Santo v. Laborers' International UnionSanto v. Laborers' International Union
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
On November 13, 2007, Joe Santo (“Santo”), Mark Palumbo (“Palumbo”), Joe
The plaintiffs are current and former members of two local unions, Local 1018 and Local 1010. LIUNA is an international labor organization representing workers in the United States and Canada. Its governing documents, which bind LIUNA, its affiliatеs, and its members, include the LIUNA International Union Constitution (“IUC”), the Uniform District Council Constitution (“UDCC”), and the Uniform Local Union Constitution (“Local Constitution”). The Pavers District Council is an intermediate labor organization, between LIUNA and the two local unions, which is affiliated with LIUNA. And, at all relevant times, Local 1018 and Local 1010 were affiliated with LIUNA and the Pavers District Council. The Pavers District Council, Local 1018, and Local 1010 are thus all subordinates of LIUNA. The members of the Pavers District Council are delegates who are elected by the district council’s affiliated local unions, such as Local 1018 and Local 1010. (IUC, Art. XIX, § 5, pp. 53-54, attached as Ex. E to Marinovic Decl.)
The plaintiffs’ complaint asserts six separate causеs of action. The first three challenge the continuation of the trusteeships that were imposed on Local 1018, Local 1010, and the Pavers District Council, on the ground that their continuation violates (i) Title III of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., (ii) the IUC, and (iii) Title I of the LMRDA, respectively. The fourth and fifth causes of action challenge the increase in the union members’ working dues on the ground that this increase violated (i) the UDCC, incorporated by reference into the IUC and the Local Constitution, and (ii) Title I of the LMRDA. The sixth cause of action asserts that the defendants breached the duty of fair representation.
The defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint, and the plaintiffs’ third and sixth causes of action were dismissed pursuant to Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy’s March 27, 2009 Report and Recommendation, which this Court adopted on April 16, 2009.
Thus, on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, only the plaintiffs’ fourth and fifth causes of action challenging the dues increase are before this Court. Through these causes of action, the plaintiffs seek (i) injunctive relief, enjoining the defendants from deducting the increased amount of working dues from the local members’ wages; (ii) declaratory relief, directing the defendants to comply with LIUNA’s constitutional procedures for increasing dues; (iii) compensatory damages; and (iv) punitive damages.
FACTS
A. The Trusteeships
On May 9, 2005, LIUNA placed Local 1018 under an emergency trusteeship. Three days later, on May 12, 2005, LIUNA placed Local 1010 and the Pavers District Council under an emergency trusteeship. On the same days the trusteeships were imposed, LIUNA’s General President Terence M. O’Sullivan appointed Masino as the emergency trustee of Local 1018, Local 1010, and the Pavers District Council, with the authority to designate deputy trustees.
As trustee, Masino appointed John Peters (“Peters”) as one of his deputy trustees.
B. The Working Dues Increase
The members of Local 1018 and Local 1010 are required to pay both “working dues” and “monthly dues.” Working dues and monthly dues are separate and distinct in amount. These dues are used to finance the operations of Local 1018 and Local 1010 and are also paid to LIUNA monthly.
In or about February or March 2006, Masino decided to increase the working dues for the members of Local 1018 and Local 1010.
(1) to meet costs incurred in increasing staff to represent the membership and protect the jurisdiction of Local 1010 and Local 1018; (2) to meet costs, including legal expenses, incurred defending Local 1010 and Local 1018 against raids on their memberships; (3) to finance organizing efforts; and (4) to bring dues in line with other LIUNA*104 locals operating in the New York metropolitan area.
(Defs.’ R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 43.)
The dues increase took effect without the vote of either the members of Local 1018 and Local 1010 or the elected delegates to the Pavers District Council. In Masino’s view, however, he had the authority, as trustee of the Pavers District Council, to increase the union members’ working dues without calling for such a vote. Masino believed that, as trustee, he held all of the power previously held by the delegates to the Pаvers District Council.
