19 S.D. 334 | S.D. | 1905
This is an action in equity, wherein the mayor of Chamberlain seeks to have it adjudged that the defendants Henry J. King, Eliza Reynolds, and their successors in interest hold the naked legal title to certain real property in trust for certain alleged town site occupants. The appeal is from an order sustaining the demurrer to the complaint. The pleading thus assailed is voluminous. It contains many matters of which courts take judicial notice, numerous conclusions of law, and an argument in support of the plaintiffs’ position. Without attempting to eliminate its redundant and irrelevant allegations, it will be assumed that these questions of law were involved in the ruling of the learned circuit court: (1) Whether certain patents wer'e issued to the wrong parties; (2) whether defendants are estopped from asserting title to the premises by reason of former judgments of the circuit court within and for Brule county; and (3) whether several causes of action have been improperly united.
In 1880 the lands in controversy were embraced by the G-reat Sioux reservation, ‘ ‘set apart for the absolute and undisturbedoccupation of the Indians.” In that year the Chica
What, then, was the will of Congress respecting these particular tracts of land? It possessed the power to dispose of them in any manner it deemed proper, provided the disposal did not interfere with vested rights, and none such existed when these homestead proceedings were initiated. "An act of the Legislature which includes public lands in the limits of a town does not segregate it from the public domain, and withdraw it from homestead entry by its own force. It does so, as Mr. Justice Milder has well said in the leading case of Root v. Shields, 1 Woolw. 340, 359, Fed. Cas. No. 12,038, by virtue of the congressional provision only. Remove the cause, and the effect is not produced.” King v. McAndrews, 111 Fed. 860, 50 C. C. A. 29. Therefore it does not follow, even if these lands were within the corporate limits of Chamberlain, that they could not be disposed of to homestead claimants. Section 21 of the act dividing the Great Sioux reservation, approved March 2, 1889 (25 Stat. 896, c. 405), restored to the public domain all lands therein outside of the separate reservations, except certain specified islands, which were given to certain cities, and provided that they should be disposed of to actual settlers only, under the provisions of the homestead • law, and under the law relating to town sites. Section 16 of the same act (25 Stat. 893) expressly confirmed the rights of the Chi
The validity of one of these patents was involved in an action of ejectment tried by the United States Circuit Court, where it was excluded as evidence, on the ground that it was void when considered in connection with certain matters of which the court was bound to take judicial notice. King v. McAndrews, 104 Fed. 430. This ruling was subsequently reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 111 Fed. 860, 50 C. C. A. 29. Though the only question actually decided by the latter court was whether the patent could be declared void on a collateral attack in an action at law, the reasoning of its able and exhaustive opinion leads irresistibly to the conclusion that the patents in this case are not vulnerable to even a direct attack in an equitable action, and as that learned court was considering substantially the same state of facts as is confessed by the demurrer in the case at bar, its construction of the federal statutes is entitled to the utmost respect, if it be not conclusive in the determination of this appeal.
The order appealed from is affirmed.