18 Vt. 170 | Vt. | 1846
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The right of appeal was first given to a trustee by the statute of 1842, while the right of a party appellant to tender a confession of judgment (twelve days or more previous to the term of the county court, to which his appeal was taken) had long existed. It had been conferred by a statute relating to the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, passed in 1821, and again by the 49th section of Ch. 26 of the Revised Statutes. The question is now raised, whether a trustee has succeeded to this right of tendering a judgment by confession, as an incident to his right of appeal. And before the question can be answered affirmatively, it must appear, that the judgment, when confessed, would possess the attributes ascribed to such
Now the statutes, which had authorised the confession of judgment after an appeal taken, had made such a judgment final and conclusive to as great an extent as any other judgment, and had expressly provided, that execution might issue upon it. But a judgment charging a trustee is subject to be avoided by contingencies, and is never final and conclusive, but to certain purposes. If the principal defendant satisfies or avoids the judgment against himself, that against the trustee has thereafter no legal effect. So if no judgment is obtained against the principal defendant. Judgment against the trustee does not conclude the principal defendant in regard to the sum due, as between them, nor does it protect the trustee, except for payments made under it, or such as he continues bound to make. Neither would it seem, that execution is to issue against the trustee in a case like the one here stated. The Revised Statutes do not, in terms, authorise the issuing of execution directly against the trustee in the first instance, except when he is adjudged liable upon default of appearance ; and the statute of 1843 directs, that judgment shall be rendered against him as in case of default, if he improperly refuses to disclose. Such an execution is likewise authorised by the statute of 1842, when the trustee is adjudged liable upon a cash debt to the principal defendant, which has become payable, when judgment passes against such defendant. Perhaps it is also given by implication, when the trustee is rendered liable by reason of some fraudulent contract with the principal defendant. Rev. Stat. Ch. 29, sec. 34, and Acts of 1843, p. 9. It wouldseem to be a just conclusion from the existing statutes, that, except in the cases now stated, execution is to go against the principal defendant; and if the trustee fails to make payment upon it, as contemplated by law, or to expose such defendant’s property in his hands to be taken upon it, that the creditor’s remedy is to be sought in an action on the case.
But objections even more obvious and decisive arise from the wording of the act of 1842. It should be borne in mind, that, while the rights of the principal defendant are based upon the general law regulating suits between party and party, those of the trustee are dependent upon certain statutes relating exclusively to the trustee
The plea is defended on another ground. It is urged, that enough is alleged in the plea, and admitted by the demurrer, to disprove the plaintiff’s title to the note in suit, and at the same time to establish the title of Gibson. But no measure of interest in Gibson, whether regarded as a legal or merely equitable interest, could extend to the right of action upon the note. That must be in the plaintiff, because the note was made payable to him and was not negotiable. And since it is not pretended, that the present action is prosecuted without the privity of Gibson, or against his will, the plea can in no
Judgment of county court reversed, and judgment that the plea in bar is insufficient. Cause remanded for trial upon the plea of which no disposition has yet been made.