The plaintiffs contend that the dues increase also took effect without any notice being given to the members of Local 1018 and Local 1010. The defendants, however, assert that from about January to July 2006 — before the dues increase took effect — “informal” monthly meetings were held at which the dues increase was discussed, and no objections were raised by the members in attendance.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment must be granted “where the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
B. Analysis
1. LMRDA Claim
The plaintiffs assert that the July 1, 2006 increase in their working dues violated Title I of the LMRDA — specifically, Section 101(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3). The plaintiffs maintain that, despite the imposition of the trusteeships, Masino did not have the authority to unilaterally increase their working dues and that the procedures laid out in Section 101(a)(3) of the LMRDA should have been followed. This is so, the plaintiffs argue, because union members retain their Title I rights, even in the face of a trusteeship. The defendants respond that, as the trustee of the Pavers District Council, Masino possessed the power to unilaterally increase the union members’ working dues and that his doing so was in compliance with the LMRDA. The question is thus whether, consistent with Section 101(a)(3) of the LMRDA, the trustee of a non-local labor organization (such as a district council) can unilaterally increase the dues of the members of its affiliated local unions, also in trusteeship, without holding a vote, either
The LMRDA “was the product of congressional concern with widespread abuses of power by union leadership.” Finnegan v. Leu,
Sections 101(а)(1) and 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1), (2), guarantee union members equal voting rights and free speech and assembly rights, respectively. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1), (2). Section 101(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § -411(a)(3) — the provision at issue here— governs the procedures for increasing union members’ dues, laying out the exclusive methods by which such increases can take place. As the Second Circuit has explained, “Section 101(a)(3) is intended to insure that dues will not be imposed on union members by the mere fiat of their officers.” King v. Randazzo,
Section 101(a)(3) is further broken down into two subsections: Section 101(a)(3)(A), which applies to dues increases by a local labor organization, and Section 101(a)(3)(B), which applies to dues increases by a non-local labor organization. Because the dues for the members of Local 1018 and Local 1010 are established and regulated by the Pavers District Council, a non-local labor organization,
Seсtion 101(a)(3)(B) lays out three methods by which dues can be increased by a non-local labor organization:
(i) by majority vote of the delegates voting at a regular convention, or at a special convention of such labor organization held upon not less than thirty days’ written notice to the principal office of each local or constituent labor organization entitled to such notice, or (ii) by majority vote of the members in good standing of such labor organization voting in a membership referendum conducted by secret ballot, or (iii) by majority vote of the members of the executive board or similar governing body of such labor organization, pursuant to express authority contained in the constitution and bylaws of such labor organization: Provided, That such action on the part of the executive board or similar governing body shall be effective only until the next regular convention of such labor organization.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3)(B). The UDCC, which governs the Pavers District Council, has adopted the first of these three methods — known as the “convention” method— as the lawful method by which the dues of its affiliated locals’ members can be increased. (UDCC, Art. VIII, § 2, pp. 125-26, attached as Ex. E to Marinovic Decl.)
In American Federation of Musicians v. Wittstein,
Federal courts have, therefore, held that this right is protected when a local union’s elected delegates vote to increase the dues of that local union’s members at a duly constituted convention. See, e.g., Mori v. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers Local Lodge No. 6,
Despite the clarity with which courts have described the right guaranteed by Section 101(a)(3)(B), they have yet to directly address how the imposition of a trusteeship affects this particular right. In Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n v. Lynn,
[W]e find nothing in the language of the LMRDA or its legislative history to suggest that Congress intended Title I rights to fall by the wayside whenever a trusteeship is imposed. Had Congress contemplated such a result, we would expect to find some discussion of it in the text of the LMRDA or its legislative history. Given Congress’ silence on this point, a trustee’s authority under Title III ordinarily should be construed in a manner consistent with the protections provided in Title I.
Id. at 356-57,
The Supreme Court, however, did not stop there. It went on to discuss how a trusteeship also does not affect a local union member’s right under Section 101(a)(3)(A) to vote on a dues increase.
[a] trustee seeking to restore the financial stability of a local union through a dues increase thus is required to seek the approval of the union’s members. In order to ensure that the union members’ democratic right to decide on a dues proposal is meaningful, the right to exchange views on the advantages and disadvantages of such a measure must be protected. A trustee should not be able to control the debate over an issue which, by statute, is beyond his control.
Id. at 358,
The defendants’ position rests primarily on the notion that, with the imposition of trusteeships on Local 1018, Local 1010, and the Pavers District Council, there ceased being delegates to the Pavers District Council and that Masino, as trustee, possessed all of the authority of the Pavers District Council, including the authority to increase the dues of the members of its affiliated local unions. Therefore, the defendants argue, no vote was required before the dues could be increased. Rather, the “convention” method described in Section 101(a)(3)(B)(i) was fully satisfied “by Masino, as the trustee possessing the full authority of the Pavers District Council,
In support of their argument that Masino’s conduct was lawful, the defendants also cite to the LMRDA’s definition of “trusteeship,” which is “any receivership, trusteeship, or other method of supervision or control whereby a labor organization suspends the autonomy otherwise available to a subordinate body under its constitution and bylaws,” 29 U.S.C. § 402(h), emphasizing the words “suspends the autonomy.” (Defs.’ Mem. of Law 28.) The defendants fail to recognize, however, that this same definition of “trusteeship,” in effect at the time Sheet Metal was decided, did not affect the Supreme Court’s conclusion that Congress did not intend Title I rights to “fall by the wayside whenever a trusteeship is imposed.”
