell
,
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Non-Merits Arguments
i. Claims Against IAC Defendants first argue that IAC should be dismissed as a defendant because IAC never acted as Plaintiff’s employer. See Dkt. No. 23-3 at 13-15. In response, Plaintiff argues that IAC maintained significant control and influence over Care.com, including IAC’s executives making hiring and firing decisions, and thus IAC is properly named pursuant to both the single employer and joint employer doctrines. Dkt. No. 26-1 at 11-12, 16, 21-22.
To sufficiently state any of his claims against IAC, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that IAC
was his employer.
See Juhua Han v. Kuni’s Corp.
, No. 19-CV-6265,
Here, Plaintiff first alleges that IAC and Care.com functioned as a single employer because, inter alia , IAC’s public filings report Care.com’s revenue “as part of its consolidated financial statements,” reflecting “centralized control and significant integration” of the two companies. Dkt. No. 26-1 at 21. Moreover, Plaintiff contends that Care.com’s CEO is considered part of IAC’s leadership team and that IAC issued Plaintiff’s stock, managed his retirement benefits, and provided Plaintiff’s healthcare plan. Dkt. No. 19 at ¶ 13(c). Plaintiff also alleges that IAC is “the sole shareholder of Care.com,” meaning that Care.com is a wholly owned subsidiary of IAC. Id. at ¶ 12. In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that IAC and Care.com operated as joint employers because IAC “exerted substantial influence over employment decisions at Care.com.” Dkt. No. 19 at ¶ 12. Plaintiff claims that IAC executives “were heavily involved in key employment matters, including hiring and firing decisions.” Id. Particularly, IAC’s Vice President of Talent was allegedly involved in Plaintiff’s hiring, including serving as the “final decision maker” in Plaintiff’s interview process, and was allegedly involved in other key employment decisions, as well. at ¶ 13(a)-(b).
Under either theory, accepting the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint and
Plaintiff’s opposition as true, and especially considering Plaintiff’s
pro se
status, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has made out a
prima facie
case that Defendant IAC was his employer “as he alleges
that it is the parent company of his direct employer and [that] it was involved in personnel
decisions.”
Martin v. Designatronics Inc.
, No. 2:17-cv-4907,
Accordingly, to the extent that any of Plaintiff’s claims survive on the merits against Defendant Care.com, they will be similarly allowed to proceed against Defendant IAC. [5]
ii. NYCHRL Claim Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to NYCHRL should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not sufficiently shown that his employment with Care.com bore any connection to New York City. See Dkt. No. 23-3 at 15-17. Plaintiff disagrees, contending that decisions affecting his employment, including alleged discriminatory decisions, were made in New York City and thus NYCHRL applies to his allegations. Dkt. No. 26-1 at 25.
“A non-New York City resident cannot avail him or herself of the protections of the City
Human Rights Law unless he or she can demonstrate that the alleged discriminatory act had an
impact within the City’s boundaries.”
Hardwick v. Auriemma
,
Plaintiff is a resident of Schenectady and at all relevant times was employed by Defendants on a remote basis. See Dkt. No. 19 at ¶¶ 1(a), 14(a). Because Plaintiff alleges only that the alleged discriminatory decisions were “made or implemented in New York City,” Dkt. No. 26-1 at 25, and does not allege that he felt the impact of those decisions in New York City, Plaintiff cannot assert claims under NYCHRL.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s NYCHRL claim is dismissed.
B. Merits Arguments
i. Age and Disability Discrimination Claims Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action allege that Defendants discriminated against him based on his age and disabilities when they terminated him in July 2022, in violation of the ADA, the ADEA, and NYSHRL. See Dkt. No. 19 at 7. Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s discrimination claims, contending that Plaintiff has failed to connect his age or purported disabilities to his termination. See Dkt. No. 23-3 at 17-21. [6]
Under the ADEA, it is “unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). This protection covers “individuals who are at least 40 years of age.” § 631(a). In addition, the ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
“The pleading standards to establish a
prima facie
case of discrimination under the ADEA
[and the] ADA . . . are similar.”
Brown v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.
, No. 20-CV-2424, 2022 WL
6559760, at * 6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2022). To state an ADEA discrimination claim, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) he or she was “within the protected age group,” (2) he or she was “qualified for the
position,” (3) he or she “experienced adverse employment action,” and (4) “such action occurred
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.”
Green v. Town of E. Haven
,
Claims of discrimination under the NYSHRL have traditionally been analyzed under the
same standards as its federal counterparts.
See Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co.
,
Reading the allegations in the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and affording him leniency as a pro se litigant, the Court nevertheless finds that Plaintiff has failed to adequately state a claim for age or disability discrimination, even under the more liberal NYSHRL standard.
As an initial matter, the Parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was in the ADA’s protected age group, was qualified for the position of Senior Director of Global Talent Management, that at least Defendant Care.com was Plaintiff’s employer, and that Plaintiff’s June 2022 termination constituted an adverse employment action. See generally Dkt. No. 23. The only dispute is whether Plaintiff has adequately pled that his termination was motivated by discriminatory animus. Defendants claim that “Plaintiff points to no one outside of his protected group who was allegedly treated more favorably than he was, nor does he allege that he was similarly situated in any material way to such individuals,” and that “the Amended Complaint never alleges that Care considered his purported disabilities at all when it terminated him.” Dkt. No. 23-3 at 19-20. Plaintiff counters that an inference of discrimination is sufficiently shown by Plaintiff’s allegations regarding “discriminatory remarks and actions by senior executives, the timing of his termination shortly after reporting discriminatory and unprofessional conduct, and the differential treatment to younger, non-disabled employees.” Dkt. No. 26-1 at 24.
With respect to Plaintiff’s contention that discriminatory motivation should be inferred
from certain remarks and actions by senior executives, the Amended Complaint alleges only one
such remark or action by a senior executive—a statement made by Defendant Care.com’s CEO
during a meeting that occurred nearly five months prior to Plaintiff’s termination as to whether
Plaintiff was going to “fight back” after Plaintiff was allegedly subjected to profane language and
yelling by other executives. Dkt. No. 26-1 at 15-16. Plaintiff fails to allege that the remarks
by the CEO were discriminatory in nature, as opposed to merely profane. Indeed, Plaintiff does
not set forth a single concrete comment or action by any of Defendants’ representatives, negative
or otherwise, that could plausibly be connected in any way to Plaintiff’s age or disabilities.
See
generally
Dkt. Nos. 19, 26-1. And in any event, “stray comments . . . do not create an inference
of discrimination.”
Dixon v. Int’l Fed’n of Accountants
,
With respect to Plaintiff’s allegation that the timing of his termination gives rise to an
inference of discrimination because it occurred shortly after he reported discriminatory and
unprofessional conduct, the Court notes that such an argument is more appropriately raised with
respect to a retaliation, rather than a discrimination, theory.
See
discussion,
infra
, Section
IV(B)(iii). Regardless, the reports of discriminatory and unprofessional conduct on which
Plaintiff’s temporal proximity argument relies do not appear to pertain to misconduct based on age
or disability, let alone
Plaintiff’s
age or disabilities. Dkt. No. 26-1 at 13-15 (describing
complaints concerning the termination of an African American employee, the verbal abuse of a
Hispanic female employee, certain race-related statements made during a company cultural event,
and the inappropriate workplace behavior of a female executive). Without more, it is impossible
for the Court to infer that Defendants had even minimal ageist or ableist intentions when they laid
off various individuals including Plaintiff in July 2022. And as Defendants properly point out, a
discrimination theory based on timing is undermined by the fact that Plaintiff was hired when he
was roughly the same age as when he was terminated and was experiencing the same disabilities.
See, e.g.
,
O’Connor v. Viacom Inc./Viacom Int’l Inc.
, No. 93-CIV-2399,
Finally, regarding Plaintiff’s allegation that he was treated differently than his younger,
non-disabled employees, the Amended Complaint similarly lacks detail sufficient to infer that such
differential treatment was discriminatory in nature. While Plaintiff may plead bias through
Defendants’ treatment of other employees outside of Plaintiff’s protected classes, he must set forth
at least some facts alleging that he was similarly situated to the individuals with whom he seeks to
compare himself.
See Graham v. Long Island R.R.
, 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000);
see also
McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall
, 263 F.3d 49, 53-55 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]here a plaintiff seeks to
establish the minimal
prima facie
case by making reference to the disparate treatment of other
employees, those employees must have a situation sufficiently similar to plaintiff’s to support at
least a minimal inference that the difference of treatment may be attributable to discrimination.”).
The Amended Complaint lacks any contentions regarding how younger, non-disabled employees
were treated differently from Plaintiff. For example, Plaintiff does not allege that younger or non-
disabled employees were left out of the layoffs that resulted in Plaintiff’s termination. Without
allegations regarding the employment characteristics of the individuals outside of Plaintiff’s class,
or any contentions regarding how those individuals were treated differently from Plaintiff, the
Court cannot infer a discriminatory bias based on a disparate treatment theory.
