105 Va. 444 | Va. | 1906
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a decree rendered in three chancery causes heard together, the object of all of them being to subject a lot and five houses thereon to the payment of mechanics’ and builders’ liens asserted by the complainants for materials furnished and work done in the erection of the houses.
The first error assigned is to the action of the court in overruling the demurrer to the bills filed in the several causes.
Two grounds of demurrer are relied on here. The first is that the bills fail to allege that the suits were brought within six months from the time the whole amount covered by the liens became payable. (Code of 1881, sec. 2481.)
The bills do not allege when the suits were instituted, but they do allege when the amounts asserted as liens upon the property became due and payable, and the date of the process shows that the suits were brought within the time required by the statute. Where the record shows at the time the bill is demurred to that the suit was instiuted within the period fixed
The other ground of demurrer is that the bills fail to allege that the complainants gave notice of the amount and character of their claims to Mahony, the owner of the land, as required by section 2477 of the Code.
The bills do not allege such notice; but the contention of the complainants, appellees here, is that they were not sub-contractors, and therefore no such notice was necessary. The decision of this question depends upon the construction of the contract between Mahony and Byan, under which the buildings on the.lot were erected. That contract is as follows:
“This contract, made this 23d day of August, 1894, by and between G-. G. Byan, of the city.of Bichmond, and State of Virginia, party of the first part, and Daniel H. Mahony, of the second part, and of Philadelphia, Pa.
“To-wit: That for and in consideration of the sum of $4,360.00 (four thousand three hundred and sixty dollars) each, the said party of the first part agrees to furnish all material, labor and erect and complete for the said party of the second part (2) two of the (2) two story and mansard brick tenements, according to plans and specifications made by the said party of the first part and approved and accepted by the said party of the second part. And to be built on Floyd avenue, near Morris street.
“The said party of the first part agrees to allow the said party of the second part $100.00 per front for 63 feet 0 inches adjacent to the houses already described and upon which the said party of the first part proposes to build (3) three houses— duplicating those aforesaid' described, making a row of (5) five tenements.
*448 Cost of building the above two (2) tenements...... $8,720 00
Cost of 63 feet of land at $100 per foot.......... 6,300 00
To balance in favor of the said party of the first part. $2,420 00
“First Part, G. O. Ryan. (Seal).
“Second Part, DanT, H. Mahony. (Seal).”
The agreement between the parties contemplated the erection of a row of five houses, 'duplicates of each other, on the lot of Mahony, built according to plans and specifications furnished by Ryan and approved by Mahony. Two of the houses (which two the contract does not designate) were to be built for Mahony. For furnishing the material and doing the work in erecting and completing these two houses, Mahony was to convey to Ryan the residue of the lot on which the other three houses were erected, at the price of $6,300.00, and in addition, pay him $2,420.00.
While it may be difficult to define the precise legal relation between Mahony and Ryan, it is clear, we think, that Ryan was authorized and empowered to erect the row of five houses on Mahony’s lot. Mahony having authorized that work to be done by Ryan on his lot, the men who furnished the material and did the work in carrying out the scheme agreed to and authorized by Mahony ought not to be compelled to look alone to Ryan’s interest in the property for the payment of their claims. The fact that their contracts for material and labor were made alone with Ryan ought to make no difference when he was, in fact, carrying out the scheme entered into between him and Mahony, and Mahony’s interest in the property, as well as Ryan’s, ought to be liable for their claims. See Boisot on Mechanics’ Liens, secs. 300 to 305; Phillips on Mechanics’
We are of opinion, therefore, though the question is not entirely free from difficulty, that the complainants should be held to be general contractors within the meaning of sections 2475 and 2476 of the Code, and that it was not necessary for them to give Mahony notice of their claims, as provided by sections 2477 of the Code.
The commisioner, who was directed to ascertain and report the liens on the property sought to be subjected, and their priorities, reported, among other things, that there were no liens upon the two houses which Mahony had selected and retained under his agreement with Eyan; that the first lien upon the three houses which Mahony had conveyed to Eyan by deed, delivered in escrow, was a debt due Mahony from Eyan for money which Mahony had, in effect, furnished to enable Eyan to complete the erection of the houses; that the second liens were the claims of the complainants and another mechanic’s lien claimant, who had come into the cause by petition to assert his claim; and that Anderson, one of the appellants, to whom Eyan had conveyed one of the three houses, took it subject to those liens.
The mechanic’s lien claimants did not except to the commissioner’s report. The appellants excepted to it, but their exceptions were overruled by the court.
One of their exceptions was that the commissioner erred in reporting in favor of complainant Stagg’s claim, instead of rejecting it entirely. The action of the court in overruling that exception is assigned as error.
The appellants also excepted to the report of the commissioner because he reported the' claim of Daniel H. Mahony for $3,000 as the first lien upon the three houses of Ryan. The action of the court in overruling that exception is assigned as error.
While Ryan was engaged in building the five houses it became necessary for him to borrow money to complete them. To enable him to do this, John Mahony, who lived in Richmond, at the request and as the agent of Daniel Mahony, who lived in Philadelphia, endorsed Ryan’s note for $3,000, upon which he borrowed that sum, which was- used in completing the houses, with the understanding that it was to be paid by Ryan before he would become entitled to a deed from Daniel Mahony, his vendor. Ryan having failed to pay it, and becoming-insolvent, John Mahony paid it as the agent of his brother, Daniel Mahony, and the commissioner reported it as a debt due the latter.