While it may be true that the imposition of trusteeships on Local 1018 and Local 1010 meant that these local unions no longer had delegates to the Pavers District Council,
The defendants seem to suggest that, if a vote had been held, Masino’s efforts to raise funds for the locals would have been thwarted because the union members would have been under the “potential continuing influence” of the allegedly corrupt former leaders of the locals. {See Defs.’ Reply 17.) Such a vote, the defendants contend, would reflect “only the appearance of a democratic vote of a membership that in fact does not represent the members’ uncoerced views.” {Id.; see also Defs.’ Letter dated Dec. 15, 2011 at 3 (“[A] vote free of the improper influence of the former officers ... could not have been held prior to the dues increase.”).) This argument would have some force if Masino had articulated the possibility of a corrupting influence as a reason for his not having held a vote on the dues increase and if a vote had been held and had failed. In sum, the working dues increase effectuated by Masino, without any kind of vote, is a violation of Section 101(a)(3)(B).
2. Union Constitution Claim
In addition to asserting a violation of Title I of the LMRDA, the plaintiffs also argue that the defendants violated the UDCC, incorporated by reference into the IUC and the Local Constitution, by failing to comply with the procedures for increasing dues laid out therein. The defendants, however, respond that this claim is barred because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust internal union remedies before bringing this claim in district court.
Article XVI, Section 2 of the IUC requires that union members exhaust intraunion remedies before bringing an action in district court.
*111 No member shall bring or cause to be brought in any court, whether in law or equity, any action against a Local Union, District Council or the International Union or their officers, representatives or employees, in any matter involving an issue arising out of or related to the member’s membership, which is remеdiable within the framework of the International Union, Local Union or District Council Constitution without having first exhausted all of the remedies available under the aforesaid Constitutions.
(IUC, Art. XVI, § 2, p. 47, attached as Ex. E to Marinovic Decl.)
With regard to LIUNA’s internal procedures, the IUC states that,
[i]n the interim periods between regular Conventions of the International Union, all judicial authority not otherwise vested in the Independent Hearing Officer, Appellate Officer, Elections Officer, or Special Election Officer shall reside in the General Executive Board of the International Union; in pursuance of such authority it may impose such judgment or take such action as it deems warranted or appropriate over any circumstance concerning which such action is taken.
(IUC, Art. VIII, § 2(a-vi), p. 28-29, attached as Ex. E to Marinovic Decl.) In other words, a union member can bring an action before the LIUNA General Executive Board, and, as a subsequent section of Article VIII of the IUC explains, the General Executive Board’s ruling can then be appealed to the LIUNA Convention. (IUC, Art. VIII, § 2(a-viii), p. 29, attached as Ex. E to Marinovic Decl.)
As the Supreme Court has explained, “courts have discretion to decide whether to require exhaustion of internal union procedures.” Clayton v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.,
There are three factors that a court should consider in conducting the exhaustion inquiry:
[Fjirst, whether union officials are so hostile to the employee that he could not hope to obtain a fair hearing on his claim; second, whether the internal union appeals procedures would be inadequate either to reactivate the employee’s*112 grievance or to award him the full relief he seeks ...; and third, whether exhaustion of internal procedures would unreasonably delay the employee’s opportunity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his claim. If any of these factors are found to exist, the court may properly excuse the employee’s failure to exhaust.
Clayton,
Application of the three Clayton factors to the present case reveals that the plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust internal union remedies should not be excused. As for the first factor, there is no evidence that LIUNA’s officials were so hostile that a fair hearing on the plaintiffs’ dues-increase claim was not possible. The plaintiffs simply state that, because Masino “knowingly” violated the UDCC when he increased the working dues and did so after speaking with LIUNA’s General Counsel, challenging the dues increase through LIUNA’s internal review process would have been futile. (Pis.’ Opp. 22-23.) But this is insufficient evidence of union hostility. Cf. Thompson,
As for the second factor, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants have failed to show that LIUNA’s intra-union procedures would have afforded the plaintiffs adequate relief, given that the plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages. While the parties seem to agree that, under Article VIII, Section 2(a-vi) of the IUC, LIUNA’s internal review process could have awarded the plaintiffs compensatory damages (see Defs.’ Mem. of Law 49-50; Pis.’ Opp. 23-24), the plaintiffs argue that the defendants have failed to demonstrate that punitive damages were available through this process.
