66 Minn. 110 | Minn. | 1896
The plaintiff recovered a judgment- against the defendant for the sum of $248.45, on certain promissory notes. Subsequently an execution was issued, and returned unsatisfied. -On February 25, 1896, an order in supplementary proceedings was issued; and it appears that Krake, the judgment debtor, was in the employ of the city of Minneapolis as a member of the fire department, and that there was due him as wages the sum of $55 from said city over and above all exemption provided by law. Thereupon the trial court ordered that said sum be applied upon the judgment, and that the city treasurer of the city of Minneapolis turn over and deliver to the plaintiff’s attorneys the said sum to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment rendered in the case. From the order so made, the defendant appeals.
As to whether the defendant, as a fireman or assistant engineer in the fire department of said city, as he appears to be, is technically an “officer,” within the strict meaning of that term, we need not con
“The reason assigned for this is, in substance, that municipal corporations are auxiliary to the state government; that their officers .are public servants, employed to perform public duties; that the public have a right to fill these offices by the selection of the most .suitable men; that these officers are usually dependent on their salaries for the support of themselves and families; that the efficiency of their services, or even their remaining in the public service, may depend upon the prompt payment of their salaries, and the ■certainty that they will receive them when due. Hence, if creditors can step in by any legal proceedings, and prevent the payment of salaries directly to the officers in person, and divert the money to the satisfaction of their claims, the public service would suffer by impairing its efficiency, and perhaps depriving the public of the service of men whom it would be desired to retain. This is not an exemption in favor of the officer, but a rule for the protection of the public. It will be observed that the doctrine rests upon an entirely different reason from that assigned for exempting municipal corporations from garnishment, and is entirely independent of the question whether the corporation or its officers are made parties to the proceedings.”
Upon principle, there is no reason why the salary or wages due from a municipal corporation to its fireman should be subject to be reached by supplementary proceedings, and the salary of an officer be exempt. Testing the right of a fireman to have his wages or •.salary exempt in such cases, we find that the duty to be performed is one in which the object sought is the protection of property and human life. It is a matter of public notoriety and common knowledge that in recent years, in our large cities, great numbers of buildings are erected, several stories in height, and the lives of their occupants greatly endangered by the difficulty in attempting to escape in cí ses of fire. The fire departments of our cities have there
Usually, the fireman and his family are dependent upon his wages for support. Promptness and certainty in the payment of these wages may therefore be an important element in securing efficient service of the fireman, and his wages should not be diverted from the payment to him personally, but should be exempt from such supplementary proceedings as were instituted in this case. Various acts of the legislature, such as the exemption from taxation of fire engines and implements used for the extinguishment of fires, and of buildings used exclusively for the safe-keeping thereof, áre in line with this policy. It is said that cities should only employ men who are honest enough to pay their debts, but misfortune may overtake the best of men, as it did the defendant in the case at bar; and while the valuable library of the lawyer, as well as a large amount of property of other various classes of people, are exempt from execution, we think it a judicious policy that the fireman, who is protecting the property of the general public as well as endangered human life,.
An expression used in the opinion in the case of Roeller v. Ames, supra, to the effect that the court was not inclined to extend the application of this doctrine beyond the salaries of public officers properly so called,
The order of the trial court is reversed.
At page 133.
At page 135.