Under the agreement between Daniel Mahony and himself Ryan had no right to a conveyance of the legal title to that portion of the lot on which his three houses were built until he had complied with the terms of the agreement of August 23, 1894, and to secure the performance of which Mahony had retained such title. Anderson, to whom Ryan had conveyed one of his three houses, only acquired such interest in the property conveyed as Ryan had; and not having acquired by his deed the legal title, Anderson took the property, subject to all the equities between Ryan and Mahony growing out of the agree
The remaining assignment of error is to the action of the •court in overruling the exception of Sands, trustee, to the commisioner’s report, because he did not report that the deed of trust of May 9, 1895, was a prior lien on all the property embraced in that deed.
The grounds upon which it is claimed that the deed of trust ought to have been reported as the first lien upon the property embraced in it are that the bills of the complainants are demurrable; that the liens asserted by those doing work and furnishing material were invalid; and that Mahony had no lien for the $3,000 debt asserted by him.
As each of these grounds of objection to the court’s action has been considered in discussing the other assignments of error, and decided against the contention of the appellants, it follows that this assignment of error must also be overruled.
We are of opinion, therefore, that there is no error in the ■decree appealed from to the prejudice of the appellants, and that it should be affirmed.
Rehearing
Upon Petition to Reheaií, June 14, 1906.
delivered the opinion of the court.
It is true, as stated in the petition, that in deciding the case upon the original hearing no notice was taken of the fact that Anderson was not made a party to the suit of Stagg v. Sands, Trustee, &c., and the suits heard therewith, until more than six months after the amounts claimed by the complainants (mechanic’s lienors) had become due. That fact was not considered' at that time, although argued, because no assignment of error, based upon it, was made in the petition for appeal, nor was it made until the appellants’ reply brief was filed.
Where an assignment of error is made for the first time in the-reply brief of the appellant, or plaintiff in error, the court will not, as a rule, which has been announced in several cases, consider such assignment of error, because it is not a compliance-with the statute on the subject (Code 1904, sec. 3464) and is-not fair to the appellee or defendant in error. Orr v. Pennington, 93 Va. 268, 24 S. E. 928; N. & W. Ry. Co. v. Perrow, 101
Conceding for the purpose of this case, as is argued, that under the statute (Va. Code, 1904, sec. 2481) the Chancery Court had no jurisdiction to enforce the ^ mechanic’s liens of the complainants against the house and lot of Anderson unless he was made a party to their hills within the time prescribed by the statute, and that that question ought to have been considered by this court because jurisdictional, we do not think that a consideration and decision of that question could have resulted in a reversal of the decree of the chancery court appealed from, under the facts disclosed by the record.
If Ryan, the grantor of Anderson, had kept and performed the terms of his contract with Mahony, from whom he purchased the lot, and had been entitled to a conveyance of the legal title, the contention of Anderson that the house and lot conveyed to him could not be subjected in this case, and that the case as to him ought to be dismissed, might he sustained. But that is not this case, as appears from the record, and as is shown by the opinion of the court upon the original hearing. Ryan had not performed his contract with Mahony. To aid him in performing that contract, Mahony had advanced him $3,000, which was a lien upon the three houses and lots, which Ryan was to receive in part payment for erecting the two houses on the lots retained by Mahony, and in addition, Mahony’s two houses and lots were subject to the mechanic’s liens asserted in the case. Ryan was not, therefore, entitled to a •conveyance of the three houses and lots until he had paid Mahony the $3,000 advanced, as above stated, and until Mahony’s two houses and lots were freed from the mechanic’s liens, which had been perfected against them.
As was said by Judge Allen, in Yancey v. Mauck, &c., 15 Gratt. 300, 306, “A purchaser or incumbrancer of a mere-equitable title must take the place of the person from whom he purchases. The vendor may resort to the estate, whether a purchaser of the mere equitable estate from his vendee purchasd with or without notice. For want of notice or the payment of a valuable consideration cannot place him in a -more advantageous position, than his vendor.”
The house and lot purchased by Anderson is, therefore, as liable for the $3,000 due Mahony as if it were still owned by Ryan. Conceding that it is not liable for the mechanic’s lien debts, because Anderson was not sued within the time prescribed by statute, it is liable for any sum that Mahony may have to pay to release his two houses and lots from those liens, for until his two houses and lots are freed from those liens, Mahony cannot be required to convey the Anderson house and lot to Ryan or anyone else in specific execution of his contract
We are of opinion, therefore, that while the debts due the mechanics may not be liens upon the house and lot purchased by Anderson from Ryan, the house and lot are liable, under Ryan’s contract with Mahony, for any balance thereof which the proceeds of the sales of Ryan’s two houses and lots fail to pay and which is a lien upon Mahony’s two houses and lots, and that the Chancery Court • did not err in directing the Anderson house and lot to be sold for the purpose of satisfying such balance, if any, and that its decree should be affirmed.
Affirmed.
