24 Ill. App. 504 | Ill. App. Ct. | 1887
The first question we deem material to be considered in this case, is, whether the power of sale contained in the mortgage has been properly exercised by a party authorized by law to execute it. There was at the time the mortgage was executed a note given to E. Sanford, the mortgagee, which note was by him assigned with the mortgage to Whittlesey. There is no claim made that Whittlesey assigned the note to Wilkinson, but it is claimed that he assigned the mortgage. As held in Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 163, “ Neither the debt secured, nor the mortgage itself, was assignable at common law, nor have they been made assignable by any statute of this State. Only a certain class of dioses in action, such as notes, bonds, bills, and other instruments in writing, for the payment of a specific sum of money, are assignable by the terms of the statute. “ In equity the assignment of the debt will carry with it the mortgage.” “ Mortgages to secure indebtedness have never been regarded as assignable in the sense of negotiable paper so as to vest the legal title in the assignee.” “ The rule is settled, at least in this State, that such a power of sale must be executed by the original mortgagee, or in case the debt is of such a character that it may be legally assigned, so as to vest the legal title in the assignee, then the assignee himself must 'exercise the power.” Pardee v. Lindly, 31 Ill. 174. Whittlesey, to whom the note and mortgage were assigned, conld alone execute the power. If the mortgage was not given to secure a debt that was assignable, no assignment of the mortgage could vest the power of sale in an assignee. The power of sale would remain in and could be executed by the mortgagee. Although we are satisfied from the evidence that the mortgage in this case was given to secure the note, yet that fact is not important. If it was given to secure the note, it having been assigned to Whittlesey, the power could alone have been executed by him. If it was not given to secure the note, then the power of sale could only have been executed by Sanford, the mortgagee..
In neither view had Wilkinson the right to make sale of said premises under the power of sale in said mortgage; and his deed under said sale to Sanford must be held not to have passed the title.
It is also insisted by counsel for appellants that the court erred in finding the mortgage usurious. We are satisfied from the evidence that the money was borrowed from Sanford; that he deducted from the face of the loan five per cent.—four per cent., $20, for himself, and one per cent., $5, for his agent, and gave to Kane $475 and took his note and mortgage for the sum of $500, payable three years after date, with interest at ten per cent., payable semi-annually. That such transaction was usurious, we have no doubt. It is also insisted by counsel for appellants, that appellee had no interest in said property at the time of the sale.
This is a bill filed to redeem from the mortgage and claiming that there has been no valid sale under it, and asking that ■ the conveyance made under said pretended sale be set aside and held for naught. We have held that Wilkinson had no right to sell under the power in said mortgage, and that no title passed by his conveyance to Sanford.
The appellee derives her title to this property through a conveyance made by Morris Kane, February 21, 1876, to John Kane, and a conveyance from John Kane and wife to her, executed the third day of October, 1881.
It is insisted by counsel for appellant, that as appellee joined with her husband, Morris Kane, in a warranty deed, March 27, 1879, to John C. Parr to said property, said deed being subject to said mortgage, she could not acquire any title or interest in said property hostile to Parr; that whatever title she acquires would, under the deed to Parr, inure to him. We do not assent to this claim. The only interest she had in the property at the time of the conveyance was the inchoate right of dower. She is not responsible on the covenant of warranty in said deed; neither would she be barred from purchasing in an outstanding title, and asserting it as against Parr.
It appears from the evidence of the quit claim deed of Parr to Doyle of said premises, and of Doyle and wife to the appellee, that she is invested with whatever title or interest Parr had acquired through the deed of Morris Kane and the appellee to him. We hold that the deed of Morris Kane to John Kane divested Morris Kane of all title or interest in said premises.
There was no error in the holding of the court that the appellee had such interest in the mortgaged property as gave to her the right to redeem the same. This interest she had as grantee of the property from John Kane and wife. Neither was there error in holding that there was usury in the loan, and that the appellee could avail herself of it. This right was given to her as one of the makers of the note. Being in chancery she could avail herself of all her rights, either legal or equitable. The case of Essley v. Sloan, 116 Ill. 391, has no application. We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the other errors in detail, it is sufficient for us to say that we find no merit in any of them. The equity and law of the case are with the appellee. Finding no error in the decree it is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
