Santiago v. StateSantiago v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Palmer
Opinion
PALMER, J.This certified appeal requires us to decide whether an appellate tribunal has subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the denial of a petition for a new trial when the petitioner has failed to seek certification to appeal pursuant to
On May 25, 2000, the petitioner appealed from the judgment denying the petition for a new trial to the Appellate Court without first seeking certification to appeal pursuant to
The state and the petitioner assert diametrically opposed positions on the issue of whether compliance with the certification requirement of
In Seebeck, the petitioner, Erich Seebeck, had filed a petition for a new trial that was denied by the trial court. Id., 526. In accordance with
The state claimed that Seebeck’s appeal should have been dismissed on the ground that the trial court’s denial of certification deprived this court of subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. See id., 527. In claiming that this court had subject matter jurisdiction
The state seeks to distinguish Seebeck from the present case on the ground that, in the former case, Seebeck sought certification to appeal, pursuant to
Our conclusion that we have jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner’s appeal, however, does not end our inquiry. As this court previously has stated, statutorily imposed conditions to appellate review must be satisfied in the absence of good reason for excusal. Cf., e.g., Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258, 269-70, 777 A.2d 645 (2001); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hillcrest Associates, 233 Conn. 153, 173, 659 A.2d 138 (1995). Accordingly, apart from the jurisdictional issue, we must determine whether the certification requirement of
“The test to be applied in determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory is whether the prescribed mode of action is the essence of the thing to be accomplished, or in other words, whether it relates to a matter of substance or a matter of convenience. . . . If it is a matter of substance, the statutory provision is mandatory. If, however, the legislative provision is designed to secure order, system and dispatch in the proceedings, it is generally held to be directory, especially where the requirement is stated in affirmative terms unaccompanied by negative words.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Tunxis Service Center, 237 Conn. 71, 77, 676 A.2d 819 (1996); accord Katz v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 234 Conn. 614, 617, 662 A.2d 762 (1995).
We conclude that the certification requirement of
Second, as we explained in Seebeck v. State, supra, 246 Conn. 531, an important legislative policy objective of
The petitioner contends that the state has waived its right to seek dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal because the state did not file its motion to dismiss until ten months and one week after the petitioner had filed his appeal. See
As we previously have noted, however, the fundamental objective of the certification requirement of
As we previously have acknowledged, “[t]he opportunity for a new trial when new evidence comes to light provides a defendant [a] . . . critical procedural mechanism for remedying an injustice.” Seebeck v. State, supra, 246 Conn. 531. We also have observed that the opportunity to appeal from the denial of a petition for a new trial has “recognized value . . . in remedying injustice . . . .” Id., 533. On the basis of our conclusion in Seebeck; id.; and in the present case that the certification requirement of
The order of the Appellate Court dismissing the petitioner’s appeal is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
In accordance with
The state previously had sought and received two extensions of time within which to file its brief. The petitioner’s brief was filed on November 9, 2000.
The Appellate Court issued an order, without opinion, granting the state’s motion to dismiss the petitioner’s appeal.
Seebeck appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to
In Simms I, the trial court dismissed certain counts of a habeas petition and subsequently denied the remaining counts. See Simms I, supra, 229 Conn. 179-80. Pursuant to
In Simms II, supra, 230 Conn. 609, we invoked our appellate jurisdiction under
In Seebeck, we concluded, in accordance with the standards adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431-32, 111 S. Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1991), for the issuance of certificates of probable cause to appeal from a federal court’s denial of habeas relief, that a petitioner satisfies his burden of establishing a court’s abuse of discretion in denying a timely request under
We note that neither party addressed this issue but, rather, focused solely on whether, under the facts of the present case, compliance with
We observed in Seebeck that Senator John H. Filer, one of the sponsors of the legislation that added the requirement of certification to
Of course, the decision of whether to entertain an untimely request for certification to appeal under
In the event that the petitioner does seek certification to appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying his petition for a new trial, that court will be required to decide whether to excuse the petitioner’s delay in filing his petition for certification to appeal; see footnote 17 of this opinion; with due regard to the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and any other relevant factors. In considering the length of the delay, the trial court should be mindful of the fact that most of that delay is attributable to the petitioner’s efforts to seek direct appellate review from the judgment denying his petition for a new trial. Because the procedural avenue followed by the petitioner in the present case appears to have raised an issue of first impression in this state, we do not believe that the delay resulting from the appellate litigation of that issue should be weighed heavily, if at all, against the petitioner.