Although “punitive damages are available to deter malicious violations of the LMRDA,” Maddalone,
The plaintiffs do, however, contend that, because the working dues were increased during the trusteeships’ existence, exhaustion of internal union remedies was not required. In support of this proposition, the plaintiffs cite to cases holding that exhaustion of intra-union remedies is not required for actions seeking the dissolution of a trusteeship. See Brush v. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union,
In short, the plaintiffs’ claim that the dues increase violated LIUNA’s constitutions is barred because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust LIUNA’s internal remedies before bringing this claim in district court. None of the Clayton factors exist here, and the defendants have thus met their burden of establishing the applicability of the exhaustion defense.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the LMRDA claim is granted, and the defendants’ cross-motion is denied. The defеndants’ motion for summary judgment on the union constitution claim is granted, and the plaintiffs’ cross-motion is denied. I do no more than rule on the motions because the issue of damages is unresolved, and it is not clear to me that the plaintiffs are entitled to obtain a refund of the entire sum of dues imposed without a vote. They continued to receive the benefits of union membership during that period, and it seems clear that some increase was necessary. Indeed, the plaintiffs never sought to enjoin the collection of the dues.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The plaintiffs purport to bring this lawsuit as a class action pursuant to Federаl Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of the 1,300 former and current members of Local 1018 and Local 1010, but they have yet to move to certify a class.
. Specifically, Article XIX, Section 5 of the IUC provides that "[t]he membership of the District Council shall consist of the delegates from affiliated Local Unions who have been properly and lawfully elected as such delegates and each affiliated Local Union shall be entitled to representation.” (IUC, Art. XIX, § 5, p. 53-54, attached as Ex. E to Marinovic Decl.)
. Masino is also a LIUNA Vice President and the New England Assistant Regional Manager.
. The plaintiffs' sixth cause of action was dismissed, except for the claim contained in paragraph 106(d) of the complaint. The plaintiffs, however, later withdrew this claim on their own.
. As a result of thе merger, Local 1018’s charter was revoked, and the good-standing members of Local 1018 were transferred to Local 1010.
. Peters was later replaced by Keith Loscalzo.
.Masino testified that he discussed this decision "extensively'' with Peters, his deputy trustee. He also discussed the dues increase with LIUNA's General Counsel, Michael Bearse. According to the defendants, Peters also discussed the dues increase with the accountants and attorneys for Local 1018, Local 1010, and the Pavers District Council.
. Peters admitted that these meetings were not run in accordance with any union constitution. (Peters Tr. at 46:9-10, attached as Ex. G to Ennis Decl.)
. Masino explained that he was not present at these meetings but that Peters was. (Masino Tr. at 72:23-73:13, attached as Ex. F to Ennis Decl.)
. Article XVIII, Section 8(c) of the IUC provides in part:
Each Local Union shall fix and regulate the dues payable by its members in such amount as is lawful and necessary to carry out its objects, purposes and obligations .... In areas where District Councils exist, said dues shall be fixed and regulated as provided for in Article II, Section 2(e) and Article VIII, Section 2 of the Uniform District Council Constitution.
The initiation fees and dues to be paid by members and apprentice members to Local Unions affiliated with a District Council, shall be established and regulated by the District Council, in accordance with the provisions of Article II, Section 2(e) and Article VIII, Section 2 of the Uniform District Council Constitution.
(Local Constitution, Art. VIII, § 1, p. 95, attached as Ex. E to Marinovic Decl.) Article II, Section 2(e) of the UDCC provides that the Pavers District Council shall hаve the authority
[t]o establish and regulate the amount of initiation fee and dues to be paid by members and apprentice members to its affiliated Local Unions within the limits provided in the International Union Constitution.
