Sandstrom v. LeaderSandstrom v. Leader
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, which initially and directly passed upon the validity of
Appellees, George N. Leader, Mary Pellatier, and Greynolds Park Manor, Inc., were charged by information with receiving a bribe in connection with furnishing services to a nursing home patient in violation of
We must first address the proper scope of our review. It was proper for appellees to contend that other subsections of the statute, when read in conjunction with the provisions under which they were charged, produced such inconsistencies as to render the charging provisions impermissibly vague. However, these litigants did not possess the requisite standing to argue that the subsections of 400.17 under which they were not charged were void for vagueness. Fundamental constitutional principles dictate that one may not challenge those portions of an enactment which do not adversely affect his personal or property rights. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); State v. Champe, No. 53,811 (Fla. Dec. 14, 1978); Land v. State, 77 Fla. 212, 81 So. 159 (1919). Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is necessary in order “to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions[.]” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). If we failed to abide by this limitation our Court would be relegated to being a “roving [commission] assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the [state‘s] laws.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 611, 93 S.Ct. at 2915; accord, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).
Consequently, the scope of the circuit court‘s review should have been limited to a determination of whether subsection (2)(a) and the corresponding definitional provision, subsection (1)(b), are unconstitutionally vague. Although the lower court ruled upon the validity of
The second procedural issue concerns whether habeas corpus proceedings are a proper vehicle for the constitutional challenge of a statute. To dispose of this question we need only cite to several of a myriad of cases which have held that a writ of habeas corpus may be utilized by an accused to challenge the constitutionality of a statutory provision under which he is charged. E.g., State ex rel. Lee v. Buchanan, 191 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1966); Roberts v. Schumacher, 127 Fla. 461, 173 So. 827 (1937); Lehman v. Sawyer, 106 Fla. 396, 143 So. 310 (1932); Buchanan v. State ex rel. Hunt, 171 So.2d 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).
We now come to the crux of the case before us — whether
Subsection (1)(b) of
[A]ny consideration corruptly given, received, promised, solicited, or offered to any individual with intent or purpose to influence the performance of any act or omission.
Subsection (2)(a), which establishes the substantive offense, proscribes the solicitation, offer, or receipt of a “bribe” in connection with the furnishing of items or services to a nursing home patient. Appellants contend that the term “bribe” is sufficiently definite to inform potential violators of the acts within its ambit because of its definitional requirement that the consideration be colored by “corrupt” motive. Appellees contend, however, that the element of corruptness does nothing to cure the purported vagueness of the term “bribe.” In support of their position, appellees rely upon our recent decision in State v. DeLeo, 356 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1978). There we held that the element of “corrupt intent” did not obviate the vagueness of
keyed into the violation of any statute, rule or regulation, pertaining to the office of the accused, whether they contain criminal penalties themselves or not, and no matter how minor or trivial.
In addressing the requirement that the violation has occurred with “corrupt intent,” this Court noted:
This element of the offense might prevent its arbitrary application, but it does not. All that . .. is necessary for intent to be corrupt is that it be “done with knowledge that the act is wrongful and with improper motive.” This standard
is too vague to give men of common intelligence sufficient warning of what is corrupt and outlawed, therefore, by the statute. The “corruption” element, as defined, does nothing to cure the statute‘s susceptibility to arbitrary application. While some discretion is inherent in prosecutorial decision-making, it cannot be without bounds. The crime defined by the statute, knowing violations of any statute, rule or regulation for an improper motive, is simply too open-ended to limit prosecutorial discretion in any reasonable way. The statute could be used, at best, to prosecute, as a crime, the most insignificant of transgressions or, at worst, to misuse the judicial process for political purposes. We find it susceptible to arbitrary application because of its “catch-all” nature.
Id. (Footnotes omitted).
The definition of “corrupt” in DeLeo, therefore, begged the question of what acts were proscribed by
In contrast, the statute before us is not “open-ended.”
Finally, appellees have presented us with an array of acts which, although arguably well intended, might be deemed punishable under
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
Notes
The relevant portions of § 400.17, Fla. Stat. (1977), read:
Bribes, kickbacks, etc., prohibited. —
(1) As used in this section:
(a) “Kickback” means that part of the payment for items or services which is returned to the payor by the provider of such items or services with the intent or purpose to induce the payor to purchase the items or services from the provider.
(b) “Bribe” means any consideration corruptly given, received, promised, solicited, or offered to any individual with intent or purpose to influence the performance of any act or omission.
(2) Whoever furnishes items or services directly or indirectly to a nursing home patient and solicits, offers, or receives any:
(a) Kickback or bribe in connection with the furnishing of such items or services or the making or receipt of such payment; or
(b) Return of part of an amount given in payment for referring any such individual to another person for the furnishing of such items or services;
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, or by fine not exceeding $5,000, or both.
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(5) The admission, maintenance, or treatment of a nursing home patient whose care is supported in whole or in part by state funds shall not be made conditional upon the receipt of any manner of contribution or donation from any person. However, this shall not be construed to prohibit the offer or receipt of contributions or donations to a nursing home which are not related to the care of a specific patient. Contributions solicited or received in violation of this subsection shall be grounds for denial, suspension, or revocation of a license for any nursing home on behalf of which such contributions were solicited.