See Connaughton
v. Mt. Vernon City Sch. Dist.
, No. 21-Civ-692,
Overall, the Amended Complaint is devoid of any plausible allegations that show that
Plaintiff’s age or disability status was a factor in his termination or that Plaintiff was ever treated
“less well” because of his age or disabilities. Plaintiff relies on a single conclusory allegation that
“younger, non-disabled employees” were treated differently than Plaintiff, and the Amended
Complaint does not set forth a single instance of “comments, stereotyping, or other indications of
animus based on” Plaintiff’s age or disabilities.
Wesolowski v. Polish Comm. Ctr. of Buffalo, Inc.
,
No. 1:21-CV-751, 2022 WL 6784611, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2022);
see also Spataro v.
Glenwood Supply
, No. 10-CV-4792,
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s discrimination claims pursuant to the ADA, the ADEA, and NYSHRL are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
ii. Hostile Work Environment Claims While Plaintiff does not set forth separate causes of action for hostile work environment, the Amended Complaint states as part of Plaintiff’s discrimination claim that he was “subject[ed] . . . to a hostile work environment.” Dkt. No. 19 at 7. Bearing in mind Plaintiff’s pro se status, and given that Defendants’ Motion affirmatively seeks dismissal of a hostile work environment claim, see Dkt. No. 23-3 at 21-23, the Court chooses to read the Amended Complaint to bring separate causes of action for hostile work environment under federal and New York State law.
To establish a federal claim for hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate: “(l) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, and (2) that a specific basis
exists for imputing the objectionable conduct to the employer.”
Alfano v. Costello
,
The 2019 NYSHRL amendments eliminated the requirement recognized under federal law
that, to state a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must adequately plead that the alleged
conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.
Tortorici v. Bus-Tev, LLC
, No. 17-CV-7507,
Notably, the most liberal NYCHRL standard “does not distinguish between claims of
‘discrimination’ and ‘harassment’ or hostile work environment.”
Mitura v. Finco Servs., Inc.
, 712
F. Supp. 3d 422, 452 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (citing
Williams
,
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
iii. Retaliation Claims Finally, Plaintiff states that Defendants are liable under Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and NYSHRL for retaliation. Dkt. No. 19 at 7. Defendants argue in the Motion that a retaliation claim under any statute should be dismissed because Plaintiff does not allege that he engaged in any protected activity and since Plaintiff fails to allege that any purported retaliation was the but-for cause of his termination. See Dkt. No. 23-3 at 23-29.
It is well settled that retaliation claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA are
analyzed under the same framework.
Smith v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.
, No. 18-Civ-8545, 2019 WL
6307471, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2019) (citing
Cerni v. J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC
, 208 F. Supp.
3d 533, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2016);
Treglia v. Town of Manilus
, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002);
Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y.
,
Proof of causal connection can be established indirectly by showing that the protected activity was followed closely by discriminatory treatment ... or through other evidence such as disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct, or directly through evidence of retaliatory animus directed against a plaintiff by the defendant.
De Cintio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr.
, 821 F.2d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal citations
omitted). The Second Circuit “has not drawn a bright line to define the outer limits beyond which
a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship between the exercise of
a federal constitutional right and an allegedly retaliatory action.”
Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop.
Extension
,
As with other NYSHRL claims, the 2019 amendments modified the standard for NYSHRL
retaliation claims to make it closer to the standard under the NYCHRL.
See Meckeler v. Cornell
Univ.
, No. 23-CV-773 (FJS/ML),
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he reported several instances of workplace misconduct in the months leading up to his termination. See Dkt. No. 26-1 at 13-14. First, Plaintiff alleges that, in March 2022, he conducted “an exhaustive investigation” into Care.com’s decision to discharge a newly hired 54-year-old African American colleague, which Plaintiff claims was met with obstruction. Dkt. No. 19 at at ¶ 15(b); Dkt. No. 26-1 at 13. Second, Plaintiff claims that, on May 3, 2022, he reported a young white male colleague’s verbal abuse against a Hispanic female employee to Care.com’s Senior Director of Human Resources and Plaintiff’s manager. Dkt. No. 19 at ¶ 15(a); Dkt. No 26-1 at 12-13. Third, Plaintiff alleges that he filed a “complaint” on May 6, 2022 following a company Cinco de Mayo event wherein “racially insensitive incidents” took place. Dkt. No. 19 at ¶ 15(c); Dkt. No. 26-1 at 13. Finally, Plaintiff also asserts that, on June 15, 2022, he reported to his manager that Defendant Care.com’s CFO engaged in unprofessional conduct during a candidate interview when she appeared on a remote meeting in bathrobe and abruptly ended the interview after only asking one question. See Dkt. No. 26-1 at 14; see also Dkt. No. 19 at ¶ 15(e). Plaintiff was terminated less than a month later, on July 7, 2022. Dkt. No. 26-1 at 14.
