228 A.D.2d 895 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1996
We affirm. As we have previously stated, "where a governmental body undertakes to maintain an area for recreation, in general some degree of supervision ought to be exercised to assure that the area is reasonably fit for that purpose” (Cornell v City of Albany, 199 AD2d 756, 757). It is also clear that a municipality has a duty to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition (see, supra, at 757; see also, Solomon v City of New York, 66 NY2d 1026, 1027). While the County does not dispute these principles, it claims that the jury’s verdict should nevertheless be set aside because the proof failed to establish that the County’s actions were a proximate cause of plaintiffs accident. We disagree.
In determining if a jury verdict should be set aside, the question is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict and, if so, whether the evidence on the whole so preponderates in favor of the losing party that the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence (see, Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746; Kelley v Balasco, 226 AD2d 880, 881; Moffatt v Moffatt, 86 AD2d 864, affd 62 NY2d 875). Applying that standard, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict and, further, that the evidence did not so preponderate in the County’s favor on the question of proximate cause that the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence.
The record reveals that the County permitted pedestrians as well as bicyclists, rollerskaters and rollerbladers to use the
The County maintains that even had the bicyclist been traveling in the correct direction, the accident could still have happened. Even accepting this assertion, that is not enough to show that "no valid line of reasoning or set of permissible inferences exist that would permit the jurors to arrive at the verdict reached” (Zalinka v Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 221 AD2d 830, 831). Given the evidence and the record before us, the jury could reasonably conclude that the County was negligent in permitting the dual usage of the path, and/or that nonenforcement of its signs was negligent and that either of these were substantial factors of plaintiffs accident. Thus, Supreme Court did not err in refusing to set aside the verdict.
The County further contends that the jury’s awards for past and future pain and suffering were excessive. Under CPLR 5501 (c) a court may overturn a jury’s money verdict when it "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation” (Wendell v Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 189 AD2d 1063, 1064). This discretionary power, however, is to be exercised sparingly (see, Cochetti v Gralow, 192 AD2d 974, 975). Here, the jury awarded plaintiif $50,000 for past pain and suffering and $102,000 for future pain and suffering. Plaintiffs physician testified that her shoulder had to be surgically repaired
Plaintiff testified to the severe pain she was in immediately after the accident and her inability to do anything for the next month except sit and minimally walk around. Plaintiff indicated that even after the surgery she could not lead an active lifestyle. She could not do housework or cook to the extent she had prior to the accident or work at her previous pace in her beauty salon business. Plaintiff’s testimony was corroborated by her husband and friends. Given this evidence, as well as noting that great deference is accorded to the jury’s interpretation of the evidence (see, Abar v Freightliner Corp., 208 AD2d 999, 1002) and that questions of witness credibility are for the jury to resolve (see, Countermine v Galka, 189 AD2d 1043, 1045), we cannot say that the jury’s awards for past and future pain and suffering materially deviated from reasonable compensation (see, Wendell v Supermarkets Gen. Corp., supra; Reed v Harter Chair Corp., 185 AD2d 547; Diorio v Scala, 183 AD2d 1065).
Mikoll, Crew III, Casey and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment and order are affirmed, with costs.