(UDCC, Art. II, § 2(e), p. 113, attached as Ex. E to Marinovic Decl.) Article VIII, Section 2 of the UDCC provides:
When an increase in initiation fees or dues payable by members and apprentice members to affiliated Local Unions is contemplated, the District Council shall convene a special convention to review the dues structure of all affiliated Local Unions and to determine whether an increase is warranted for one or more affiliated Local Unions. Written notice of such special convention shall be mailed to its affiliated Local Unions nоt less than thirty days from the date on which it proposes to take such action. The notice shall outline the date of the convention when the proposed increase is to be considered and voted upon by the delegates to the District Council, the date on which the contemplated increase is to go into effect and the grounds or reasons for such increase, in order that Local Unions may be informed and consider the matter at a meeting of their membership. The duly elected delegates to the District Council shall be the delegates to this convention. A majority vote of the delegates at such convention of the District Council shall be required, and when so tallied shall be effective for and on behalf of all affiliated Local Unions.
(UDCC, Art. VIII, § 2, pр. 125-26, attached as Ex. E to Marinovic Decl.)
. Notably, the trustee in Sheet Metal "[r]ecogniz[ed] that he lacked authority to impose a dues increase unilaterally,” and so a special meeting was convened where the dues increase proposal could be put to a membership vote.
. The Court addressed Section 101(a)(3)(A) because, unlike Local 1018 and Local 1010, dues increases for the local union in Sheet Metal were not regulated and established by a non-local labor organization, but rather by the local union itself.
. The defendants are wrong in stating that, by not allowing Masino to unilaterally increase the local union members’ dues, the Pavers District Council was deprived of its "right” or "power” to increase dues and to thus acquire funds for its affiliated local unions. (Defs.' Opp. 3, 10, 11.) Whether or not the Pavers District Council has such a right, a holding that Masino's conduct violated Section 101(a)(3)(B) does not mean that district councils and local unions in trusteeship are unable to raise funds. Rather, as the Supreme Court made clear in Sheet Metal, the trustee must simply seek the approval of the local unions' members or, in the case of a district council, of its elected delegates. See
. In describing a trustee’s authority, the IUC provides that "[t]he trustee ... shall be authorized to take full charge of the affairs of the subordinate body [i.e., the district council or local union], to appoint temporary officers or employees at any time during the trusteeship ..., and to take such other action as, in the trustee’s ... judgment, is necessary for the preservation of the subordinate body and its interests.” (IUC, Art. IX, § 7, p. 34, attached as Ex. E to Marinovic Decl.) Whatever "such other action” may mean, Sheet Metal makes clear that it cannot mean the authority to deprive union members of their right as guaranteed by Section 101(a)(3)(B). Indeed, Section 101(b) provides that "[a]ny provision of the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization which is inconsistent with the provisions of this section shall have no force and effect.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(b).
. The IUC provides that, "[d]uring the period of trusteeship, all the officers and delegates of the subordinate body are relieved of their particular trust.” (IUC, Art. IX, § 7, p. 34, attached as Ex. E to Marinovic Decl.)
. In a letter filed after the summary judgment motions were briefed, the defendants argue that both of the actions the plaintiffs suggest Masino could have taken would have violated the LIUNA constitutions. (See Defs.' Letter dated Dec. 15, 2011 at 1.) Specifically, the defendants assert that holding a direct vote of the union members would have violated the provision of the Local Constitution
. The LMRDA expressly permits unions to require such exhaustion before an action can be brought in district court. See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (“[Ajny such [union] member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures ... within such [labor] organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof.").
. Specifically, Article VIII, Section 2(a-viii) of the IUC says that
[a]ny member or subordinate body aggrieved by a decision, direction, ruling or order of the General Executive Board shall have the right to appeal therefrom to the Convention of the International Union, provided, within thirty days from the date of notice of said decision, direction, ruling or order, from the General Secretary-Trеasurer, the aggrieved member or subordinate body shall file an appeal in writing with the International Union, addressed to the General Secretary-Treasurer at Headquarters.
(IUC, Art. VIII, § 2(a-viii), p. 29, attached as Ex. E to Marinovic Decl.)
. The defendants concede that failure to exhaust is not a defense with respect to the plaintiffs’ LMRDA claim, even though they argued otherwise in their answer and motion to dismiss. (See Defs.’ Reply 26 ("Plaintiffs’ argument that they are not required to exhaust internal remedies with respect to their LMRDA claim is immaterial, as defendants do not now contend otherwise.”).)
. Two of the plaintiffs, Palumbo and Aquista, contend that, before they filed their complaint in district court, they contested the increase in working dues. They admit, however, that they do not possess any documentation regarding this alleged protest, and they fail to specify precisely how they contested the dues increase.