The “protected activity” element of a federal retaliation claim is satisfied where the plaintiff
has “a good faith, reasonable belief that he was opposing an employment practice made unlawful”
by Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA.
Kessler v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
, 461 F.3d
199, 210 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting
McMenemy v. City of Rochester
, 241 F.3d 279, 285 (2d
Cir.2001)). This includes making complaints to management.
See La Grande v. DeCrescente
Distrib. Co., Inc.
,
Additionally, with respect to the causal element of a retaliation claim, it is sufficient for
Plaintiff to “plausibly plead a connection between the act and his engagement in protected
activity,”
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist.
,
Here, Plaintiff claims that he reported instances of potential discrimination within four months of his termination. Therefore, at this juncture, the Court finds that he has adequately pled that Defendants terminated him in retaliation for making those reports. And since Plaintiff has pled a prima facie case of retaliation under the more stringent federal standards, those allegations similarly plead a prima facie case under the more liberal NYSHRL retaliation standard.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims survive and will be allowed to proceed. V. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 23, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART ; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff’s first cause of action for disability discrimination under the ADA and NYSHRL is DISMISSED without prejudice ; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff’s second cause of action for age discrimination under the ADEA and NYSHRL is DISMISSED without prejudice ; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for discrimination and retaliation under NYCHRL is DISMISSED without prejudice ; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules. [9]
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 24, 2025
Albany, New York
Notes
[1] Defendants note in their motion to dismiss that “IAC Inc. is improperly named in the Amended Complaint’s caption as “IAC/Interactivecorp.” See Dkt. No. 23-3 at 8. In his opposition, Plaintiff notes that Defendant IAC/Interactivecorp’s public filings refer to the company as “IAC Inc.” Dkt. No. 26-1 at 7. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is directed to change Defendant IAC’s name to “IAC Inc.” on the case docket and the Parties are directed to refer to Defendant IAC as such in the future.
[2] On August 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority, requesting that the Court take notice of a stipulated order for permanent injunction, other injunction, and other relief filed in the matter F.T.C. v. Care.com , Inc. , No. 1:24-cv-987 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2024). Dkt. No. 30. The Court considers this supplemental authority to the extent that it is relevant.
[3] Citations to court documents utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic filing system.
[4] Also in May 2022, Plaintiff claims to have reported to his manager “irregularities in the financial and billing questions related to the MSS team,” which was seemingly relevant to an ongoing litigation involving IAC subsidiaries. at ¶ 15(d). In response, Plaintiff alleges that his manager “shrugged his shoulder and moved to the next subject without further discussions.” Id.
[5] The Court notes that “[e]ven where two companies are deemed a joint employer, it is not
necessarily the case that both are liable for discriminatory conduct.”
Goodman v. Port Auth. of
N.Y. & N.J.
,
[6] While Defendants do not concede that Plaintiff suffers from one or more recognized disability under the ADA, or that Defendant Care.com had knowledge of Plaintiff’s purported disabilities, they chose not to rely on those arguments as a basis for dismissal. Dkt. No. 23-3 at 20 (“Even if Plaintiff had one or more disabilities and Care was aware of them, Plaintiff has not even made a nominal effort to plead that his purported disabilities were tied to his termination”).
[7] With respect to allegations pertaining to remarks, the Court cannot determine whether to infer a
discriminatory bias based on remarks alone unless those allegations are specific and identify (i)
who made the remark, (ii) when the remark was made, (iii) the content of the remark, or (iv) the
context in which the remark was made.
See Fried v. LVI Servs., Inc.
,
[8] Of course, to the extent that discovery bears out that Plaintiff merely complained of general
mistreatment or activity not otherwise protected under the relevant statutes, the retaliation claim
may not survive.
See Newsome v. IDB Cap. Corp.
, No. 13-CV-6576,
[9] The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions herein.